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Abstract
In the early 2000s, millions of households suffered from starvation as waves of drought
repeatedly hit the northern states of India. Despite the famine, the Indian authorities remained 
shockingly unresponsive to the needs of starving populations. In the ensuing decade, a unique 
configuration of experts, activists, law-makers and lay-persons occupied key spaces and 
institutions to formulate a right to food law that establishes the biopolitical duties of the state—
that is, improving people’s well-being—in the domain of food security. This legislation was 
enacted in 2013: the National Food Security Act (NFSA).
Based on 17 months of fieldwork in New Delhi, this dissertation ethnographically 
explores the productive tension between the ethico-political nature of the NFSA and its rather 
technical implementation in urban centres. I ask: How do biopolitical interventions, designed to 
make the state transparent and accountable in the delivery of food entitlements, reconfigure 
bureaucratic practices and subjectivities? Articulated at the intersection of the analytics of 
governmentality and an anthropological reading of science and technology studies literature, I 
scrutinize the re-materialized ration card deployed in the aftermath of the NFSA to render 
bureaucratic practices transparent. I examine how the ration card mediates governmental attempts
of policing relations of patronage, monitoring practices of corruption, and shaping empowered 
bodies. I argue that while the NFSA was formulated to improve the lives of the Indian population,
the distribution of re-materialized ration cards contributed to make the population into a 
collection of individual bodies empowered to combat chronic hunger on their own. This 
dissertation probes the gap between what ration cards seek to accomplish, what they do, and the 
unanticipated effects of these bureaucratic instruments on people’s lives. 
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First, through a reading of India’s policy archive, I document the historic and political 
trajectory of food policies to contextualize the emergence of right to food discourses in India. 
Then, I scrutinize how and why notions of governmental accountability and transparency took a 
predominant place in the formulation of the food security legislation. Finally, I examine how key 
documents and devices used to implement the NFSA have mediated norms of accountability and 
transparency in different urban contexts.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
On a sunny day in Winter 2015, my research assistant Ritesh1 and I found ourselves 
sitting in a small one-room house painted in bright shades of yellow, located in the maze of 
households close to the Hazrat Nizamuddin railway station, in Sarai Kale Khan. We sat in a 
corner and opened our notebooks in front of us. In the opposite corner, a fridge covered with a 
multicoloured shawl sat adjacent to a single bed, on which a young man was sleeping. He had 
been working all night and did not seemed disturbed by a dozen women of all ages who had 
gathered in front of us. Our host, a young woman named Maawa, had just brought us a glass of 
water. However, while pulling my phone out of my pocket, I awkwardly spilled most of its 
contents on my notebook and the mat beneath us. I picked up the glass and set it aside as if 
nothing had happened, while Maawa raised her voice above the low chattering. 
As soon as she spoke, the room fell silent. The man, still sleeping on the bed, turned to 
face the wall. Maawa introduced us. She explained that I was a student of anthropology, from 
Canada, studying the distribution of rations in Delhi and that Ritesh was assisting me. All eyes 
turned to me. I briefly described my project, explicitly mentioning that I was not a member of the
bureaucracy or the government, and asked permission to record our conversation on my phone. I 
planned to write a book on food and ration cards in Delhi, I further explained, the focus of which 
would centre on ration card holders. As I finished my sentence, a chaotic eruption of voices filled 
the room at once: 
1 Throughout the dissertation, to preserve the anonymity of interlocutors I encountered, I use pseudonyms to refer 
to many of them, especially in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. The pseudonyms have been chosen to reflect each
interlocutor’s religious identity. However, when I refer to interlocutors who occupy a public function or engage 
publicly in political debates, I use their real names. For bureaucrats, I refer to their positions rather than their 
identity. For all of my research assistants, though I had multiple research assistants, I use a single pseudonym 
(Ritesh) to refer to all of them for the sake of simplicity and coherence throughout the dissertation.
2Woman A: Yes, I have an old ration card. I've been to the office twice [to get a new ration 
card]. But it hasn't been delivered. 
Woman B: And what about those cards which just have one or two names on them?
Woman C: My ration card is here, but my children’s names aren't on it. They asked us to 
come after elections. Look, this is my old card. And this one is new. 
Woman D: We've been told that this might take months or even a year or two before getting
new ration cards. These cards won't work after two years or so. Then our old 
ones will be used again. 
During the 17 months of fieldwork that I undertook in Delhi in 2014-2015, I learned that open-
ended interviews, or encounters with interlocutors such as this one, are rarely conducted in an 
organized manner. After a short while, Maawa summarized the situation as the rest of the women 
turned towards her: “Everyone has the same problem. Some cards don’t have names, some people
aren’t getting rations.” As a starting point for our discussion, I then proceeded to ask what 
seemed to be the most elementary of questions: “Why do you need a ration card? Why do you 
want a ration card?” A short moment of awkward silence ensued. The response appeared to be so 
self-evident to everyone, including Ritesh, that the question threw off most of interlocutors. 
Ritesh would later ask me how I could ask such a trivial question. After what seemed to be a too 
long pause, Maawa broke the silence: “For rations,” she said.
Maawa’s reply was not the answer I was necessarily fishing for. In the past, I had 
visited other basti (informal settlements),2 where I had asked a similar question that led to 
radically different answers. Uma, for instance, a grandmother working seven days a week as a 
maid for a middle-class neighbour, used to bring her ration card to the rashan ki dukan, 
commonly called a Fair Price Shop in English (hereafter, referred to as FPS or ration shop), to 
2 Following Kalyani Menon-Sen and Gautam Bhan (2008, 3–4), I avoid using the terms slum or Jhuggi Jhopdi (JJ)
colony to designate high-density settlements that lack minimum standard services typically located on occupied 
land. The former has a pejorative connotation, and the latter falls under the category of bureaucratic terminology.
Instead, I use basti, to mean “urban settlement,” as most interlocutors colloquially used it.
3collect her monthly allotment of subsidized rations (hereafter, referred to as rations or 
entitlements). But she also recalled times when her ration card had functioned as collateral for 
default of payment in various transactions, including when her husband had been unable to pay 
his tab at a bar he regularly visited or when a relative had contracted a debt to a local 
moneylender. In another basti, Ritesh and I had met a young man from the state of Bihar, 
Rehaane, in a labyrinth of hundreds of rickshaws behind a newly erected metro station in the 
heart of Old Delhi. Rehaane had migrated to Delhi at the age of 14 years and had since then 
occupied a myriad of daily-wage jobs. He was in his late teen years, and he lived, slept, and ate in
the basti of rickshaw pullers that was surrounded by small eateries and other little shops. At 
night, he told us, it was not uncommon for him to hang out in the streets adjacent to the rickshaw 
park with other pullers. On occasion, especially when some of them were drinking, police 
officers would raid them. Typically, he explained, police officers put drunk pullers who lacked 
identification documents (IDs) in jail. However, when one holds an ID, he explained, that is 
sometimes enough of a deterrent for police officers who would rather let the offender go (after 
doling out some of their infamous bamboo stick blows), rather than fill out the necessary 
paperwork to put someone with an ID in jail for a minor infraction.3
To Uma and Rehaane, ration cards embodied what Veena Das has called “the right to 
urban dwelling” (2011, 327; see also Harms 2016), whereby the rationing document grants legal 
recognition of urban residence to holders that live in basti. The notion of “urban dwelling,” Das 
notes, refers to the incremental practices through which basti-dwellers gradually find their 
3 Most pullers listening to our discussions agreed, with the exception of an older migrant worker. Playing devil’s 
advocate, he made the point that for a migrant worker, holding a ration card in Delhi was counterproductive. He 
had come to Delhi to provide for his family, to send remittances to his home village, and holding a ration card in 
Delhi would strip an additional set of rations away from his family that had stayed behind.
4legitimate footing in the city. An ID that locates its holder in a basti certainly contributes to that 
effect, as the rich literature on urban citizenship or belonging in Delhi illustrates (Baviskar 2010; 
Ghertner 2010, 2015; Routray 2014; Rao 2010a; Rao 2013). But it also gives its holder, 
especially if they are a member of the poorest populations of the city, access to a range of 
informal practices through which one can better navigate the impetus of urban life. Accessing 
small loans or dealing with police forces are just two instances among many in which holding an 
ID, such as the ration card, makes urban dwelling easier. 
With that said, as Maawa and other women were quick to remind me, access to 
subsidized rations from FPSs remains perhaps the most significant right embodied by the ration 
card. While anthropology entails detailed examinations of the mundane aspects and elements of 
everyday life, anthropologists tend to emphasize or fetishize the informal, illegal, or unfamiliar. 
However, in this process, material objects under study tend to take what Matthew S. Hull calls 
“something different from or more than” (2012a, 254) the meanings they are typically associated 
with. It is important to document, as I explore in Chapter Four, how objects such as the card are 
imbued with multiple and conflicting meanings and how they act on variegated practices; 
however, I argue it is equally important to carefully attend to the very materiality of these objects
—their visual aspects, particularities, and qualities—and what they do. Thus, while the ration 
card helps to establish identity and belonging in the city, or the right to dwelling, it is also 
essential for most interlocutors for securing access to staple foods at a cheap rate. 
In Maawa’s home, Alka, a grandmother, explained how a functioning ration card makes
living in the city easier:
See, now, I’m not getting any ration at all. I used to get 25 kg of wheat and 10 kg of
5rice every month. That's all I want, just like before they [the Indian state] change
everything.  They've just  cancelled that system, and now, my ration card does not
work. I am a widow. I just have children. I can't just expect people to give me things
[or food, in this context]. I have four daughters and granddaughters. So getting rations
makes a difference. I had a card, but it was cancelled. I used to get ration. Then I went
to the village. There was some work happening related to ration cards renewal then
[in Delhi]. [When I came back,] I went to the governmental office, but they didn't
listen, and so my card is now cancelled. This was three years ago. I haven't got ration
for  four  to  five  years.  I  eat  grain  worth  ₹ 20/kg.  It's  really  expensive.  (Personal
Communication, 4 February 2015)
It was rather expensive, considering that subsidized wheat and rice were sold in FPSs at a 
respective rate of ₹ 2 and ₹ 3/kg. According to Alka, she had on a few occasions visited a 
governmental office to pry information from bureaucrats, all in vain. “They ask for proof every 
time,” Alka said. “Different forms have to be filled. We're illiterate. So I don't get the things, the 
paperwork, and it becomes difficult.” Alka had submitted a form to obtain a ration card, but had 
no idea if her application had been accepted or processed. As a result, Alka was left waiting, 
hoping she would eventually receive her ration card by mail.
Alka had been living in the settlement since “Nehru’s time,” a few doors down the alley
from where we were all sitting in Maawa’s home. When she first settled in Sarai Kale Khan, the 
basti was surrounded by farm fields, where she used to work and pick her own vegetables. By the
time of my fieldwork, the fields had been replaced by informal housing, which had developed 
into multi-story buildings. When we met, Alka was a matriarch and a widow. Her husband had 
passed away a decade ago. Since then, she had had to find suitable husbands for her older 
daughters and ensure that her family could eat at least once a day. 
Although she was still in charge of buying vegetables, pulses, and oil for her family, 
Alka did not cook anymore, nor did she work. Her younger daughters prepared meals for the 
6family. Her oldest son was the main breadwinner. However, a couple of months before we met, 
her oldest son had broken his arm and lost his ability to work. Alka had borrowed money at a 
usury rate from a neighbour to pay the medical bills. Her younger son, in his late teen years, was 
trying his luck in the daily-wage market to help support his family while his brother recuperated. 
In the meantime, bills were stacking up. Alka had not paid a single electricity bill while
reimbursing her interest to the moneylender every month. This was a source of concern, 
especially for the three grandchildren she had to feed every month. Alka was also losing sleep 
over her two younger daughters. Soon enough, she would have to find them husbands, but 
without an enviable dowry and with skyrocketing debts, their prospects seemed uncertain. 
Understandably, access to monthly entitlements would help to reduce their financial burden—or 
at least help to feed the household. 
As she shared her woes with us in Maawa’s home, Alka burst into tears. Stories like 
hers were not uncommon, but they were always hard to listen to. She finally said: “I wanted to 
ask you... are you just going to ask questions about our situation or will there be benefits at all?” 
The question blindsided me. I muttered something, but another woman began to share her own 
misfortunes, cutting me off. Minutes later, Alka left the meeting. On her way out, she grabbed 
Ritesh by the arm and politely but firmly asked him if we would do anything about her problems. 
If not, she would have to leave; she had chores around her house that needed her attention.
About 15 months before Ritesh and I had met Alka, in September 2013, the Indian state
ratified the National Food Security Act (NFSA), a law set to legally protect four distinct 
entitlements: lunch for children of six years old or less and for pregnant or new mothers; midday 
meals for school-goers; maternity cash entitlements; and monthly rations to the poorest two-
7thirds of the Indian population—about 740 million people (GoI 2013). Access to monthly rations 
has been provided since India’s independence through the Targeted Public Distribution System 
(TPDS), a national ration distribution scheme that channels food grains from Indian farmers to 
points of distribution in the FPSs. Since the Second World War, the TPDS has become the 
cornerstone of the country’s postcolonial strategy to alleviate hunger and poverty (Mooij 1998). 
As I explore further in Chapter Two, the TPDS has maintained the same welfare function—
distributing commodities subsidized by the central state—but has evolved over the years, 
reflecting the ideological inclinations of consecutive regimes. In the wake of the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s, a decade that profoundly changed the Indian welfare landscape as 
much as Indian politics and policy more generally (see Kohli 2006a, 2006b), the TPDS has 
remained a moving target for defenders of fiscal responsibility and budgetary restraint. Advocates
for modulating welfare have framed corruption practices as a hindrance to the system’s efficiency
and effectiveness in reaching its targeted beneficiaries and, more generally, as significant failures 
of governance (Basu 2011). In 2005, the Indian state published a study on the performance of the 
TPDS that revealed alarmingly high levels of corruption and diversion of food to the black 
market—euphemistically referred to as “leakages” (Planning Commission 2005, xiv). Even 
though the study’s data was out-dated by the time the NFSA was drafted, it remained a widely 
cited source among neoliberal supporters who argued for the replacement or the scaling down of 
the TPDS (Khera, personal interview, New Delhi, August 2015). In response, activists and 
scholars fighting for the revitalization of the TPDS in the NFSA engaged in an important 
production of knowledge on the critical role of the TPDS in the Indian welfare landscape (Drèze 
and Khera 2013; Khera 2011; Himanshu and Sen 2011; Mander 2012b, 2012a; RTFC 2011b; 
Svedberg 2012). However, even these activists and scholars have identified high levels of 
8leakages as a predicament of transparency for a government seeking to secure the well-being of 
hungry populations. In other words, as welfare programs have been increasingly reformed to be 
more efficient and effective, leakages have continued to pose a significant hindrance to the 
government’s efforts to optimize available resources and provide food to members of the poorest 
population. The enactment of food security legislation presented an opportunity to overhaul the 
food welfare landscape and to solve the leakage problem in the TPDS infrastructure.
The NFSA includes a clause that mandates the modernization of the entire TPDS 
infrastructure to render transactions at FPSs more transparent. Under chapter five of the 
legislation, entitled “Reforms in Targeted Public Distribution System,” the NFSA calls for the use
of “information and communication technology tools,” including the “end-to-end 
computerization” of the TPDS, to establish “full transparency of records” (GoI 2013, 5–6).4 
Materially, according to the NFSA, government transparency is to be realized through an 
economy of new tools that will help to lift the veil on how exchanges at FPSs are conducted, 
recorded, and monitored. In the aftermath of the NFSA, these tools have carried a particular kind 
of bureaucratic power—one that can, in due course, reform the TPDS infrastructure. Since the 
TPDS network has been, at least in part, discursively constructed as a site of leakages rather than 
a critically important welfare program that has helped to sustain food consumption for millions of
households across India (as the discussion mentioned above illustrates), the formulation of the 
NFSA has presented an opportunity to simultaneously modernize the TPDS infrastructure and as 
4 Interestingly, chapter five of the NFSA includes eight clauses: (a) doorstep delivery of food grains; (b) end-to-
end computerization of the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS); (c) the use of biometric information to 
authenticate targeted beneficiaries; (d) full transparency of records; (e) preference for public entities rather than 
private entrepreneurs to operate FPSs; (f) diversification of commodities offered in FPSs; (g) support of other 
models for the TPDS; and (h) the introduction of other measures, such as cash transfers or food coupons, to 
support the TPDS. During my fieldwork in Delhi, when the NFSA was gradually being implemented, clauses 
that emphasized greater exertion of bureaucratic power on rationing practices (i.e., clauses [b], [c], and [d]) were 
prioritized over other clauses, which were more generally abandoned or ignored.
9I argue the re-materialization of the ration card constitutes a governmental strategy to eliminate 
corruption from the TPDS. In the implementation of the NFSA, old ration cards were re-
materialized into new ones that are better equipped to monitor the exchange of rations in FPSs. 
Before their re-materialization, ration cards had been bureaucratic documents made out of paper
—booklets—in which written inscriptions were made to chronicle the monthly distribution of 
rations. In the aftermath of the NFSA, ration cards were re-materialized into digital documents 
made of plastic that enable the state to closely track and record the allotment of entitlements.  
What is more, the Department of Food, Supplies, and Consumer Affairs (DFSCA) has also set up 
a web portal, called the Food Security Portal, which publicly documents the movement of grains, 
the identification of beneficiaries, and the production of ration cards. As a result of these changes,
old ration cards have lost their most basic functionality. For Alka and other interlocutors, getting 
a new ration card has become a priority—a necessary task for them to undertake in order to 
access their rightful entitlements. In Chapter Four, I analyze the transition from the old ration 
card to the new one. But suffice it to mention here, the transition to a more transparent TPDS has 
not been a smooth one for Alka and many other ration card holders.
Between the time she had submitted her application for a new ration card and the day 
we met with her, Alka had been waiting for close to nine months. In that time, she had exhausted 
every avenue she could think of to put her hands on one of the new re-materialized ration cards. 
On our way out of the basti, after our meeting in Maawa’s home, we found Alka cleaning the 
front steps of her bright blue-bricked house. After exchanging a few words, she welcomed us 
inside. She sat down on a charpai (a traditional woven bed), pulled a silver box from a shelf 
within reach, and opened it up. She proceeded to fold for each of us a paan (a betel leaf 
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containing areca nuts, spices, and tobacco), before chomping on one herself. We began to talk 
about Alka’s recent trip to the DFSCA field office. However, not used to paan’s effects, my head 
began to turn. I had not expected it to be so potent and had to quickly take my leave. 
Before we left, however, Ritesh and I asked for Alka’s personal information. Since the 
Food Security Portal enables members of the TPDS’s targeted population to track their ration 
card applications, we explained that we might be able to log in to the portal and learn whether her
ration card had been approved or not. She happily agreed. She sprung off the charpai and 
grabbed a plastic bag, hanging from a hook on the wall. The bag contained various IDs, 
electricity bills, passport pictures, and a photocopy of her ration card application. The three of us 
stood in the middle of the room, around the open bag. Using my smartphone, I inputted Alka’s 
information and logged in to the Food Security Portal. It took a few seconds for the webpage to 
load and for us to discover that Alka’s application had been approved six months previously—six 
months during which she had been unable to draw her rightful entitlements as legally secured by 
the NFSA. On the screen, Alka’s ration card number appeared, along with other information, such
as her occupation, her household’s annual income, a list of registered family members—which 
included only herself—and her assigned FPS. With my lips turning red from half-chewed paan, I 
promised Alka that we would come back later in the day with a printed copy of the information 
we had just retrieved. 
On our way out of the basti, we paused at the local post office. In the morning, a few 
women had accused mail carriers of failing to distribute ration cards sent by the DFSCA. The 
person in charge at the post office assured us, however, that almost all ration cards had already 
been distributed. When they were first issued, he explained, political pressure had been put on in 
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the post office staff to distribute the cards as soon as possible. As a result, the clerks had 
confirmed to governmental authorities that all of the cards had been distributed immediately 
following their arrival at the post office. In reality, however, it had taken a few weeks to distribute
them all. In urban spaces such as Alka’s basti, addresses are irregular, sometimes incomplete, and
ever changing. “See, the locality is very crowded and complicated,” the clerk told us. “People 
don't know each other, so it’s difficult to deliver. All live on rented houses [and may have moved. 
Sometimes,] there is no name of the house owner.” After a pause, as if he was unsure as to 
whether he should continue or not, he added: “We want our delivery percentage to be high . . . 98 
to 99%. If the mail carrier knows you, then he keeps the envelope with himself unofficially, and 
then when he sees you, he’ll give it to you. But only in case if he knows you.” Clerks also tried to
call applicants at the phone numbers listed on envelopes, but sometimes, they found the listed 
number was not in service anymore. “Calls also we have made from our personal mobile, not 
official mobile,” the clerk explained. “Otherwise, we would be questioned as to why the bills 
were so high by our superiors. So, we did from our own mobile just so that the people get their 
ration cards.” 
After having received 2,000 new ration cards from the DFSCA, this particular post 
office had delivered almost all of them over the ensuing four months, with the exception of about 
60 envelopes. Since the post office staff had already registered all of the ration cards as delivered,
they did not want to be caught red-handed with undelivered cards. Affably, the clerk allowed us 
to have a peek at the 60 envelopes that remained, but Alka’s ration card was not among them. 
Months later, in May 2015, I accompanied seven right-to-food activists from the Delhi 
Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan (DRRAA) in a locality of North Delhi to a local office of the DFSCA.
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Like Alka and Maawa, residents of this neighbourhood had also struggled to get new ration cards.
After spending a few hours on the Food Security Portal to verify that residents’ applications had 
been approved, we arrived unannounced at the DFSCA office to share residents’ concerns. It was 
closed, but a clerk unlocked the door to let us in so we could find some relief from the scorching 
heat while he fetched his superiors. In a corner of the office, one of the activists discovered 
transparent garbage bags replete with unsent envelopes containing new ration cards. Once the 
Director of the field office returned, the activists questioned him on the matter. It became clear 
that the Delhi state had stopped the distribution of new ration cards as a way to entice cardholders
to download a softcopy of their cards—the e-ration card—directly from the Food Security Portal. 
When we had met Alka months earlier, this e-ration card system was not yet operational. It was 
implemented shortly afterwards. In retrospect, however, it was not clear to me when and how 
exactly the Delhi state decided to inform applicants that they had to download the e-ration card.
After leaving the post office, we found an Internet cafe where we printed the screen 
capture of Alka’s ration card information on an A4 white sheet of paper. We headed back to her 
home, found her on her charpai and gave her the A4 white piece of paper. We proposed to 
accompany her to her assigned FPS so she could tentatively collect her first entitlements with her 
fabricated rationing document. The FPS was located down the street from her blue house—a ten-
minute walk away. She accepted and led the way in the streets of Sarai Kale Khan.
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The FPS was closed when we arrived. On the street, members of the Indian National 
Congress (hereafter, the Congress), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Aam Aadmi Party 
(AAP)—three political parties that competed for 70 seats in the Delhi Legislative Assembly—
followed one another to reach out to voters, just a few days prior to the Delhi Legislative 
Assembly elections on February 7, 2015. Amid a cacophony of music, chants, klaxon, and 
speeches projected over speakers, we phoned the FPS owner. According to DFSCA regulations, 
the FPS was supposed to be open. We threatened to denounce the owner to the DFSCA if she did 
not come to unlock the door and hand over Alka’s rations. I had witnessed other activists using 
similar tactics with some degree of success. It worked: she promised to be on site within 30 
minutes and politely asked us not to report her to the authorities. While we waited for the FPS 
owner to arrive, delegates from the AAP and the Congress promised Alka that once in power, 
they would do everything they could to eliminate corruption from the TPDS and to expedite the 
Illustration 1: These were the bags replete with envelopes containing the new ration cards.
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distribution of ration cards. Given Alka’s experience with navigating bureaucratic worlds, I doubt
that she believed them. Long after the political parties’ parade had ended, the owner finally 
reached her shop, and unlocked the door.
As soon as the owner arrived, she glanced at Alka’s A4 sheet of paper and immediately 
refused to sell her rations. To her defence, the rationing document did not seem very legit. Alka 
pleaded that for months, her rations had been dispatched to the FPS, but she had been unable to 
collect any, since her ration card had not been mailed to her. Getting angrier, Ritesh tried to 
convince the FPS owner that the information on the sheet of paper was genuine. However, the 
owner argued that without a genuine ration card, she could not sell entitlements to Alka, even 
though her application appeared to have been approved by the DFSCA. She would not budge but 
she did express some empathy in response to Alka’s pleas. On the sheet of paper printed from the 
Food Security Portal, it was clearly stated that Alka’s entitlements had been delivered to the FPS 
for (at least) the past two months. Behind Alka, people began to line up. As the queue lengthened,
the FPS owner agreed to distribute entitlements to Alka if her sheet of paper was authenticated by
a bureaucrat from the DFSCA. She told Alka to come back a few days later with her 
authenticated, yet quite unique, rationing document and promised to sell Alka her rightful 
entitlements. 
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When we met with Alka a few weeks later, she had finally collected her rations from 
the FPS: 4 kg of wheat and 1 kg of rice. An inspector from the local DFSCA office had stamped 
and signed her otherwise useless sheet of paper, giving it enough clout to compel the FPS owner 
to deliver to Alka her food grains. In the celebrated piece “The Signature of the State,” Das 
(2004) explores how bureaucratic inscriptions on paper engender a circulation of state power that 
finds its way into the lives of the governed. She writes: 
The examples of . . . ration cards, and other hundreds of other such documents show
how the state comes to be present in the everyday life of its subjects. Because it can
be multiplied, literalized through court papers, certificates, and forged documents, it
can enter the life of the community. . . . It is precisely because the documents can be
forged and used out of context, and because the bureaucratic-legal processes are not
legible even to those responsible for implementing them, that the state can penetrate
the life of the community and yet remain elusive. (Das 2004, 245)
For Das, it is within the productive tension between the comprehensible and elusiveness, the 
Illustration 2: This is the ration card/A4 piece of paper that was later signed by a DFSCA bureaucrat.
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legible and illegible, the legitimate and illegitimate, that the state not only manifests itself but 
also produces the modalities through which bureaucratic practices can exert its presence. For 
Alka, the signature of the DFSCA bureaucrat materialized the state’s presence onto an otherwise 
impotent piece of paper. It gave her access to her rightful entitlements, from which she had been 
otherwise excluded, despite her repeated attempts to get them. In postcolonial India, Das notes, 
documents are “bearer of rules and regulations,” as much as they materialize the “spectral 
presence” of the state (2004, 251). Through the navigation of documents’ (il)legibility and 
(il)legitimacy, the signature of the state shapes the agency of objects and how they act on a range 
of practices (see Das 2011). In Alka’s case, the bureaucrat’s signature brought the state into her 
everyday life: it determined whether or not her sheet of paper would allow her to enjoy her 
rightful entitlements.
Along with the experience of Alka with her ration card, this framing of documents and 
the power they bear offers a stark contrast to the ideas and assumptions of the state found in the 
very constitution of the right to food entitlement as formulated in the NFSA. Take this statement 
of a former civil servant, human rights activist, author, and prominent architect of the NFSA, 
Harsh Mander: 
The idea of the right to food . . . is that it places at the centre the role of the State to
ensure food security for  all  residents, at all times. . . . The advantage of the rights-
based  approach  to  food-security  issues  is  that  it  transforms  people  from passive
recipients of State benevolence to active agents who claim and enjoy their legal and
equal human rights as citizens. (2012a, 232; italics in original)
Here, Mander asserts that a human rights approach to food security signals “that the state is the 
primary institution to which claims must be directed” (Edelman et al. 2014, 925; Holt Giménez 
and Shattuck 2011), inasmuch as people voice their claims to keep state interventions in check. 
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This position foregrounds a set of assumptions about the state, its roles and functions, the society 
it governs, and the transformative potential found in the production of specific types of subjects 
that do not necessarily reflect the experiences of targeted populations. In the implementation of 
the NFSA, Mander’s assertion will certainly be put to test. As Alka’s story illustrates, a right to 
food entitlement does not mean much until that right is materialized into documentation 
embodying the power of the state. It also shows that the power of the state is distributed along a 
large association of humans and things, all acting on one another: a foreign researcher, a FPS 
owner, a bureaucrat, a piece of paper, a digital infrastructure, a smartphone, and so on, and so 
forth.
In this dissertation, I recognize that the NFSA was not formulated and implemented to 
mechanically “end hunger” (Mander 2012a, 235). Instead, building on Mander (2012a, 2015) and
others (Drèze and Sen 2013; RTFC 2011b), I situate the NFSA as a normative and political 
project enacted to compel the state to act on the issue of chronic hunger, but also as a public call 
against the indifference of the wealthy to the situation of the poor and hungry. In such a project, 
the construction of “active agents” is key: governmental interventions are established to provide 
the necessary, or adequate, resources so that poor citizens can empower themselves to overcome 
the (economic) barriers that have systematically hindered their access to a dignified life without 
hunger (Drèze and Sen 2013; Mander 2012a). I contend that the implementation of the NFSA has
resulted in a series of government mechanisms deployed in such a way as to make the state into a 
seemingly caring entity set out to arrange the population as a collection of empowered individual 
bodies left out by themselves to navigate bureaucratic sites to find their way out of chronic 
hunger. In light of this, I argue that the development discourse of “empowerment” that echoes 
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with the production of “active agents” does not fit well with the experience of the interlocutors I 
encountered. In the anthropological tradition, my argument relies on ethnographic description to 
translate these complex experiences and enrich overly simplistic understandings of the right to 
food entitlement that frame it as an authoritative solution to the perennial issue of chronic hunger 
that has accompanied India’s history (Davis 2001; Sen 2013). 
Ethnographic representations are always partial, selective, and incomplete, yet they 
typically open a window on unfamiliar experiences and practices that are imbued with meanings. 
In the following sections, to properly shed light on and expand these situations, practices, and 
meanings, I situate my argument at the intersection of an anthropological literature on 
governmentality and science and technology studies (STS), allowing the literature to frame my 
discussion and substantiate my claims, as I conceptualize the range of analytical tools used 
throughout this dissertation. More precisely, I engage with the concepts of governmentality and 
techno-politics not necessarily to argue against the ways in which the right to food entitlement 
was formulated, but rather to elucidate the relation between the discursive formation of the right 
to food entitlement, the mechanisms of government it has generated, and the effects they have 
had on the population.
1.1 “The Will to Improve”5
The NFSA commitments on food security followed events in 1966, when the right to 
food became a legally binding principle for the 162 states that ratified the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). India was one of those states. The ICESCR 
stresses state obligations to recognize “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”
5 The title and content of this section are respectively inspired and informed by the lucid and ground-breaking 
work of Tania Murray Li (2007b) in her book The Will to Improve.
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(UN General Assembly 1966, sec. 11.2). Contrary to the ICESCR, though, the NFSA does not 
grant a fundamental right to be free from hunger. What it does is secure a right to four legal 
entitlements: food grains entitlements through the TPDS; free lunch programs for school-going 
children; one meal a day for children aged six or less and their mothers; and maternity cash 
entitlements. As such, the right to food entitlement guaranteed by the NFSA should be understood
as the right to access entitlements through welfare. The right to food entitlement emphasizes the 
delivery mechanisms of these entitlements. One could reasonably argue that this set of 
entitlements may well protect a large section of the population from chronic hunger (see Mander 
2012a). However, in this dissertation, I do not engage with such claims. Instead, I am interested 
in the relation between the discursive formation of the right to food entitlement and its 
implementation. As Alka’s experience illustrates, the deployment of the right to food entitlement 
is contingent on a myriad of mundane situations and circumstances, most of which are shaped, in 
the context of the NFSA, by a governmental obsession with rendering rationing practices 
transparent and accountable—or devoid of corruption.
For the right to food entitlement to be taken seriously, or to be “consequential,” as 
Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat put it, “the practices of solemnly encoding certain 
rights in constitutions, of entrenching and interpreting these rights in judicial practices and 
invoking them in political rhetoric also hinges on the efficiency of the imagination of the state as 
a guarantor of these rights” (2001, 18). The appeal of a human rights-based approach to solving 
social issues makes sense only if the state is imagined to be able to deliver on its obligation to 
implement these human rights. The ability to secure the right to food entitlement, for instance, 
depends on the state’s capacity to impose a legal system on its population and to abide by an 
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ensemble of obligations. A rights-based approach, which includes the provision of transparent 
and accountable mechanisms of entitlement delivery, emerges as a change of culture in 
governance (Sharma 2013). If a state is imagined to be unable of undertaking this change, then it 
makes little sense to resort to a rights-based approach as a solution to chronic hunger in the first 
place. As such, the need to eradicate corruption from bureaucratic practices has been granted a 
prominent position in the formulation of the NFSA. Anthropology and ethnographic research, 
Mark Goodale notes, are “uniquely positioned” (2006b, 26) to study how ideals of human rights 
are made intelligible (and implementable) in local contexts, and how these ideals are enacted in 
practice. It is thus important, I believe, to turn our attention to how the Indian government 
appears as the caretaker of the population as a whole (Gupta 2012). In this section, therefore, I 
examine how normative ideals of government, informed by a rights-based approach, are carried 
over in bureaucratic interventions to empower the governed. For this reason, I explore a grid that 
encourages us to think of interventions in the lives of the population as attempts to “make live” 
rather than to “let die” (Li 2010)6 through Michel Foucault’s “analytics of governmentality” (Li 
2007b, 12).7
The definition that Foucault ascribes to “government” is the “conduct of conduct,” 
described by Colin Gordon as “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide, affect the conduct of 
6 In an article entitled “To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations,”
Tania Li (2010) explores how governmental interventions can literally make live or let die of surplus populations
—those who struggle to make a living wage. Li shows that the biopolitical responsibility to “make live” 
interventions for the surplus population is a situated object of contentious politics. Li contends that “social 
forces” (2010, 67), which includes among others labour movements, communist parties, and activists, play a key
role for “the activation of a biopolitics” (2010, 67) leading to a meaningful implementation of make live 
interventions. Pitted against observations drawn from her field site in Central Sulawesi in which the surplus 
population do not enjoy the make live interventions of the government, Li examines how right-to-food activists 
in India have struggled for the implementation of right to work and right to food policies.
7 On “the analytics of governmentality,” Tania Li writes that it can be “used to examine the practices of rule [that] 
articulate elements of government, discipline, and sovereignty” (2007b, 12). This section examines this 
articulation in the context of the implementation of the NFSA.
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some person or persons” (1991, 2). To govern is to administer the relationships of human and 
nonhuman agents, to properly dispose of humans and things (Foucault 1991, 95), within the 
confines of their natural and cultural environment. Here, the object of government is the 
population, its well-being, and its biorhythms: birth rates, pandemics, natural disasters, wars, 
economic prosperity, political division, extreme poverty, chronic hunger, and so on, and so forth. 
To maintain its sovereignty within the borders of the nation-state, the government manages 
potential risks that may destabilize the biorhythm of a population. Thus the exercise of 
government is “knowing and improving the condition of the population” (Li 2010: 79; see Li 
2007a; 2007b)8 or what Foucault calls “biopolitics of the population” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 
196). The establishment of a right to food entitlement falls in line with such an exercise of 
government: it embodies, at least in principle, what Tania Murray Li has framed as “mak[ing] 
live interventions” which are interventions aimed towards “the activation of a biopolitics that 
places the intrinsic value of life—rather than the value of people as workers or consumers—at its 
core” (2010, 67). Turning our attention to the governmental interventions enables us to explore 
how the right to food entitlement are intricately embedded in fields of power.
“Governing people,” Foucault suggests, “. . . is not a way to force people to do what the
governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between 
8 To illustrate the mechanisms of biopolitics, I borrow this citation from Tania Li (2010), but in reality, Li explores
the modalities of biopolitics in greater depth in her book The Will to Improve (2007b; see also 2007a). Probing 
the analytics of governmentality and development in Central Sulawesi, Li shows how technical interventions are 
always intricately embedded in situated relations of power. Through a sophisticated ethnographic account, Li 
attends to not only the rather technical making of development project blueprints by experts, but also to the 
practices and processes of governmental interventions that invariably shape the lives of the targeted populations. 
In The Will to Improve, however, these populations are not mere objects to be improved; these subjects have 
agency, they engage with, interrogate, and contest development projects deployed to improve their life. In light 
of Li’s contribution to the study of governmentality, this dissertation seeks to emulate such an ethnographic 
approach by exploring what the right to food entitlement seeks to accomplish, how the techniques of government
are designed to improve the lives of the population, and uncover the unanticipated practices and processes 
produced following the implementation of the NFSA.
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techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified
by himself” (in Lemke 2000, 5). However, it is impossible to police or discipline every single 
individual in a population. To govern thus requires that power be manufactured in such a way as 
to conduct individuals’ conduct at a distance: to organize the population through both the 
coercive and regulative (or panopticonic) mechanisms of the law from which behaviours are 
observed, judged, and examined or normalized—an operation of power that results, in the words 
of Li, in “educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” (2007b, 257). 
The shaping of these desires, habits, aspirations, and beliefs depends upon a grid of 
reason, a rationality of government that operates within modalities of power that Foucault calls 
“governmentality.” Governmentality, a neologism coined from the contraction of gouvernement 
and mentalité, provides a foundation for analyzing the interrelation between the exercise of 
government (gouvernement) and the rationality (mentalité) that informs government actions 
(Gordon 1991; Legg 2007; Lemke 2001; Rabinow 1984). As Gordon succinctly explains: 
“governmentality is about how to govern” (1991, 7). It describes a “rationality of government,” 
he adds, “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government . . . capable 
of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to 
those upon whom it was practiced” (Gordon 1991, 3). Governmentality, in a nutshell, is an 
exercise of government that imbues its own rationality into individuals’ intimate practices and 
affairs. As a result, individuals consent, knowingly or not, to be governed (Li 2007a). Inherent to 
the exercise of government is thus an attempt to transpose a rationality of government onto a grid 
of conventions, meanings, morals, and ethics of the population (Gordon 1991, 48).
Interventions such as the NFSA are not simply articulated out of thin air. They are 
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designed and implemented in relation to a rationality of government that makes development 
projects intelligible. Two interrelated practices are central to this process: (a) problematization, 
which refers to the formulation of a problem and the identification of solutions; and (b) 
“rendering technical,” which consists of the transposition of solutions into the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of development projects (Li 2007b, 7–10; Rose 1999). Here, the 
rationality of government plays a critical role because it produces knowledge—a discourse—that 
frames the formulation of what the population may need and how the government may satisfy 
those needs. As I show in Chapter Two, the problem of chronic hunger has remained an issue of 
governmental concern in postcolonial India; however, the history of food policy in the country 
indicates that different governmental interventions have been undertaken in successive discursive
regimes, according to changing sets of conceptions and practices about the world and how it 
works. As Li notes, the “identification of a problem is intimately linked to the availability of a 
solution” (2007b, 7). The rationality of government works on the ability of planners and experts 
to formulate solutions to a problem. For instance, soon after India gained independence in 1947, 
experts and planners worked to dramatically increase food production to meet the nutritional 
needs of the (urban) population. Decades later, in a populist move, the emphasis of governmental 
interventions was shifted to the distribution of entitlements as a strategy to raise people above 
poverty. 
This is not to say that the rationality of government determines the practices of 
problematization and rendering technical—or that they are both apolitical (see Ferguson 1990). In
a rather elegant series of feminist essays on the “politics of need interpretation,” Nancy Fraser 
(1989, 113–87) captures the political nature of the interrelated practices of problematization and 
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rendering technical as contending needs claims. As Fraser points out: “the interpretation of 
people’s needs is itself a political stake, indeed sometimes the political stake” (Fraser 1989, 145; 
emphasis in original). The perceived needs of the population often go without saying, unnoticed. 
But they are imbued with meanings that find their way into development projects. For Fraser, 
therefore, a closer look at the politics that animate the formulation of a population’s needs can 
shed light on the underlying norms and assumptions that give credence to governmental 
interventions. Fraser unpacks the politics of need interpretation to devise a discursive approach to
studying the exercise of government—that is, not an approach emphasizing “the distribution of 
satisfactions” (1989, 163) but rather on “what various groups . . . really need and whose 
interpretation of . . . needs should be authoritative” (1989, 145). Fraser’s contribution to the 
analytics of governmentality gives us a framework to analyze conflicting views in the process of 
discourse formation. As I explore in Chapter Three, when analyzing the NFSA, the politics of 
need interpretation lead us to chart how certain solutions to chronic hunger—such as the 
elimination of corruption—have remained central throughout the formulation and implementation
of the NFSA, while others—such as reverting the TPDS back to a universal welfare program of 
food distribution—have been rapidly excluded. It prompts us to question how the right to food 
entitlement generates, in its techniques of government, conditions of inclusions and exclusions. In
other words, it leads us to interrogate how the right to food entitlement creates situations in which
targeted populations may be included or excluded from these entitlements either through 
targeting mechanisms or in the delivery of entitlements. Thus, I turn my attention to how 
conditions or situations of exclusions are intertwined in the implementation of development 
projects.
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In his book, Red Tape, Akhil Gupta defines structural violence as “a capacious term that
encompasses not only the exclusion from entitlements such as food and water, but also the 
exclusion of certain groups from particular forms of recognition (citizenship rights, equal rights 
before the law, rights to education, representation, and so on)” (Gupta 2012, 20; see also Das 
1996). Navigating between biopolitics and systematic exclusion from governmental 
interventions, Gupta tries to make sense of how bureaucratic practices of welfare arbitrarily 
produce detrimental outcomes for a segment of the population—a process that he calls “the 
production of arbitrariness (Gupta 2012, 24). To illustrate the workings of governmentality on the
production of arbitrariness, Gupta compares two development projects that were implemented 
before and after India’s economic liberalization. In 1991, India approached the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to participate in the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), reformed its 
domestic economy, and opened its borders to global trade (see Kohli 2006a, 2006b). Gupta ties 
these neoliberal market-friendly reforms to a dramatic switch in governmental rationality that 
hinges on the end of the welfare state and the emergence of neoliberalism. For Gupta, this 
departure marks the emergence of neoliberal governmentality—that is, a domain of economic 
knowledge based on an ambiguous market-friendly “grab bag” (Kohli 1989, 306) of inconsistent 
measures from which governmental interventions are made intelligible.
Gupta goes on to ethnographically explore the modalities of the two development 
projects, coming to the conclusion that “there are substantial continuities in biopolitics and 
violence across the period that divides neoliberal governance from earlier forms of rule” (2012, 
272). Moreover, Gupta notes that different rationalities have indeed informed policy formulation 
within these programs; while neoliberal development projects seek to improve well-being by 
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emphasizing notions of citizen empowerment, entrepreneurialism, and fiscal responsibilities 
(Sharma 2006), earlier projects in India were formed around the making of a benevolent state 
lifting the poor out of poverty. Yet, in their deployment, Gupta argues, both types of projects 
resulted in upsettingly similar practices. As it turns out, structural violence is consistently 
experienced across forms of rule, often in normalized ways. More critically, Gupta notes the lack 
of urgency to alleviate the experience of structural violence as an absolute governmental priority 
(Gupta 2012, 273–75).
There are, of course, shortcomings to Gupta’s analysis. Neoliberalism is an ideology 
that has informed policy reforms in India since the 1980s, but it has also resulted in a range of 
processes—what Noel Castree (2010a, 2010b), among others, calls neoliberalization—that have a
direct influence on the lives of people and things.9 In other words, to refer to neoliberalism as a 
single and cohesive set of ideas informing laws, policies, and welfare programs is misguiding, 
especially since neoliberalization processes impact the population in manifold ways, on multiple 
scales (see Castree 2010a, 2010b; Hoffman et al. 2006; Kohli 2006a, 2006b). Second, while 
development programs of empowerment, entrepreneurialism, and microcredit have risen in 
popularity in South Asia in the neoliberal age (Rankin 2001, 2002; Sharma 2006), what has 
populated the development landscape in India since the turn of the millennium is a series of 
rights-based laws that, according to Shannon Speed, have been designed specifically “as a 
9 Neoliberalism is a popular, and a rather ubiquitous, “label of critique” (Ganti 2014, 99) in anthropology and 
elsewhere (see, among several others, Duménil et Lévy 2011; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Harvey 2005; Hirsh 
2010; Guthman 2008a; 2008b; Ong 2006; Rankin 2001; Rao 2010; Sharma 2006; 2013). However, as Nastree 
(2010a; 2010b) and others (Elyachar 2012; Ferguson 2009; 2015; Ganti 2014; Hoffman et al. 2006; Kohli 2006a;
Ortner 2010) have suggested, this label of critique also indexes a large realm of ideas, practices, phenomena, and
political economic contexts that are not necessarily monolithic or even coherent (Ferguson 2010). Informed by 
this discussion (see Hoffman et al. 2006), this dissertation aims to explore how “neoliberalism [is] doing its 
work” (Ortner 2011) on targeted populations by focusing on the processes it generates in the dispensation of 
entitlements (see Chapter Five). 
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response to neoliberal globalization and important discourse of resistance movements” (2005, 
31). Speed adds: “this conceptualization is shared by human rights activists” (2005, 31). In 
response to governmental inertia to address the most basic and urgent nutritional needs during a 
period of intense economic liberalization, Indian right-to-food activists have debated on, and 
formulated a series of, propositions for more than a decade to pressure government authorities to 
adopt accountable and transparent measures in their interventions (see Chapter Three). Such 
claims were eventually co-opted by the Indian state. After the enactment of rights to information 
(2004) and right to work (2005), the right to food entitlement secured by the NFSA (2013) figures
as the latest governmental attempt in India to provide a range of legal protections against chronic 
hunger and the endemic practices of corruption in the delivery of entitlements. These demands 
for rights and entitlements by activists and civil society initially had some radical underpinnings, 
however I show how in the context of neoliberalization, such rights-based laws, including the 
NFSA, are not revolutionary (see Brown 1995).
In the design of these laws, as my discussion of the politics of need interpretation 
illustrates in Chapter Three, radical political claims that tend to challenge the structure of capital 
accumulation (and structural violence) are largely ignored, and in the implementation of these 
laws, techniques of government tend to depoliticize both the hold of the state on society and the 
existence of poverty—or chronic hunger (cf. Ferguson 1990). In the case of the right to food 
entitlement, for instance, techniques of government seek to create economic opportunities for 
individuals by providing a range of entitlements, along with bureaucratic pathways, such as 
grievance redressal and monitoring mechanisms, that allow for individuals to challenge the state 
if and when it fails to secure those entitlements. But in the implementation of the right to food 
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entitlement, as Alka’s experience shows, access to entitlements depends on a series of 
contingencies. In this regard, techniques of government are not elaborated to tackle structural 
problems that afflict one particular group over another, nor are they deployed to ensure that every
single individual who suffers from chronic hunger has access to entitlements; rather, they are 
designed to help empowered bodies to help themselves10—to “instantiate or develop agency 
where it did not exist before” (Brown 2004, 454).11
In this constellation of governmental techniques and glossary, “empowerment” is 
certainly a buzzword in human rights and development discourse in the neoliberal age. But its 
meanings are somewhat equivocal. For Aradhana Sharma, who has studied the 
governmentalization of women’s empowerment in neoliberal development projects: 
“empowerment is a moving target whose meaning is constantly redefined through subaltern 
women’s struggle. It has an ambiguous and open-ended quality that manifests itself in multiple 
and conflicted ways in women’s lives” (2006, 81). This is not necessarily surprising, since the 
literature on the governmentality of development emphasizes the gaps between the design and 
implementation of projects—the unanticipated and unaccounted effects of development 
blueprints on the lives of people (Ferguson 1990; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995; Li 
10 I borrow the expression from Michael Ignatieff: “human rights matter because they help people to help 
themselves” (2000, 57 in Brown 2004, 454).
11 In this sense, the implementation of a right to food entitlement echoes what James Ferguson (2015) terms the 
“politics of distribution,” a form of distributive politics that has emerged in recent years, “rooted in a conviction 
that citizens . . . are the rightful owners of a vast national wealth . . . of which they have been unjustly deprived” 
(2015, 26; italics in original). Ferguson writes that global capitalism has restructured its labour force and now 
needs fewer and fewer low-waged workers who, in turn, become even more marginalized and impoverished. 
Ferguson thus argues that, in the absence of employment, the democratic state must take care of its most 
vulnerable segments of the population through the distribution of social payment—cash transfers—to keep the 
poorer class out of abject poverty. Ferguson’s insightful argument explores the relation of capital to biopolitics 
and empowerment. My argument echoes Ferguson’s, but centres not so much on capital and the reproduction of 
surplus population (see Li 2010), but on the intricate interrelationship between structural violence, discourse of 
good governance, and biopolitics that are, as I show in this section, key features of the discursive formation of 
the right to food entitlement. 
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2007a, 2007b; Sharma and Gupta 2006). In Sharma’s (2006) ethnographic study, the 
governmental program of women’s empowerment in Northern India sought to produce 
empowered bodies that are aware of gender and class inequalities. Yet Sharma’s empowered 
interlocutors did not hesitate to use narratives of empowerment in their struggles against 
hierarchies of power and structural exclusion, including with local bureaucrats: “[empowered 
women] learn statist language and practices and use them as potentially subversive tools for 
demanding accountability” (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 81). Sharma builds her analysis on Partha 
Chatterjee’s theorization of political society in postcolonial contexts. In a nutshell, Chatterjee 
argues that the exercise of governmentality results in the making of a population—the political 
society—that is located in the margins of the rules of law (2004, 2011). In order to avoid creating 
a dangerous legal precedent for the stability of the rule of law, the ruling of a political society is 
always conducted on an exceptional basis in which each governmental intervention is an object 
of negotiation. This awkwardly results in the making of political subjects who, voluntarily or not,
“make claims on the state, negotiate entitlements, and contest social hierarchies” (Sharma 2006, 
81). Consequently, Sharma concludes, the making of empowered subjects is conducive to 
creating a political domain for subaltern women who would otherwise have difficulty voicing 
claims about structural violence (such as gender inequalities) that extend beyond the objectives of
development projects. In the words of Sharma, the governmentalization of empowerment 
“open[s] the door for a meaningful democratization of civil society and state institutions” 
(Sharma 2006, 81).
And yet, since ethnographic analysis is always situated (Haraway 1988), Sharma’s 
views on empowerment are not readily translatable to all development projects. The making of 
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empowered women as political subjects may well differ from the making of active agents entitled
to food entitlements. Producing empowered bodies oftentimes signals the production of agential 
individuals capable of working their way out of poverty, or chronic hunger. But there is also 
another side to this narrative. In this framework, when empowered bodies fail to better their own 
lives, it is not necessarily taken as an indication that the governmental intervention has failed. 
Oftentimes, empowered bodies are held responsible for successfully engaging with techniques of 
government, and failure to do so is interpreted not necessarily as a failure of governance, but as a 
misfire, a statistical inevitability, or a trait of character that simply cannot be regulated by 
authorities. In evacuating structural violence from the discursive formation of governmental 
intervention, therefore, failure to improve the lives of certain individuals is normalized—or 
worse, ignored (Gupta 2012). Statistically speaking, when an intervention improves the lives of 
the population, even marginally, it is deemed to be a technical success to be emulated. When it 
does not, it is taken as an indication that the practices of problematization and rendering technical
have not been properly conceptualized—a process that compels actors to return to the drawing 
board to develop another project blueprint (Ferguson 1990).
Different techniques of government operate on different populations in different ways. 
As such, it is important to attend to the formulation of perceived needs, to the conditions of 
deployment of techniques of government, and especially to the instruments used to conduct 
people’s conduct. In this section, I have explored the contours of the analytics of governmentality
as a way to present how fields of power/knowledge animate the mechanisms deployed to improve
the lives of people. I have highlighted how for the production of empowered bodies, the 
techniques and instruments used to implement development projects such as the NFSA matter. In 
31
the next section, therefore, I posit that these techniques and instruments are of cardinal 
importance for the realization of a right to food entitlement. My argument, and the contribution of
this dissertation more generally, rests on the assumption that instruments of government mediate
—that is, “transform, translate, distort, and modify” (Latour 2005, 39; Hull 2012a, 253)—the 
rationality of government, which here consists of objectives of accountability and transparency 
that distinguish the NFSA from previous governmental food security interventions. Thus, in the 
next section, I chart what instruments of government are and what they do.
1.2 Infrastructures of Improvement: Mediating Accountability and Transparency
In the previous sections, I introduced the analytics of governmentality as a grid of 
analysis that helps us explore the field of power that informs the exercise of government through 
bureaucratic procedures. I situated the NFSA as a governmental project responsive to a discursive
approach to human rights that emphasizes principles of good governance, deployed to render 
bureaucratic practices accountable and transparent. I have used the term “techniques of 
government” to encompass the myriad tactics employed by the government to improve the 
population. “Instruments of government,” on the other hand, are the metrological tools used to do
so. In this section, I turn my attention to these instruments.
Instruments are critically important in the deployment of governmental projects. They 
are used to measure and configure the biorhythm of a population. For instance, for Foucault, 
statistics is the science of government that generates knowledge about the population (1991, 96). 
To produce such knowledge requires a large number of statistical instruments for regulating and 
monitoring the population in order to direct appropriate action on it. 
However, instruments are not only mere tools. They do not simply provide metrics 
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about the population: they also frame cultural understandings of the government and the 
population. They embody meanings and configure the exercise of government. Scholars have 
investigated how the state shapes natural and social landscapes through the (mis)use of science 
(Scott 1999), or “how the state works,” thanks to the instruments of statistics (Corbridge et al. 
2005, 18). I take a different approach. Building on Timothy Mitchell (2002), I argue that the 
positivist qualities of scientific discourse—what gives knowledge its truthness—and the power of
the state are simultaneously constituted in social practices.12 Taking a closer look at instruments 
and infrastructures of governmentality, I believe, enables us to decode these processes. 
According to Mitchell, infrastructures and instruments of governmentality are examples
of techno-politics: a “technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process of manufacture 
whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman agents, both intentional and not, and in which 
the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended” (2002, 42–43). 
Building on Bruno Latour’s (1993, 2005) insights on the critical importance of nonhuman agency
to understand social phenomena, Mitchell debunks the idea that humans and things are passive 
objects waiting to be organized by governmental interventions—or passive recipients of a 
rationality of government. For Mitchell, scientific knowledge (which he refers to as 
technoscience) generates passive categories, which the government can then claim in order to 
rule over the population. The object of critique here is the very function of government 
rationality. Mitchell contends that by insisting on the formulation of subjects and things as 
12 In a footnote, Mitchell positions his concept of techno-politics in opposition to ideas presented in James C. 
Scott’s monograph, Seeing Like the State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. 
Mitchell states: 
While I admire many of Scott’s arguments, my own analysis differs from his in important ways. In particular, 
whereas Scott is concerned with the way modern states have misused powers of science, and distinguishes this 
misuse from proper science, I am concerned with the kinds of social and political practice that produce 
simultaneously the powers of science and the powers of modern states. (2002, 312)
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constructs, technoscience fails to capture the social reality of “the amalgam of human and 
nonhuman things and ideas” (2002, 43). This is what he means when he points to the fact that 
“the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended.” Since people are 
more than homo oeconomicus, or rational individuals, and since things are more than passive 
objects isolated from a pristine nature, scientific categories always fail to adequately capture the 
complexity of the world, leading rationalities of government to impose on the population frames 
of reference that are ill-adapted or skewed. In Rule of Experts, Mitchell identifies some of these 
technical bodies that have shaped the dynamics of Egypt’s social, economic, and political life 
during the 20th century. A map, a 1980 World Bank report, or a model village are some of the 
constitutive elements that form the technical body of modern-day Egypt. These are intricately 
inserted in an association of humans and things that act on one another: an elusive mosquito, a 
peasant, a plot of land, or Timothy Mitchell himself. In following closely the trace left by the 
alloy of a technical body when inserted in a network, Mitchell situates sites of struggles in which 
instruments of government shape and are being shaped by (human and nonhuman) actors.
In the previous section, I discussed governmental rationality that both informs and 
renders interventions intelligible. As Gordon discusses, the engineering of governmental 
rationality has been partly the affair of economists who have pioneered and expanded a field of 
knowledge—political economy—that “inaugurates a new mode of objectification of governed 
reality, whose effect is to resituate governmental reason within a newly complicated open and 
unstable politico-epistemic configuration” (1991, 16). Historically, in anthropology, research on 
the meanings of economic practices has taken a prominent position, at least for a few decades of 
the 20th century, animated by two approaches called formalism and substantivism. The latter has 
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argued that economic practices are embedded in broader cultural domains, while the former has 
defended universalistic concepts of what constitutes the economy and economic practices (Hann 
and Hart 2011).13 This debate came to a halt when Mark Granovetter suggested that economic 
practices are “closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations and that such an argument 
avoids the extremes of under- and oversocialized views of human action” (1985, 514). Scholars 
of science and technology studies (STS) who are interested in economic practices have built on 
Granovetter’s insights to conceptually frame network not as a cultural context, “but a network 
which configures ontologies” (Callon 1998, 8). Here, the network either frames the relationships 
between agents or it shapes the constitutive association of various sorts of agents. For 
anthropologists interested in the analytics of governmentality, this theoretical development 
provides a rather potent entry point for exploring the agency of instruments of government and 
how they configure the association of humans and things—to which I now turn to.
From an STS perspective, what is at stake is not the question of whether pre-existing 
fields of expertise inform governmental rationality, but rather how these fields of expertise, 
embodying certain metrics over others, are mediated by instruments of government. Take the 
construction of the economy, for instance (see Mitchell 2002). Economic knowledge establishes 
key categories that shape our cultural understandings of what is deemed to be economic and what
is not. Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon (2009, 2010) argue that operationalization in worlds of 
economic knowledge—economization—generates economic practices. Just like other analytical 
objects, such as the state, the economy does not pre-exist economic practices: it is a fabrication 
13 Two schools of thought have dominated the debate on the question. Following Karl Polanyi (1967), a 
substantivist approach focuses on the particular and localized circumstances of economic practices, while a 
formalist approach emphasizes the traction of universal political economic concepts in different locales. The 
substantivist vs. formalist debate has helped to accentuate the orientation of anthropology as a discipline that has 
historically thrived on documenting the particular nature of human experiences within the universal essence of 
human existence (see Hann and Hart 2011, 55–71).
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that results from a series of analytical categorization and reification of everyday practices (Callon
1998; Mitchell 2008). As such, for Çalışkan and Callon, what is central to their analysis is “[the 
identification and characterization of] entities that have been ‘economicized’” (2009, 391), 
entities that are rendered economic. Here, infrastructures and instruments play a critical role since
they enable the discursive formation “of relations between politics and the economy. . . . 
Discourses draw boundaries, exclude and reject, and it is in these mechanisms that the political 
dimension [of the formation of the economy] lies” (Callon 2010, 164-65). For Çalışkan and 
Callon, the economy is always locally and technologically engineered and is “aimed at 
describing, analysing and making intelligible the shape, constitution and dynamics of a market 
socio-technical arrangement [or agencements14]” (2010, 3). This led Çalışkan and Callon to 
contend that infrastructures and instruments—what they call socio-technical agencements—
enable the enactment of economic knowledge into everyday practice.
Socio-technical agencements, one should note, have all been engineered to design, 
implement, or maintain markets or the economy, Çalışkan and Callon argue, and as such, these 
agencements carry with them an assortment of economic knowledge. Socio-technical 
agencements help human agents, or stakeholders involved in these configurations of networks, to 
make calculations in the process of valuing and exchanging commodities, and as such, these 
socio-technical agencements enable the performance, the enactment, or the mediation of the 
calculation of exchange. In other words, these socio-technical agencements (hereafter, 
instruments or “devices,” which are objects that “do things . . . [they are] objects with agency” 
[(Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007, 2)]) help to bring into reality a number of economic 
14 Agencement is a French word that does not translate well in English. It refers to notions of arrangements or 
assemblage, but it connotes notions of agency (Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007).
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conceptions about economic processes. Çalışkan and Callon have thus produced a critique of 
economics as a discipline, and economic knowledge more generally, by proposing a reflexive 
research program that explores the impact of economic reification, and other forms of economic 
knowledge production, on human calculation and processes deemed economic more generally. 
Central to this research program is the emphasis on socio-technical agencement, or how 
instruments act on a network of humans and things.
This research program has indeed inspired anthropologists to explore how 
governmental rationality, through the agency of various infrastructures, instruments and other 
devices, shapes the operation of technologies of government on populations. Here, as Brian 
Larkin points out, infrastructures are not simply “out there” (2013, 329) like pre-given categories 
of material configuration, such as functional roads and working electrical networks, that stand out
in and of themselves. Instead, they are constituted through the use and manipulation of 
infrastructures or instruments that take shape as socio-technical agencements. Thus, conceptually,
infrastructures comprise elements of governmental rationality, techniques of government, and 
bureaucratic practices; they are conduits, in other words, that reveal the exercise of government 
underpinning plans, programs, and projects (Anand 2011; Larkin 2013; Mitchell 2002). For 
instance, Stephen J. Collier (2011) has argued that city building or the provision of electricity 
during the Soviet era exposes the practices of government in a planned economy, which are 
radically different from those in, say, the West, which depend on user demands. Building on the 
STS literature, Collier shows how infrastructures are sites of techno-politics that foreground the 
organization of people, things, and their relationship according to the scientific knowledge 
imparted to those relationships.
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Other anthropologists have pioneered creative ways to explore in detail the formation 
of one single site of techno-politics by heavily drawing on actor-network theory and its emphasis 
on associations between heterogeneous networks (Callon 1998; Hull 2012b; Latour 1993, 2005). 
For instance, in his ethnography on water supply in Mumbai, India, Nikhil Anand (2009, 2011) 
shows that two networks are connected to ensure water delivery: (a) the material conduits (pipes, 
pumps) and expertise stemming from different domains (engineering, political, economic) that 
regulate the flow of water in the city; and (b) the social network that rules people’s connectivity 
to the water supply network. Anand’s account is in fact a brilliant ethnographic analysis of a 
formation of techno-politics, which presents in great detail the problems and failures of water 
delivery that are integral parts of the infrastructure. But it also critically documents the sense of 
belonging to the city manifested through urbanites’ claims to water, or what he calls “hydraulic 
citizenship.” Following Collier (2011) and Anand (2009, 2011), Antina Von Schnitzler (2008, 
2013, 2014) delves even deeper in her analysis of techno-politics by focusing on a single 
instrument, the water meter—a device or object with agency that articulates actions once inserted 
in a network of techno-politics (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007). Von Schnitzler argues that 
while the water meter has a governmental and an economic function, its imbrication in the 
techno-politics of water provision reveals a larger governmental rationality. Water meters are 
deployed to produce a specific kind of citizenry: rational individuals who do not waste water. 
Both Von Schnitzler and Anand show that infrastructures and instruments are reactive to 
biopolitics, but they also have unanticipated effects on the networks in which they are inserted. 
Building on Çalışkan and Callon’s (2009; 2010) insights, infrastructures and instruments are far 
from neutral sites of disposition or arrangement of humans and things; they form the grounds on 
which plans, programs, and projects are produced and contested (Larkin 2013, 331).
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If to govern is to administer, one could, as Anand (2009, 2011) and Von Schnitzler 
(2008, 2013, 2014) have done, carefully scrutinize the instruments used to conduct the conduct of
people. Against this discussion of infrastructure and instruments as mediators of governmental 
rationality, I situate my account of the modernization of the TPDS and the re-materialization of 
the ration card. When the right to Indian food entitlements was first discussed in the years leading
up to its ratification in 2013, debates raged on what the overall needs of the population are and 
what types of interventions should be implemented to address them. Central to these debates were
concerns over the overhaul of the TPDS, the vast infrastructure of subsidized food distribution in 
India, and the enduring issues of corruption that plagued the distribution of food grains (see 
Planning Commission 2005). The TPDS involves the participation of a myriad of actors. Farmers 
sell their wheat and rice to the agency that manages the TPDS, the Food Corporation of India 
(FCI). This food grain is channelled through an extensive train network across the country and 
then stored behind locked gates in various conditions in local depots, called godowns. Each state 
government administers the distribution of subsidized food to its subject population. In Delhi,15 
the Department of Food, Supplies, & Consumers Affairs (DFSCA) buys the wheat and rice from 
the FCI to sell it back to licensed Fair Price Shops (FPSs) that are privately operated, but the 
responsibility lies with the Department of Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited 
(DSCSC) to transport the grain from seven godowns located in the National Capital Territory 
(NCT) to FPS locations, which are points of distribution to the population. To do so, the DSCSC 
15 Delhi is an administratively layered place. It is a union territory called the National Capital Territory (NCT) of 
Delhi. Typically, union territories fall under the administration of the central government, but the Parliament of 
India has amended the constitution to grant the NCT a legislature. The NCT is divided into three different 
municipalities—the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the New Delhi Municipal Council, and the Delhi 
Cantonment Board—that have different jurisdictions. Delhi also comprises seven cities, among them Old Delhi 
and New Delhi, the latter of which was planned and constructed when the British Crown moved the capital of 
India from Calcutta to Delhi (Legg 2007). Unless I specify otherwise, I use Delhi to refer to the NCT.
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subcontracts the task to private truck owners, who hire daily-wage workers, to dispatch bags of 
wheat and rice from the godowns to the FPSs. Food grains are carried in bags of jute or plastic. 
The bags are stored in enclosed, poorly ventilated FPSs until stocks are liquidated. As bags of 
food grains move from one governmental site to the next, leakages occur constantly, and for a 
variety of reasons. Building on Mitchell and Anand, I see the TPDS as a large techno-political 
alloy, tentatively modernized in the aftermath of the NFSA to plug leakages. I contend that the 
government’s attempts to digitize the TPDS reflect the imperatives of good governance that 
inhere in elements of governmental accountability and transparency. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, the Food Security Portal is used to publicly display in minute detail the 
journey of food grains within the NCT of Delhi. These new technologies of information were set 
up with the hopes of instilling greater practices of transparency in the administration of 
entitlements. The TPDS has a history that predates Indian independence, but it has also a life of 
its own, with informal rules, conventions, and practices modulating its operation. As such, an 
exploration of the techno-politics of the modernization of rationing practices leads me to 
investigate the design and implementation of experts and planners’ welfare blueprints to render 
the TPDS infrastructure corruption-free and the unintended effects of these interventions on the 
targeted population.
Central to the overhaul of the TPDS infrastructure in the aftermath of the NFSA is the 
re-materialized ration card. Here, I frame the ration card as a document, a “rationing document” 
(Sriraman 2013, 335), that embodies rights-based discourses found in the NFSA. Building on a 
growing anthropological literature of bureaucratic documents, and informed by the work of 
Çalışkan and Callon (2009, 2010) and other materialist anthropologists (Anand 2009, 2011; Von 
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Schnitzler 2008, 2013, 2014; Larkin 2013), I conceptualize the ration card as an instrument of 
governmental rationality that embodies knowledge, rules, and practices and mediates—rather 
than represents—the signs and meanings it bears. 
According to Hull (2012b), as documents circulate, they re-arrange humans and things 
in ways that are impossible to predict, let alone command. As they move, these documents help to
constitute what they have been calibrated for, and as they do so, they help assert bureaucratic 
control over the population. Yet, these documents are more than mere things. They carry complex
meanings, or denotations, of bureaucratic power and other referents about people and things. 
When they circulate, they “translate and displace social relations within government” (Hull 
2012b, 19); in mediating associations of people and things, they draw humans and nonhumans 
within the purview of bureaucratic power. Ration cards, I believe, also mediate relations of 
governmentality. They are conceived and fabricated as instruments of government-facilitated 
welfare functions, but they also embody normative semiotics of human rights discourses on good 
governance. In their manipulation, ration cards exert bureaucratic power on rationing practices; 
yet that bureaucratic power is unevenly distributed in the TPDS infrastructure and, as this 
dissertation aims to show, imposes the burden of transparency on ration card holders rather than 
on government officials.
Since 2005, activists, experts, academics, and laypeople have directly helped to shape 
the enactment of three human rights laws set to empower Indians: the right to information in 
2005, the right to work in 2005, and finally the right to food entitlement in 2013. These three 
laws are often reported as success stories in which civil society has handily acted on the 
legislative apparatus to promote ideals found in human rights discourses: transparency, 
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accountability, and citizen empowerment, which once amalgamated, lead to the constitution of 
legitimate and authoritative democratic institutions and efficient management of welfare and of 
human and natural resources (Smith 2007). But this is only a part of the narrative. Investigating 
the translocal nature of neoliberal good governance, Sharma (2013) argues that the right to 
information in India, and its objectives to instil elements of state transparency in bureaucratic 
mechanisms, is cast in technocratic procedures that do not sit well with activists’ aspirations for 
the democratization of social and economic opportunities. As it appears, the meanders of 
bureaucratic practices impede the manipulation of the right to information. Similarly, Nayanika 
Mathur (2012) suggests that paper documents, in the context of the implementation of right to 
work legislation, render the Indian state transparent. Governing paper appears to be central to 
governing welfare.16 However, Mathur’s ethnography led her to conclude that the economy of 
paper documents required to make the Indian state transparent is so vast and complex that the 
legislation in question becomes almost impossible to implement. Making the state transparent 
through the production, circulation, and exhibition of a colossal amount of paper documents, it 
turns out, hinders rather than expedites the provision of welfare. 
Like Mathur (2012) and Sharma (2013), I suggest that if transparency is made by 
documents, then an ethnographic analysis of documents is in order. Taking the overhaul of the 
TPDS and digitization of the ration card as an entry point, as I did with Alka, I contrast old ration 
card objects with new digital ones and explore how rightful holders of the ration card navigate 
bureaucratic spaces. My contribution is to show that the use of new technologies of 
authentication deployed by the Indian state to make bureaucratic practices transparent have 
16 I borrow the sentence from Government of Paper—“[g]overning paper is central to governing the city” (Hull 
2012b, 1)— where Hull meticulously shows how paper documents draw a wide range of people and things under
bureaucratic rule.
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dramatically re-arranged the association of humans and things that have historically structured 
the bureaucratic distribution of rations in Delhi. In the process, I argue, digital ration cards acted 
on the TPDS in Delhi to rearrange human agency in the infrastructure of entitlement distributions
to eliminate mundane prospects for corruption. Like every other development project (cf. 
Ferguson 1990; cf. Li 2007b; cf. Mosse 2013), the digitization of documents has had 
unanticipated effects on the intended objectives of the NFSA, including the systematic exclusion 
of empowered bodies from the NFSA (see also Abraham and Rajadhyaksha 2015; Masiero 2017).
As the ethnography presented in this dissertation illustrates, my efforts to track the digital ration 
card as a socio-technical agencement acting on welfare socialities, imbued with meanings of 
accountability and transparency, show that the obsession with preventing practices of corruption 
has been pursued at the risk of systematically excluding people from their rightful entitlements.
1.3 Methodology
Daniel Miller (2017) argues that the primary contribution of anthropology is 
ethnography. In fact, Miller asserts that thick ethnographic material brought back from the field, 
in the Geertzian tradition, should be completely detached from theoretical groundings—such as, 
for instance, the concept of neoliberal governmentality—that tend to fetishize a set of conceptual 
abstractions rather than focusing on ethnographic engagement with people and their lives. For 
Miller, the engagement of ethnography with theories turns anthropology back to its armchair 
days. I disagree.
Instead, I contend that ethnography is not the end but rather the means of anthropology.
I follow Tim Ingold (2017), who highlights the necessity of differentiating anthropology and 
ethnography in order to ensure that the anthropologist’s voice does not remain hidden behind 
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interlocutors. Anthropology and ethnography, Ingold suggests, should not be conflated into one 
another, let alone congealed into a single, perhaps even confusing, project. Clarifications are in 
order. “Anthropology,” for Ingold, “is a generous, open-minded, comparative, and yet critical 
inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of human life in the one world we all inhabit” (2017, 
22). Anthropology is sensible to the ways in which lives are lived and could be lived; it is 
sensible, in other words, to possibilities. Perhaps even more importantly, anthropology also plays 
a crucial role in making these possibilities intelligible, and perhaps even realizable. 
This is not to say that ethnography is a mere tool, a case study, instrumentalized to 
reflect theoretical underpinnings. For Ingold, “ethnography has its methods—its rules of thumb, 
its ways of working—but it is not a method” (2017, 23). Participant observation, on the other 
hand, is a method. The method of participant observation does not just involve the collection of 
data on people and their mundane practices. It is about learning. It is a transformative research 
method in which the anthropologist’s way of thinking develops and changes as she shares 
experiences with a group of people and learns about their perspectives on the world we all share. 
Ingold writes:
But to practice anthropology, as I understand it, means to study with people, not to
make studies of them—just as we might study with our teachers at the university. We
do  so  in  order  that  we  may  grow  in  wisdom  and  maturity,  in  our  powers  of
observation, reason, and critical thinking, in the hope and expectation that we can
bring these powers to bear on whatever problems we may tackle in the future. That’s
why  participant  observation  should  be  understood,  in  the  first  place,  not  as
ethnographic but as educational. (2017, 23)
Ethnography, thus, serves a crucial purpose; it assists anthropologists in developing sensibilities 
and empathies, but it is the anthropologist’s responsibility to make these intelligible, not only for 
the benefit of other anthropologists, but also for scholarly and popular knowledge more generally.
44
Ethnographic knowledge, I am convinced, should not be confined to our discipline. Contrary to 
what Miller (2017) asserts, the use of theory opens a bridge across disciplines and thus 
encourages dialogue. It is a path of engagement with other discourses that are perhaps not as 
entwined with ethnographic knowledge and practice. To be clear, I do not suggest that 
ethnographic knowledge should be framed by theory. Rather, I believe that theory may provide a 
conversational entry point from which ethnographic insights depart. This is especially true for 
recent prominent accounts on the anthropology of the state, which has emerged thanks the 
philosophical development of the concept of governmentality.
My research methods took shape as I tried to locate the ephemeral phenomenon of the 
right to food entitlement in urban settings. Initially, I tried one approach, to no avail. I first 
volunteered with the Right to Food Campaign (RTFC) as a way to critically document the 
mechanisms through which right-to-food activism in India shapes the state and poor urban 
subjects. But this approach took me on a path further away from the people and the objects at the 
core of the NFSA: the population targeted by the NFSA, the ration card, the FPSs, and more 
generally, the TPDS. I thus turned to exploring the various urban locations in which people may 
need a right to food entitlement. Once there, I also tried to ask direct questions about poverty and 
chronic hunger. Rapidly, I realized that questions such as “Do you go to bed hungry at night?” led
to an embarrassing deadlock, where both the interlocutor and I felt understandably awkward and 
hesitant to push discussions further. Ultimately, I focused on the techno-politics of the right to 
food entitlement and concentrated on its infrastructures and devices. 
I chose this approach because my fieldwork took place in Delhi, between February 
2014 and October 2015, just a few months after the ratification of the NFSA, in September 2013. 
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At that time in Delhi, the modernization of the TPDS was in full swing, unlike in many other 
Indian states. My intention was to find people who would share life stories about the state, the 
TPDS, the ration card, and their FPS, as a way to question the ethico-political domain that is 
embodied and deployed by the NFSA. My guiding conceptual question was: “How does the right 
to food shape everyday lives and encounters with the state?” Although this question is pertinent 
to debates about the analytics of governmentality, I realized quickly that it had little to no traction
with the interlocutors I encountered. When I turned to the topic of the ration card, however, 
interlocutors were much more voluble (see Jacob 2008). The rationing document became an 
ethnographic object of interest to me.
My research took place in several urban areas of New Delhi. Over the course of my 
fieldwork, I had the chance to share stories and food with a number of women and families from 
various urban locales. I lined up with homeless men and women living in urban shelters and 
waited to get a warm meal in religious points of distribution, including the Nizammuddin Dargah 
and the Gurudwara Bangla Sahib. I also visited migrant workers, farmers from Andhra Pradesh, 
who resided in tents provided by local contractors in need of cheap labour. I shared some of the 
most delicious meals I have ever had: a few rotis (round flat bread) cooked on an open flame in a 
chulha (a cooking stove made out of bricks and mud), with sabzi (vegetables cooked in gravy, or 
curry) prepared with a special mix of masala (spices) brought to the capital from the workers’ 
home village. But the contractors, unhappy with my presence, quickly manifested their 
discontent. I had to leave the premises to avoid putting the interlocutors I encountered in danger. 
On other occasions, I spent evenings watching TV with rickshaw pullers, munching on hot and 
oily gobhi pakoda (cauliflower pakora or fritter) and pyiaz pakoda (onion pakora or fritter), lying 
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on the ground under a blue tarpaulin, while men beside us, huddled under a wool blanket, slept in
their rickshaws. 
After a long day in the fields, which would often stretch late into the evening, I would 
always leave the interlocutors’ basti to head back home. I chose to reside in an apartment, in a 
central and cosmopolitan neighbourhood, from which I could use the metro to navigate the city 
more efficiently. Although I do understand why it has become a rite of passage for human rights 
activists and academics to live with interlocutors, to experience their way of life, I also think that 
most of the basti’s residents would find it rather curious, if not off-putting. For many of them, I 
was, and still am, a wealthy American, even though I identified myself as Québécois. Thus, living
in a basti when I had the means to live somewhere else made little sense to them. Of course, this 
methodological tactic was also more convenient and comfortable for me, since I had, in my small
studio, access to latrines, electricity, water, shower, and food that I would otherwise not be able to
use or consume in the basti. But it also meant that when I visited the basti, I was always in the 
residents’ home, on their territory, and would abide by their cultural codes and their modes of 
being, which I tried to learn.
In Delhi, close to two million new ration cards were to be distributed across the NCT, 
based on a range of geographical, economic, and socio-economic criteria. To meet people, I 
identified two basti based on these bureaucratic indicators.17 The first was located at the outskirts 
of a posh neighbourhood of South Delhi. It was constructed in the 1980s, soon after a few 
17 To be precise, to meet potential rightful beneficiaries of the right to food entitlement, I endeavoured to meet with
basti-dwellers in dispersed settlements in New Delhi. But I did not set out to conduct my fieldwork in these two 
specific basti, where I eventually focused on. It happened rather organically, and as a result, this dissertation is 
informed by a range of interactions with interlocutors that reflect the rather diverse composition of Delhi’s basti-
dweller population. Most of the interlocutors I encountered in these two basti are Dalits and migrant workers that
have been living in Delhi for decades, but their states of origin are diverse, as are their occupations, financial 
situations, and overall positions in the city. 
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migrants from Tamil Nadu were forced to move away from an informal settlement where the 
Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium would be erected. At first, the migrants built only a few kachcha 
jhuggi (temporary housing units) in a bright alley, next to a governmental school, minutes away 
from the local open sewer. However, the basti had substantially grown since its inception. By the 
time I first visited in November 2014, three generations of Tamil migrants occupied the basti, 
spread across 42 pakka jhuggi (housing made out of bricks). Latrines and water utilities remained
nonexistent, which was a primary concern for women, who have to be strategic whenever they 
urinate or defecate in order to avoid the potential dangers that lurk in the wasteland between the 
basti and the sewers. Most of the women worked as maids for their wealthier neighbours, 
sometimes for as many as twelve hours per day, seven days a week. Most men, on the other hand,
were daily-wage workers, rickshaw pullers, or noker (servants). 
I spent four months visiting this basti, during which time I accompanied women to the 
local FPS and engaged with FPS owners. Most interlocutors had in their possession their new 
ration cards, but many were unable to access their full entitlements. When possible, I assisted 
them in the cleaning and cooking of rations, but more often than not, given the gender, class, and 
caste modalities entrenched in local cultural practices, these women preferred that I not interfere. 
On a more practical level, they worked more rapidly and efficiently without me; showing me the 
rudiments of their culinary routine was generous enough, but having to oversee me cooking 
would have slowed them down.
The second basti was located in the heart of Chandni Chowk, within the walls of 
Shahjahanabad, commonly referred as Old Delhi. In 2009, while the entire city was preparing for 
the 2010 Commonwealth Games, the authorities had destroyed the interlocutors’ former homes 
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(see Baviskar 2010), located in an informal settlement under a gloomy underpass, centimetres 
away from the railroad that leads to the touristic destinations of Agra and the Taj Mahal. Most 
interlocutors, male and female, were at the time, and still are today, intricately embedded in the 
spice trade in the nearby market. When their kachcha jhuggi was bulldozed in 2009, sixty 
households moved with all their belongings into a vacant lot next to the market, making it their 
own. Once again, latrines and water utilities were nonexistent, as electricity would also have 
been, had the residents not connected their jhuggi to the electrical network of the Railway 
Corporation. The basti residents used nearby abandoned buildings as an isolated place to defecate
and urinate. The conditions of the basti first surprised me, and it took a while to get accustomed 
to the environment. 
I was first introduced to the pradhan (chief) of the second basti early in my fieldwork, 
but I engaged with the local residents only a year later, in February 2015. From then until the end 
of my fieldwork, in October 2015, I spent countless hours in the basti, where I was active in 
helping the residents to apply for ration cards. When I left, six applicants had obtained their 
cards, more than two years after the ratification of the NFSA. Only one of them had successfully 
retrieved her entitlements from the FPS—and she had managed to do so on only a single 
occasion.
To complement my field trips in various localities of Delhi, I also collected archival 
data from the National Archives of India and the Department of Delhi Archives, along with 
second-hand research compiled from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and interviews. I 
have been using this material to further my understanding of the cultural constitution of India’s 
subsidized food infrastructure. I interviewed members of the RTFC, intellectuals, and 
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bureaucrats, as well as one politician who participated in the formulation of the NFSA. These 
included development economists Jean Drèze and Reetika Khera; Commissioner of the Supreme 
Court Naresh Chandra Saxena; Special Commissioner Harsh Mander; Principal Advisor to the 
Commissioner Biraj Patnaik; activists Kavitha Srivastava, Dipa Sinha, and Sejal Dand; Senior 
Advocate at the Supreme Court Colin Gonsalves; former Minister of Rural Development Jairam 
Ramesh; and former members of the RTFC Secretariat, Eklavya Vasudev, Dheeraj Kumar, and 
Swati Narayan. Towards the end of my fieldwork, I was also welcomed to the Delhi RTFC 
meetings and had the opportunity to meet with three brilliant activists Shakeel Abdul, Anjali 
Bhardwaj, and Amrita Johri, without whom I would not have been able to understand the realities
of the politics of hunger in India and the disciplining of the everyday state in the national capital 
(see Webb 2012).
In the months preceding and during my fieldwork in India, I took Hindi classes, first at 
York University, then at the South Asian Summer Language Institute at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, and finally in a private school of South Delhi, between September 2013 and 
July 2015. My level of competency in Hindi was never fully sufficient to converse comfortably 
with interlocutors. Yet, while I do acknowledge, like every anthropologist, that being fully fluent 
in the language of the interlocutors I encountered would have been undoubtedly advantageous, I 
also believe that out of respect for them and what they had to say, seeking the involvement of 
research assistants was the appropriate thing to do. Over 17 months of fieldwork, I employed 
twelve research assistants who accompanied me to field sites and assisted me in transcribing 
recordings. 
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1.4 Outline of Chapters
In Chapter Two, I trace the historical trajectory of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), which became the TPDS in 1997. Using the concept of “food regime” as an analytical 
roadmap, I examine how a series of governmental rationalities have shaped postcolonial food 
policies in India in three successive periods: the making of modern India under Jawaharlal Nehru,
the making of the welfare state spearheaded by Indira Gandhi, and the making of economic 
liberalization. I conclude by demonstrating how the infrastructure of rationing is caught up in a 
productive tension between the biopolitics of the (T)PDS (maintaining the welfare of poor 
individuals) and its dysfunctions (leakages), which human rights discourses attempt to relieve. 
In Chapter Three, I reflect on the discursive formation of a right to food entitlement in 
India. I situate it as a technology of “good governance” that seeks to end the relations of 
patronage that have over the years crippled the infrastructure of the (T)PDS. In this sense, I 
contend that the right to food entitlement is an equivocal technology of government that aims to 
tackle two issues at once: chronic hunger and corruption. Using the analytics of governmentality, 
I demonstrate how the formulation of the NFSA was animated by a politics of need interpretation 
that has shaped the nature, the form, and the scope of the Indian right to food entitlement. 
In Chapter Four, I analyze how one of the key instruments of the TPDS—the re-
materialized ration card— that mediates the normative principles of the NFSA in bureaucratic 
practices. To do so, I follow the circulation of this rationing document. Building on the work of 
Hull (2012b), I situate the new ration card as a bureaucratic site of techno-politics. In the process 
of modernizing the infrastructure of the TPDS, the ration card was radically reconfigured to 
embody new techniques of government deployed to eradicate practices of corruption from the 
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TPDS. Using ethnographic material, I emphasize the varied uses of old and new ration cards in 
the Indian capital and document how the ration card draws associations among people and things.
I show that the circulation of the ration card has been designed to exert bureaucratic control, 
notably in FPSs, but has also had two unexpected consequences: that of generating systematic 
exclusions from the infrastructure of rationing and that of weakening the basti-dweller’s ability to
secure her position in the city.
An individual’s ability to access and use a ration card depends on her ability to navigate
both the bureaucratic worlds and the frustrating production of arbitrary outcomes that populate 
the distribution of entitlements. Chapter Five brings attention to these processes. I draw from 
Chatterjee (2004; 2012), Gupta (2012), and Sharma (2006; 2013) to illustrate the effects of 
neoliberal rationality on the production of arbitrariness, and to document the efforts deployed by 
ration card holders to overcome these hindrances. Bridging the analytics of governmentality and 
STS, I document the formation of associations of humans and things in the exercise of 
government. While documenting shortcomings in the design and implementation of the right to 
food entitlement, I describe the tactics employed by empowered bodies to overcome their lack of 
literacy and manipulate various devices in order to finally access their lawfully secured food 
entitlements.
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Chapter 2: The History of the Infrastructure of Rationing in India
This chapter contextualizes food politics in postcolonial India. Tracing the history of 
food policies, I examine how the infrastructure of food rationing has been instituted historically 
and framed by three consecutive governmental rationalities. Building on food regime analysis, I 
argue that the Indian infrastructure of rationing has been responsive to a corpus of knowledge, 
techniques, and scientific and political discourses that have shaped the welfare state and actively 
helped to construct a modern Indian nation. I show that Indian rationing practices have been 
rather fluid in India between the 1940s and 2000s because they depended on different 
interpretations of the population’s needs in successive regimes. 
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, to contextualize the formulation of the right to food entitlement in India 
in the early 2000s, I present a history of the infrastructure of rationing that has emerged in India 
since the Second World War. The Public Distribution System (PDS), later restructured as the 
Targeted Public Distribution System (TDPS), is a vast rationing program, designed to stimulate 
food production at the national level and food security at the household level (Mooij 1998, 77). 
Building on the work of Akhil Gupta (1998) and other scholars (Chopra 1981; Mooij 1998), I 
argue that the national construction of the (T)PDS has been responsive to the formation of a 
corpus of knowledge, techniques, and scientific discourses. In Postcolonial Development, Gupta 
(1998) analyzes how global discourses on development and food regimes shape localized 
agricultural practices. I take a similar approach. I examine how food policies have evolved in 
relation with food regimes, by illustrating the polymorphous forms and usages of rationing 
practices in successive economic and political contexts. In this chapter, then, I explore the 
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development of the (T)PDS in relation with successive food regimes that have shaped the 
material operations and processes of governmental interventions from the 1940s to the 2000s.
“Food regime” is a concept that “links international relations of food production and 
consumption to forms of accumulation, broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist 
transformation since 1870” (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95). This conceptualization 
subverts linear tropes of modernization to focus instead on an analysis of “global power 
arrangements” of food economy (McMichael 2009, 140), often referred to interchangeably as 
“food politics” (Guthman 2008a; McMichael 1998), which explores “the opposing movements of
the state system and international division of labour” (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95). 
There have been three food regimes. The first food regime corresponded to the settler states 
economy between 1870 and 1930. The second food regime centred on the complex interrelation 
between the formation of modern states in the Global South and the hegemonic role of the United
States in the construction of a world economy. The third food regime, still debated and contested 
(see Friedmann 2005), emerged in the 1970s-1980s, “incorporating postcolonial states into an 
imperial field of power to legitimize and expand capitalist markets as the vehicle of ‘national’ 
economic growth and modernity” (McMichael 2009, 141). For Gupta, food regimes have been 
instrumental in the formation of development discourse, a narrative according to which 
teleological beliefs of “progress” shape political and economic organization to bring them in line 
with Western ideals of modernity (see also Moore 2005; Rist 2007). In this chapter, I focus 
mainly on the second and third food regimes, which are the basis for the formation of rationalities
deployed in the context of, respectively, the formation of postcolonial modern India and the 
liberalization of the Indian national economy that corresponded to the alignment of governments 
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with capitalist interests (Friedmann 1982; Friedmann and McMichael 1989; McMichael 2009). I 
use the logic of accumulation in the second and third food regimes as a guide to contextualize the
logic of development that informs Indian food policies and politics and, more precisely, the 
infrastructure of rationing in India and related interventions in the agricultural sector. 
Policies are always articulated with a purpose; they are designed and implemented to 
address particular perceived needs to regulate the biorhythm of the population. Policies are also a 
construct; they reflect the discursive modalities of their respective food regimes. By tracing the 
history of food policies in India, this chapter explores how the postcolonial government has 
responded to the social problem of chronic hunger. In India, the issue of chronic hunger has 
traversed the country’s postcolonial history (Dandekar and Rath 1971a, 1971b; Drèze and Sen 
2013; Sen 2013; Shah 1949), and has, as a result, been intricately linked to the construction of the
modern nation (Gupta 2012). The need for food, and the government’s responsibility to provide 
for such a need, has been rather uncontroversial and widely acknowledged across modern epochs.
This is, after all, the biopolitical raison d’être of modern governments: to secure the well-being 
of the population (Foucault 1991). What has been controversial, however, is the scope of 
governmental interventions deemed sufficient and necessary to satisfy the population’s nutritional
needs.
As Nancy Fraser argues, needs are interpretative, and this quality is inherently political;
needs have a “relational structure . . . they have the form ‘A needs x in order of y’” (1989, 163). It
is precisely this relational structure that begs questions such as: Who gets to interpret who is 
needy? What type of needs should be satisfied? Who gets excluded from the articulation of public
discourse? How do cultural and political processes give an authoritative voice to some 
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interpreters over others? These interrogations all focus not necessarily on the satisfactions of 
needs, per se, but on discourses about needs—and specifically, how such discourses frame 
governmental interventions. In this chapter, thus, I situate food policies in relation to discourses 
about needs and their corresponding food regime.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first, I discuss the establishment 
of the PDS, India’s infrastructure of rationing, during the Second World War and its deployment 
through key biopolitical interventions shortly before and well after Indian independence in 1947. 
I demonstrate how the socialist regime implemented by Nehruvian politicians and experts was 
developed to devalue the price of food grains in order to stabilize the infrastructure of rationing in
urban areas and promote India’s industrialization. Under this regime, as I show, the nutritional 
need for food was interpreted in Malthusian terms, where the production of national wealth and 
the import of cheap food were positioned as key strategies to alleviate poverty and chronic 
hunger.
In the second section, I examine the relation between scientific techniques of food 
production known as the “Green Revolution,” Indira Gandhi’s populism, and the expansion of the
PDS across the country. I critically document how socialist food policies were articulated in a 
populist recasting of the state’s responsibilities, designed under Gandhi’s rule to raise the poorest 
segments of the population above an arbitrary level. For more than two decades, the 
infrastructure of rationing expanded to increasingly reach the poorest members of the population, 
who typically reside in rural areas. 
The formulation of Indian postcolonial food policies have espoused successive 
governmental rationalities between the Second World War and 2000. These rationalities echoed 
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prevalent global food regimes and debates leading up to the formulation of perceived needs of a 
population, which instituted, over the years, national food economies. Under Gandhi, such a 
process led to the multiplication of points of distribution, called Fair Price Shops (hereafter, FPSs
or ration shops).
In the third section, I build on Çalışkan and Callon’s (2009, 2010) insights about 
economization—which explore how the science of economics shapes behaviour, activities, and 
fields as economic—to question how FPSs emulate market processes in the distribution of 
rations. I explore how in the 1990s, the economic liberalization of the socialist regime in India 
shaped the infrastructure of rationing according to the neoliberal rationality of government. The 
neoliberal rhetoric of welfare efficiency and civic responsibility took a prominent place in the 
interpretation of people’s needs, and as a result, the distribution of rations in FPSs reflected new 
economic modalities. In the third section, therefore, I examine how the neoliberalization of the 
TPDS engineered a series of economic processes that changed the practice of ration distribution. 
Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how the infrastructure of rationing, in the early 2000s, was 
caught in a productive tension between the welfare functions of the (T)PDS (maintaining the 
welfare of poor citizens) and its dysfunctions (leakages). 
2.2 The Politics of Hunger Under Nehru
After the country gained independence in 1947, and until the late 1970s, only one party,
the Indian National Congress (hereafter, the Congress), ruled India.18 Inspired by the economic 
18 In 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru occupied the position of Vice President of the Viceroy’s Executive Council to assist 
with the transition of power between the British Raj and the newly independent countries of the Indian 
subcontinent, India and Pakistan. The Congress elected Nehru to become the first prime minister of India, a 
position that he occupied until his death in 1964. Following his death, Gulzarilal Nanda acted as the second 
prime minister of India for three weeks until the Nehruvian socialist Lal Bahadur Shastri was chosen by the 
Congress to succeed Nehru. He remained in office for 19 months, until his demise in January 1966.
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planning of other socialist regimes, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s central government19 
instituted the Planning Commission in 1950 to develop and execute five-year plans, blueprints 
that provided the building blocks on which India would be developed. Under Nehru’s leadership, 
interventions in the economy, the planning and guiding of economic growth, and the promotion 
of welfare were heavily centralized between the commanding height of the Government of India 
(GoI) and its ruling party, the Congress. According to Partha Chatterjee, “[t]his was perhaps the 
principal governmental function that legitimized the position of the Congress leadership within 
the new post-colonial state” (1997, 12). The objectives of the first three five-year plans were to 
transition India from an agrarian society to a modern and industrialized one. Nehruvian 
developmentalism stemmed from the belief that modernization and economic prosperity would 
mechanically translate into welfare provision for the people. For K. T. Shah, a member of the 
National Planning Committee set up by Nehru in 1938, the aim of economic planning was to 
“produce a balanced economic structure,” in which India would be “at least self-sufficient” 
enough to feed its population on a diet of 2,400 to 2,800 kcal per person (1949, 48–49). In this 
section, I explore how the infrastructure of rationing, under Nehru’s leadership, was developed to 
sustain the central government’s economic objectives.
“Before 1939,” notes the former Indian Civil Servant Henry F. Knight, “the [colonial] 
Government of India [or British Raj] had made no plans for the food supply for the civilian 
population” (1954, 269). The colonial presumption at that time was that the domestic production 
of food grains through “traditional” agricultural methods and the importation of rice from Burma,
a British colony until 1937, would be largely sufficient for feeding the entire Indian population. 
19 India has been a federal state since its independence in 1947. Its central government, the Government of India 
(GoI), now oversees 29 states and seven union territories, including the National Capital Territory (NCT), which 
is commonly called Delhi, all of which have local jurisdictions.
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Later, following the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe and on the frontier of the 
Indian colony, the British Raj implemented two key interventions: a campaign to subsidize food 
production, called the Grow More Food Campaign, and rationing practices. These were initially 
deployed to minimally protect Indians against the economic and political ravages of war. They 
were later maintained to sustain Indians during poor harvest conditions and civil unrest that 
resulted from the partition of the subcontinent into two countries, India and Pakistan (Knight 
1954; Srimanjari 2009). 
The Grow More Food Campaign was originally deployed by the British Raj to 
encourage the expansion of the surface area of food production and the intensification of harvests
to sustain the country’s war efforts. However, the initial design of the campaign seemed to have 
been improvised, and by the end of the war, colonial authorities were incapable of measuring 
whether or not irrigation works and other programs had actually increased food production or if 
higher yields during that period had resulted from favourable monsoon rains (Sherman 2013, 7). 
In 1947, when the colony was divided into two independent countries, two fertile regions, Punjab
and Bengal, were partially cut off from India’s domestic markets, which reduced the aggregate 
quantity of food available to feed the newly independent India’s citizens. In this post-
independence context, the Grow More Food Campaign was initially maintained as a nationalistic 
effort to produce more food. National food self-sufficiency was critical, Nehru insisted in a radio 
address: “If we do not produce enough food for our country, we become dependent upon other 
countries, and in a matter like food we cannot afford to be dependent” (Sherman 2013, 8–9).20 
20 Although the Grow More Food Campaign was initially established in 1943, it is only after independence that the 
campaign became an integral component of plans to develop and expand India’s agrarian sector (Sharma 1980). 
Through governmental subsidies and loans to farmers, the government planned to buy more domestically 
produced grains—at a price that was cheaper than what they could find on the international market at the time—
to distribute in areas of food deficit. By 1947-1949, the country’s food situation had become less precarious, but 
food supply remained low. Fearing the detrimental effects of drought or flood, the Advisory Planning Board 
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The Grow More Food Campaign served as a call for every Indian citizen to participate in the 
national project of food self-sufficiency.21
However, in the first few years following independence, weather conditions worsened, 
food availability declined, and popular criticism of the Grow More Food Campaign arose.22 
“Imagining a nation,” it turns out, “was not the same as feeding one” (Sherman 2013, 11). By 
December 1950, during the Conference of Food Ministers in Bombay, governmental officials 
concluded that the Grow More Food Campaign had largely failed—that the funding allocated 
through its subsidies had had no “incremental effect” on aggregate food production (National 
Archives of India file No. BP 301[1]/52). Furthermore, as stated in the Grow More Food 
Campaign Report of 1952, farmers had been given little incentive to produce cheap food to 
promote the industrialization of urban areas (in Chopra 1981, 62).23 The campaign was thus 
abandoned in 1951-1952. It was not mentioned in any of the 39 chapters of the First Plan (1951-
56); however, the modernization of India’s agrarian sector and the development of food self-
sufficiency were stressed as prime concerns in this document.
pursued the Grow More Food Campaign to promote food self-sufficiency in every state. In the words of Nehru, 
this was a fight against the “ignorance” of peasants who still relied on traditional modes of production that 
conflicted with his development ideals of modernization (in Sherman 2013, 9; see also Chopra 1981). 
21 Surely, Nehru assumed, food could be an instrument of economic nationalism in a “war in which every citizen 
can be a solider and can serve his or her country” (Sherman 2013, 10). 
22 In 1951, some 50,000 people marched down the streets of Delhi, chanting, “hungry and naked India demands 
bread, clothing, and houses” and “a government that cannot end blackmarketing [sic] and corruption has no right
to exist” (Sherman 2013, 18). With elections just around the corner, the need to clothe and feed Indians garnered 
growing attention in political circles.
23 Despite the criticisms that it faced, the Grow More Food Campaign did constitute a critical building block in the 
construction of a modern architecture of governance in India and the institution of localized development blocks 
and community development centres (Sahi 1967). The campaign also succeeded in drawing the attention of 
policy makers and promoting the capitalization of the agricultural industry—a state responsibility—in order to: 
(a) expand the area of cultivable lands; (b) expand crop density yields; and (c) construct nationalist ideals of 
independence from the global market by implementing new agricultural technologies and political mechanisms. 
It established the idea that the central government would need to finance the country’s agricultural production by
subsidizing modernized modes of agriculture through incentives administered by the collection of local political 
bodies: panchayat and officials from development blocks and districts. 
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A second colonial intervention that was maintained after independence was rationing, 
which was characterized in 1946 by B. R. Sen, the Food Secretary to the Government of India, as
“the most effective means of enforcing equality of sacrifice and equitable distribution.”24 Equality
and equity are, of course, commensurable to the larger contexts in which they are measured. Take
Great Britain, for instance. Political scientist Tarangini Sriranam (2014) reminds us that, during 
the Second World War, rationing practices in Great Britain were designed to control scarce and 
valuable commodities, such as eggs, meat, or butter, for the vast majority of the population, while
less valuable commodities, such as bread and potatoes, were available in unlimited quantities. 
Rationing practices in India took a different form. First, rationing was only statutory in urban 
areas of India.25 Second, rationing practices covered essential staple food items, such as wheat 
and rice, as well as other commodities that were deemed necessary for the army, including cloth, 
fuels (e.g., coal, mineral fuels, petroleum), and medicines. As Historian Indivar Kamtekar 
strikingly illustrates, rationing practices in the colony were diametrically opposed to those in 
Great Britain: 
In  Britain,  the  ration  merely  determined  what  a  person  ate;  in  India,  it  might
determine whether a person ate at all. British rationing carried, for the majority of
people, connotations of equality; Indian rationing offered, to a minority of Indians, a
promise of subsistence. (in Sriraman 2014, 46)
Unsurprisingly, then, food rations were prized in the subcontinent.
To enable access to rationed goods, rations cards were mainly issued to families living 
24 Sen uttered these words during the Standing Committee of the Chamber of the Prince, on March 13, 1946 
(National Archives of India, BP 201 [1946], p. 7).
25 Statutory rationing only took place in urban areas of India, where ration card holders only had access to a certain
quantity of food grains and commodities, fixed by the state, at a prescribed rate. The food economy was under 
government control. Any violations of the statutory orders—from ration card holders, shop owners, or anyone 
else—was punishable by law. Non-statutory rationing took place mainly in rural areas, where rationing practices 
were implemented to supplement the open market (see Chopra 1981). 
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in urban areas, in all sections of society, irrespective of classes or castes.26 Sriranam (2014) 
describes two challenges that informed the distribution of these ration cards: hoarding and 
jurisdiction (see also National Archives of India, R-1014[10] [1943]). In areas of statutory 
rationing (in cities), ration cards and licenses to trade food were distributed in an attempt to instill
confidence, among consumers, producers, and traders, in the ability of the state to secure food for
all. Hoarding was deemed to be a major hindrance to the circulation of food grains and, 
ultimately, to the proper functioning of the infrastructure of rationing. Colonial drain, poor 
harvests resulting from poor weather conditions or pest damage, and price volatility certainly 
contributed to the institution of rationing (Sen 2013; Srimanjari 2009).27 However, long queues 
outside of food supply stores, strikes by grain merchants, and the occurrence of hoarding more 
generally also enticed colonial authorities to enforce control over the food economy, in order to 
pace the distribution of food to the population and prevent any kind of insurgence, civil 
disobedience, or revolt—an effort that ended up being rather unsuccessful (Bhattacharya 2001; 
Srimanjari 2009). 
Ration cards were also critical instruments for monitoring the identities of deserving 
26 The contours of the ration card are rather messy. Not all ration cards granted the same rations. Rationing 
documents were typically issued to households because that approach was thought to be cheaper and easier to 
administer, but individual ration cards were also distributed to industrial workers and government employees 
(Sriraman 2014).
27 Bombay (Mumbai) was the first city to introduce rationing, which it implemented as early as 1939. By 1943, 
twelve other cities, including New Delhi, had implemented rationing schemes; however, rationing was still seen 
as largely unjustified across the British Raj and the princely estates. After the Burmese invasion by Japan (1942-
45) and the Bengal Famines (1942-44), hunger began to spread dangerously throughout the subcontinent. The 
imposition of a coordinated food plan quickly came to be seen as critical for contending with the rapid decrease 
in food supply for the colony’s civil population. By 1944, 103 cities were rationed. In 1945, the number 
increased to 516. More than 150 million people were covered by a rationing scheme, representing about an 
eighth of the entire population of the British Raj. Rationing in rural areas was deemed unnecessary, based on the 
belief that farmers could grow and eat their own produce and pay their landless labourers in kind. After the 
Second World War, rationing measures were abandoned for several months, until the collapse of crop production 
in South India galvanized the movement towards rationing again. By 1946, 771 towns and rural areas were under
a rationing scheme. That number grew to 878 in 1947, reaching around 45% of the registered population 
(Chopra 1981).
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beneficiaries. Historically, notes Sriranam (2014), the deployment of welfare programs is always 
accompanied by a governmental obsession with filtering and adjudicating the populations that are
deemed deserving of welfare support from those that are deemed alien to it, most notably 
migrants and homeless people. Although federal in its design, the infrastructure of rationing in 
India has been (and still is) provincial or regional in its implementation. During the British Raj, 
each provincial government was responsible for the deployment of rationing in cities within its 
own jurisdiction. Similarly, after independence, state governments were responsible for properly 
implementing the central government’s food rationing plans. Censuses and surveys were 
conducted across statutory areas to carefully monitor the subjects deemed deserving of rations, as
well as those that were deemed less or not deserving. Residence became (and still is) a clear 
bureaucratic marker of belonging and the central category for the dissemination of ration cards, 
which eventually made the ration card the key identification document (ID) that testified 
residence in the city. In contrast, lack of residence proved to be a critical factor for exclusion 
from welfare programs. That is not to say that migrant workers and homeless people did not 
obtain ration cards in statutory areas. They did, especially shortly before and after Partition, when
massive flows of migrants reached urban centres, such as Delhi and Calcutta. However, the ration
cards that were distributed to migrant workers and homeless people were always labelled as such,
and the rations allocated to these cardholders were temporary and smaller in volume than those 
granted to other residents. Over time, the use of temporary ration cards opened up arbitrary 
spaces for bureaucratic officials to determine whether or not applicants could extend their use of 
ration cards or access other welfare programs, such as housing schemes under the jurisdiction of 
state governments (Sriraman 2014, 62). 
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By 1947, the infrastructure of rationing in India had been compromised by the price 
volatility of food in the global market. In a nutshell, India could not afford the infrastructure of 
rationing. In the aftermath of independence, in December 1947, the Foodgrains Policy Committee
of 1947 proposed a gradual rollback of rationing commitments and a policy of decontrol. But this
shift in food policy did not last long. As early as September 1948, floods and droughts forced the 
government to reintroduce measures to increase domestic food production and reinstate rationing.
The Government of India restored its control over the food economy. In an effort to manage the 
price volatility of food grains and prevent hoarding, food zones were drawn to restrain the 
movement of grains within the Indian territory, from “surplus” to “deficit” zones.28 
In the first decade after independence, the government switched back and forth between
exercising total control and relaxing control over its food economy. “The basic weakness seemed 
to be the absence of a well-defined co-ordinated food policy,” R. N. Chopra, the former chairman
of the Food Corporation of India (FCI), has argued (1981, 8). On the one hand, when the food 
economy was under total state control, the government’s commitments to rationing were higher 
than its corresponding procurements. Not enough food was available to hand out rations to every 
ration card holder. On the other hand, total decontrol was not desirable either. It left the newly 
independent India at the mercy of uncertainties linked to “traditional” methods of food 
production (e.g., flood, drought). For instance, in 1953, wheat and coarse grains were freed from 
restrictions of movement across food zones. However, buffer stocks of food grains29 remained 
28 Food zones are cordoned-off areas, from which the movement of food is restricted. Since food grains cannot be 
moved beyond the frontiers of these zones by non-government agencies or individuals, market prices are 
devaluated to reach procurement prices. Surplus can thus be bought by agencies at procurement prices and 
moved to deficit areas. In the 1940s and 1950s, food zones corresponded to areas of food production in India; for
example, Punjab and the Delhi territory formed one food zone. Since the mid-1960s, food zones tend to be 
conflated with states’ geopolitical territories.
29 A “buffer stock” is a supply of food grains that is used to prevent the collapse of market value in good crop 
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low. In the following years, the poor harvests of 1954-1955, coupled with low buffer stocks, 
created a critical shortage of food supplies. India responded by configuring food zones once again
to control soaring food grains prices and reinstating rationing practices. 
In 1957, the Foodgrains Enquiry Committee proposed a long-term plan that aimed to 
strike a balance between total control and decontrol of the food economy. Rationing practices 
were extended30 and zonal policies were instituted to create cordoned regions in which the prices 
of food grains would stabilize (Mooij 1998, 82–83). Calling for “the mobilization of popular 
energies on a national scale,” as much as “understanding and co-operation from the people,” the 
Foodgrains Enquiry Committee (1957, 133) recommended flexible regulatory control of the trade
of food grains that allowed for the sale and purchase of those grains in the open market when 
conditions permitted, the distribution of licences to traders, and the construction of a food grains 
buffer stock (Chopra 1981, 8, 96–98). Already in 1955, the Essential Commodity Act was 
designed to grant powers to the central government to regulate the production, supply, and 
distribution of foods to gradually increase its buffer stock for “securing their equitable 
distribution and availability at fair prices, or for . . . the efficient conduct of military operations” 
(GoI 1955, sec. 3). The infrastructure of rationing expanded; more licenses to operate ration 
shops, called FPSs, “where food is sold to consumers at a ‘fair price,’” were opened; and more 
ration cards were delivered, especially in rural areas (Chopra 1981, 94).31 
production years and ensure the availability and stability of food grains in bad years.
30 Ration shops, called fair price shops (FPSs), were privately or collectively run shops, operated under licences 
distributed by each state’s food department, which buys subsidized grains from agencies at issued prices and 
sells it back to ration card holders at fixed prices. Profits are predetermined at a particular rate basis.
31 In the First Plan (1951-56), the Public Distribution System (PDS) was operated to channel food from rural to 
urban regions and other deficit areas. The Second Plan (1956–1961) and Third Plan (1961–1966) aimed to 
expand the items sold in FPSs, including raw materials and a few other consumer goods, and to encourage the 
formation of cooperative rather than private traders to run the FPSs.
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The Foodgrains Enquiry Committee sought to modify rationing practices from the 
provision of temporary relief in times of food crisis to a more perennial and centralized welfare 
program, which would later be called the Public Distribution System (PDS) in the Fifth Plan 
(1974-79).32 Yet, and it is important to stress, the committee planned for measures of rationing to 
serve as a supplementary mode of food provision. At the time, as Chopra argues, it was thought 
that, “[a]s the production of food increases, controlled and rationed distribution of food grains 
through the [PDS] decreases” (1981, 210). Administrators believed that the food situation would 
significantly improve, leading people who lived in urban areas to increasingly get their food 
grains or other commodities from somewhere other than a ration shop. In practice, however, the 
PDS grew in cities into a universal system of distribution of subsidized commodities “irrespective
of income” (Chopra 1981, 206). Under Nehru's rule, the infrastructure of rationing was gradually 
implemented in cities as a way to feed urban areas, which were considered to be the engine of 
modernization.
However, it soon became clear that without increased food imports, the implementation
of a perennial rationing infrastructure was not feasible. By 1954-1955, the food situation in India 
had become dire. Buffer stocks in the country were too low, and poor weather conditions 
impaired the domestic food production required to sustain the PDS. The First Plan was coming to
an end, and despite investment in farming and irrigation, it was widely recognized in the Second 
Plan (1956-1961) that “[a]griculture may fall short of the mark” (Planning Commission 1956, 
para. 32). The Second Plan (1956-1961), which promoted heavy industrialization in urban India, 
shied away from national food self-sufficiency as a goal and promoted a greater acceptance of 
food imports. Rather than drawing from domestic food production, the newly independent state 
32 To facilitate the articulation of the argument, I refer to the architecture of rationing as the PDS.
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had little choice but to turn to global markets in order to pursue the industrialization process. The 
authors of the Second Plan stated:
It would, of course, be desirable on psychological as well as administrative grounds
to avoid as far as possible control and rationing of the necessities of life like, for
instance, food grains. On the other hand, high or rising prices of primary necessities
are apt to create serious difficulties. The basic remedy for a situation of scarcity or
shortage  is,  of  course,  an  increase  in  supplies,  and,  to  an  extent  when  domestic
supplies  are  deficient,  imports  may  be  inescapable.  (Planning  Commission  1956,
para. 33)
In March 1954 and May 1956, India imported 0.9 and 2 million tons of rice respectively from 
Burma (Knight 1954, 78, 84). In August 1956, India came to an accord with the United States to 
import 3.1 million tons of wheat and 0.19 million tons of rice (Chopra 1981, 87). For the rest of 
Nehru’s tenure, these imports quickly became the tapping source for the infrastructure of 
rationing (Chopra 1981, 210), to the point where the central government attempted to introduce 
wheat in rice-eating areas to change the food habits of rice-eaters. Importing food to sustain the 
PDS was a cornerstone strategy for ensuring the channelling of food to cities in which the 
industrialization of the country was taking place.
In 1954, the US created its food aid program by adopting the US Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act, generally referred to as Public Law 480 (PL-480), which 
among other aims, facilitated the dumping of surplus American grains, mostly corn and wheat, in 
national markets of the Global South at a fraction of its actual value. Since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, the US government had heavily subsidized its agricultural sector in order to 
encourage farmers to increase their farms’ outputs. American production continued to rise well 
into the post-war period, to the point where the storage of cereals became too costly and 
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detrimental to American farmers33 (see Clapp 2012, 28; Friedmann 1982). 
With the passing of PL-480, large surpluses that would have otherwise driven the value 
of food grains down in the US, and thus adversely affected the American agricultural sector, were
transformed into a powerful geopolitical levy. The American food aid program was designed to 
form political alliances with recipient countries, which would, once sufficiently “developed,” 
become trading partners. When Cold War tensions intensified, PL-480 explicitly became an 
instrument to counter the diffusion of communism in the Global South (Clapp 2012, 30–31; 
Mitchell 2004). 
Between 1958 and 1966, most of the 50 million tons of food grains imported into India 
came from the US (Chopra 1981; Mooij 1998, 83). PL-480 wheat was exclusively distributed 
through the PDS for rationing purposes. With good measures, PL-480 enabled the central 
government to extend PDS coverage and reach an increasing number of people. The off-take of 
grain from FPSs more than tripled from 1962-1966, reaching 280 million Indians by 1967 
(Chopra 1981, 210)—an increase that would not have been possible without American wheat. 
The PL-480 wheat sent to India between 1956-1967 was worth 3.5 billion USD (₹ 1690 crores),34
of which 1.8 billion USD (₹ 878 crores) were paid for with loans and 661 million USD (₹ 316 
crores) with grants (Chopra 1981, 120). India not only became increasingly dependent on PL-480
wheat for its rationing infrastructure, but the country’s debt also proliferated. 
When the Indian-American food aid agreement expired in 1965, the US agreed to 
maintain the flow of food aid provision, on the condition that India would begin to fully 
33 The accumulation of food grains in the US had a depressive effect on the price of those grains, which in the end, 
began to affect its heavily subsidized production.
34 1 crore is equal to 1,00,00,000 (or 10,000,000 in Western notation). So, 1690 crores is the equivalent of 
16,90,00.00,000 (or 16,900,000,000 in Western notation), or 16.9 billion.
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modernize its agricultural sector (Clapp 2012, 37). PL-480 wheat supply was on a “short tether” 
(Clapp 2012, 37; Gupta 1998, 60). In 1966, when India faced a significant food crisis, it imported
10 million tons of wheat, but not without making several concessions to the United States:
.  .  .  that  for seven years  the government  should no longer  have control  over  the
pricing  and  distribution  of  fertilizers  by  private  fertilizer  firms;  that  the  Indian
government should drop its demand for fifty-one per cent ownership of joint ventures
in  the  fertilizer  field;  that  greater  latitude  be  allowed  to  American  private  firms
operating in India; that India should stop trading with North Vietnam. Apart from this,
India's  devaluation  of  the  rupee  by  36.5  per  cent  on  6  June  1966  was  strongly
influenced by American pressure. (Byres and Crow 1983, 27, note 1 in Mooij 1998,
83)
With an entire infrastructure of rationing that depended almost exclusively on PL-480 wheat, 
India had little choice but to comply with these conditions. According to Jos Mooij (1998), it is 
unlikely that India needed so much food grains, but with the heavy industrialization of urban 
centres that had been well under way since the Second Plan (1956-1961), feeding urban areas via 
the PDS remained critically important. However, importing high volumes of PL-480 wheat also 
had adverse effects on domestic food production. The dumping of cheap PL-480 wheat drove the 
value of food grains down in the country and, accordingly, adversely impacted the agricultural 
sector and small-scale farmers’ income and means of production, contributing to the flow of 
migrants towards cities.
In the mid-1960s, India was caught in political turmoil. Soon after the elections of 
1962, Nehru’s leadership and socialist vision of the development state began to be contested. 
Nehru remained in office until the day he passed away, on May 27, 1964, and left behind him a 
divided Congress. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the new agriculture minister, 
Chidambaran Subramaniam, both championed a departure from urban industrialization in favour 
69
of an increased focus on the modernization of the agricultural sector (Gupta 1998, 60; 
Swaminathan 2013). In fact, Subramaniam openly criticized the Nehruvian approach to 
development by insisting on the importance of “high production” of food (cited in Gupta 1998, 
61). This marked a dramatic shift in food policy, and a reinterpretation of people’s needs. In the 
mid-1960s, food production fluctuated. It peaked in 1964-1965, only to plummet in 1965-1967. 
Buffer stocks were low, droughts were severe, food scarcity peaked, and starvation loomed over 
the country. Importing PL-480 wheat helped to relieve this situation, but it left the agricultural 
sector in despair. India was critically dependent on foreign food supplies. It is in this context that 
food self-sufficiency resurfaced as a nationalistic objective.
2.3 The Green Revolution and Indira Gandhi’s Populism
In 1966, in exchange for much needed PL-480 wheat, the US commanded India to 
modernize its agricultural sector. But by the time that President Lyndon B. Johnson pressured 
India to do so, the adoption of scientific techniques was already part of the country’s plans.35 
While the modernization of agriculture was not a foreign imposition on India’s sovereign food 
policies, one can concede, as Gupta (1998) does,36 that the country’s dependence on PL-480 
wheat precipitated efforts to implement what would be known as the “Green Revolution.” In this 
section, I examine how the modernization of Indian agriculture was intricately embedded in the 
35 By the early 1960s, both the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation had begun to fund research 
institutes in India, some of which had been established in Delhi as early as 1905 during the British Raj (Unger 
2014).
36 While referring to the Green Revolution as a driving force pulling the Indian postcolonial state into modernity, 
Gupta posits the following: 
An understanding of the broader discursive field of development discourse and the role of ‘scientific’ 
agriculture within it, for example, qualifies the debate about whether the Green Revolution was imposed on 
India by external actors for geostrategic reasons and to promote the interests of capital or whether it was 
independently arrived at by the Indian government . . . . it is important to keep in mind that both strategies are 
compatible with a broader vision of what constitutes development, what it means to be a ‘modern’ nation, and, 
very important, what the order of nation-states should look like. (1998, 105)
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politics of US food aid in the 1960s and became intertwined with Indira Gandhi’s perception of 
the population’s needs, which in turn decisively shaped the infrastructure of rationing.
The term “Green Revolution” was coined in 1968 by an administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), William Gaud, who attempted to capture 
its geopolitical character: “It is not a violent red revolution like that of the Soviets, nor is it a 
white revolution like that of the Shah of Iran . . . I call it the Green Revolution” (in Clapp 2012, 
34). Yet as Raj Patel argues, the Green Revolution is “a biopolitical as well as a geopolitical” 
project (2013, 4). The fundamental assumption underlying the Green Revolution was that the use 
of modern techniques of production would inevitably lead to growth in food production, which 
was needed to feed millions of hungry people, and thus prevent the threat of communism from 
spreading perhaps more easily in the Global South.37 
The Green Revolution38 is a scientific attempt to master natural hazards by modulating 
the impacts of pests and weather conditions using fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation techniques:
a “quick fix” in the words of Vandana Shiva (1991). This “quick fix” offered what seemed to be 
an ideal solution to the Indian government, which had to act promptly to withdraw the country 
from the conditions imposed by the US in 1966 (Gupta 1998, 61). Between 1964-1965 and 1975-
37 Although it could have been implemented anywhere, the Green Revolution was deployed exclusively in the 
Global South, where population growth was considered to be out of control. What came under scrutiny with the 
Green Revolution, however, was the belief that an exponential growth in the human population—mostly located 
in the Global South—would lead humanity to its downfall. When he accepted his Nobel Prize in 1970, Borlaug 
lauded the “temporary success in man’s war against hunger.” However, he did so not without warning that 
“unless the frightening power of human reproduction was curbed, the success of the Green Revolution would 
only be ephemeral” (Borlaug 2000, 490). 
38 Among other developments, one thing that resulted from Green Revolution experiments in the early 1960s is a 
robust hybrid seed—Nobel Prize recipient Norman Borlaug’s “miracle seed”—that was crafted through the 
breeding of dwarfed varieties of wheat plants from Japan (Clapp 2012, 34). Hybrid seeds require more water 
(and thus irrigation), pesticides, and fertilizer, but they are more robust. Thus, when they are grown in a given 
area with adequate inputs, hybrid varieties produce higher yields than traditional seeds. The robustness of these 
seeds is what made them “miraculous”: there is no need to expand and develop more fertile lands to produce 
more food with them. 
71
1976, the average annual growth rate of wheat production reached 7.9%, compared to 3.9% in the
previous decades (Chopra 1981, 286).39 In the beginning of the Third Plan (1961–1966), 
academic institutions had already been funded by the Government of India to research high-
yielding variety (HYV) seeds, which were then tested in seven different districts.40 Since HYV 
seeds need more water than “traditional” seeds to grow, the Green Revolution took place in farms
that were already well irrigated in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana.41 In the words of B. 
Venkateswarlu, “[i]t appears, in our efforts to develop modern technology for problem areas, we 
perfected technology for non-problem areas only” (1985, 2). If the objective of the Green 
Revolution was to construct a national economy that was self-sufficient in terms of food 
production, regardless of its natural and social impacts,42 then it worked fairly well. From 1976-
1977, 82% of the total procurement of food grains to be channelled into the infrastructure of 
rationing came from the HYV wheat fields of Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh (Chopra 1981, 
192). 
To oversee the new economy of domestic food grains, the Government of India 
39 Between 1964-1965 and 1971-1972 in India, the total productivity of wheat more than doubled and the yield per 
hectare rose by more than 50%. In 1975-1976, the total production of food grains reached 121 million tons; 
procurement reached 13 million tons; and the buffer stock peaked at 18 million tons, which was more than twice 
as much as what was projected in the Fourth Plan (1966-1971) (Chopra 1981, 130–31, 164–65).
40 Furthermore, in 1963, Borlaug sent 150 species of dwarf wheat to the Punjab Agricultural University.
41 The sudden increase in crop yield (mostly wheat) bore fruits mostly in places where existing technical and 
scientific infrastructure and institutions were already in place: in the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar 
Pradesh, as well as in some areas of Southern India, in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra (Chopra 
1981, 131).
42 To this day, the successes of the Green Revolution have not been experienced in areas that are badly irrigated or 
water depleted—where water-intensive crops do not grow easily. The Green Revolution’s effects on nature are 
plural and well documented. For example, they include increased prominence of superweeds, groundwater 
depletion, erosion and draining of farmland, and loss of biodiversity, to name a few (Moore 2012). The Green 
Revolution has also profoundly altered power dynamics of class and gender (Patel 2013; Shiva 1991) and the 
concentration of political power in rural areas of India (Gupta 1998; Mooij 1999). These effects are quickly 
dismissed as inconsequential by proponents of the Green Revolution, who argue that increases in cereal 
productivity actually saved India, if not the world, from widespread hunger (Borlaug 2000; Chopra 1981; 
Swaminathan 1982). 
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established two institutions. The first was the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC),43 which 
was created in 1965 to recommend procurement prices to the central government for the 
infrastructure of rationing. The second was the Food Corporation of India (FCI), which was 
instructed to: (a) develop and maintain a buffer stock; (b) distribute food grains to “economically 
vulnerable section of society” via the PDS; and (c) buy food grains at a minimum support price 
(MSP) from farmers, according to APC recommendations (Kumar 2015). After 1965, the 
infrastructure of rationing was much more responsive to economic experts and planners of the 
FCI and the APC. The regime of cheap food driven by US food dumping morphed into a new 
regime of development, steered by institutional support for rural landowners. Institutions such as 
the FCI and the APC were established to stabilize the value of food grains, which provided an 
incentive to farmers to produce food grains for the PDS and to keep private trade in check, while 
addressing the needs of PDS users (Swaminathan 2000). Over the decades that ensued, the 
coverage of the PDS expanded to increasingly cover rural areas. The PDS had the dual objectives
of distributing food to the population and at a rate intended to regulate the domestic production of
food grains.
The formation of the FCI and the APC, and thus the institutionalization of the 
administration of subsidized prices, occurred during the tenure of the second prime minister of 
India, Lal Bahadur Shastri—an “agriculturist at heart,” in the words of the geneticist known as 
the father of the Green Revolution in India, Mankombu Sambasivan Swaminathan. When Shastri 
passed away in 1966, members of the Congress elected Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Nehru, as 
43 The Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) is now known as the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices 
(CACP). The CACP’s mandate is fairly similar to that of the ACP: it recommends the establishment of yearly 
“minimum support prices (MSPs) to incentivize the cultivators to adopt modern technology, and raise 
productivity” (quoted from Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, GoI n.d.).
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the leader of the party and the prime minister of India. Gandhi's tenure lasted from 1966-1984.44 
According to Yoginder K. Alagh, the head of the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning 
Commission in the mid-1970s, India owes to Gandhi its national food self-sufficiency (2017). In 
fact, for Swaminathan, Gandhi “clearly saw the link between food self sufficiency (sic) and our 
ability to adopt an independent foreign policy” (Swaminathan 2013, 186). In the first few months 
after she was elected leader of the Congress, Gandhi met with Swaminathan to strategize on 
issues related to the prevailing food politics of India. On this meeting, Swaminathan writes:
I met her at her residence in late 1966 . . . the first question she asked me was, ‘how
soon can we build a food grain buffer stock of 10 million tonnes?’ I was a bit taken
aback by this question, but on reflection, I realised that we had imported 10 million
tonnes of wheat  in 1966 at  the cost of heavy political  humiliation.  I  replied,  ‘we
should be able to build a grain reserve of 10 million tonnes by early 1970s, if farmers
can be assured a remunerative price.’ (2013, 186)
What led the Green Revolution to be a celebrated success story, according to Swaminathan, is 
Gandhi's enthusiasm for a synergy between technology and public policy to entice farmers to 
modernize their agricultural practices—an enthusiasm that was not so prevalent during Nehru's 
rule.
Until 1966, elitist interventions in the Nehruvian style ranged far and wide, at the 
44 During the elections of 1967, the Congress did poorly and became divided. Sixty-two members, along with 
Morarji Desai, left the Congress to form the Indian National Congress (Organization) (INC-O). For the first time
since 1947, the Congress was met with a challenging opposition. Gandhi was able to restore her leadership 
within the rest of the Congress, which was renamed the Indian National Congress (Ruling) (INC-R), thanks to 
her three-pronged plan for the country and government: (a) to make the state the primary provider of welfare 
services; (b) to modernize agricultural development and stimulate a political relationship with landowners and 
well-to-do farmers; and (c) to mark a clear division with Nehruvian politics, notably by centralizing state power 
in Delhi and linking it to Gandhi as a strong leader (Chatterjee 1997, 18–24). A decade later, after declaring a 
state of emergency from 1975-1977, Gandhi reinstated the constitution and called general elections in 1977. 
Desai was declared the leader of the elected Janata Party and became the first non-Congress prime minister of 
India (1977-1979). Internal dissension within the Janata Party and allegations of corruption forced Desai to 
resign in 1979 and eventually led the president of India, N. Sanjiva Reddy, to dissolve parliament. In the 
elections of 1980, Gandhi, at the head of a newly formed political party called the Congress-I (I for Indira), won 
a majority in parliament. She remained in position until 1984, when she was assassinated. Her son, Rajiv 
Gandhi, was named head of the Congress-I after her passing.
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“commanding height of the economy,” but fell short of addressing rampant conditions of poverty 
and malnutrition in both urban and rural areas (Kothari 1972, 1546; see also Dandekar and Rath 
1971a, 1971b). The urban industrialization that was central to the Second Plan (1956-1961) and 
Third Plan (1961-1966) had created jobs in urban areas, but not enough to keep up with the 
massive flow of migrants from rural areas.45 After 20 years of Nehruvian rule, the divide between 
urban and rural areas—between what Rajni Kothari calls the “urban based westernized elite and 
the large majority of the people” (1972, 1545)—formed the political context in which Gandhi’s 
political career flourished. Gandhi had the political flair to position the government as an entity 
capable of satisfying the most elementary needs of the Indian population. Until then, citizens 
were expected to benevolently contribute to the making of India by missing a meal or by 
adopting rationing practices.46 By the mid-1960s, the situation had reversed. It was largely 
expected that the state would finally deliver on its welfare obligations. The formation of the APC 
and the FCI were two attempts to do so. But politicians were expected to do much more: they had
to demonstrate what they had achieved and what they could do for the hungry and the poor 
(Chatterjee 1997; Kothari 1972).47 
45 Under Nehru, the central government’s development strategy was focused on modernizing the Indian economy 
by adopting the industrialization model popular in Western countries, but in the process, it displaced an army of 
workers from rural to urban areas. After the First Plan, investment in rural areas was mostly neglected for the 
benefit of rapid industrialization. “The overall result,” asserts Rajni Kothari:
was the phenomenon of growing underemployment and poverty in the rural areas as a result of being drawn 
into a world economy and the parallel process of migration to the towns and cities for jobs which, however, 
grew at a snail’s pace owing to the fact that the manufacturing sector catered mainly to the consumption needs 
of a small ‘cosmopolitan’ (i.e., Anglicized) urban middle class. (1972, 1543)
46 For instance, early in 1951, Prime Minister Nehru made a call to the population to solve the food crisis by giving
up one meal a week (Sherman 2013, 19).
47 Partha Chatterjee notes two other elements that have marked the transfer of power between Nehru and Gandhi. 
First, after the Green Revolution, a new class emerged, the rich farmer class. Until the 1960s, the agricultural 
sector received little to no attention from Nehruvian policymakers and experts who focused on the expansion of 
public undertakings of industries and infrastructures. But the food crisis of 1965-66 forced the government to 
adopt a new approach, the Green Revolution, to quickly increase the level of available food. Second, the unified 
Congress that had ruled the country for two decades belonged to the past. Divisions within the Congress had 
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Building on Ernest Laclau, Gupta describes populism as 
connected not so much to a determinate stage of development as to a crisis ‘of the
dominant ideological discourse which is in turn part of a more general social crisis’
[Laclau 1977, 172-175]. In such a crisis, a fraction within the dominant bloc seeks to
impose its hegemony through a direct appeal to the masses. (1998, 65)
With her famous political slogan “Garibi Hatao” (remove poverty), Gandhi had the political 
sagacity to understand the social crisis in which India had been plunged in the 1960s and to turn 
it to her advantage (Chatterjee 1997). Gandhi captured the failures of the previous generation of 
Nehruvian politicians in satisfying the needs of the population and made a promise to rule for the 
people who had until then been left on the sidelines of the movement towards modernization. In 
fact, Gandhi was able to preserve the traditional electoral support of the Congress, “a somewhat 
paradoxical alliance of urban elites and rural landholding castes at the top with low castes and 
minority groups below” (Chatterjee 1997, 23). During the 1971 elections, Gandhi remarked that 
while establishment members of the Congress sought her removal, she herself wanted nothing 
else than the removal of poverty (Gupta 1998, 67). She won the election in a landslide. Garibi 
Hatao functioned as a populist rallying cry deployed to bring attention to the severe conditions of
poverty that affected a large majority of Indians. In the process, this electoral strategy pitted 
ordinary people against the country’s political elites in a dichotomizing and antagonizing way. 
With her rising popularity among poor voters, Gandhi consolidated her power in the Congress 
and the national government. The burgeoning delivery of welfare programs came to be seen as a 
handout from Gandhi herself (Chatterjee 1997, 23).48
poisoned the ambivalent relationship between the party and government. To reassert her grip on the Congress 
and the government, Gandhi worked to associate her own image with that of the Congress, centralized the 
function of government under the executive branch, and packaged welfare programs to finally attend to the 
welfare functions of the state (Chatterjee 1997, 21–23).
48 Just like those of the previous generation of Congress leaders, Gandhi’s vision of the development state also 
relied on socialist claims to redistributive justice. But Gandhi’s populist agenda led her to instate a rule that was 
76
As a result of the Green Revolution, a new class of wealthy farmers arose in North 
India at the precise moment at which Gandhi extended ideals of redistributive justice for the rural
poor (Gupta 1998). As Gupta remarks, “the transformation of social relations brought about by 
populist programs were linked to the appropriation and redeployment of development discourses 
by farmers group led, in turn, by well-to-do owner-cultivators” (1998, 70). In fact, the rising 
prominence of an agrarian class of wealthy farmers, which resulted from the Green Revolution, 
translated Gandhi’s populist discourse of development along the urban-versus-rural divide. From 
1970-1990, the emergence of a class of well-to-do owner-cultivators grew in rural areas. While 
highly variegated and regionally diverse, the rise of this class of owner-cultivators led to a chasm 
between the rural Bharat (traditional India) against an elitist urban India (modern India) (Bentall 
and Corbridge 1996, 27; Gupta 1998; Mooij 1999). This class of owner-cultivators occupied a 
position of power in local and national politics (Mooij 1999). As Mooij writes: 
As a result of the Green Revolution, a new class of capitalist farmers emerged who
gained considerable political power in the course of time (Mitra, 1977). Not only did
they  become  influential  in  almost  all  political  parties,  they  also  succeeded  in
penetrating into various policy institutions, such as, for instance, the Commission on
Agricultural Costs and Prices. (1998, 94)
Rather than keeping the price of food grains down to feed the poor, as it was purported to do in 
the Nehru era, food policy shifted under the influence of the emergent well-to-do farmers 
movement to maintain a price equilibrium for the benefit of well-to-do farmers’ interests (Mooij 
1998, 1999).49 The financial interests invested in the infrastructure of rationing certainly helped to
much more “centralized, statist and focused on a single leader” (Chatterjee 1997, 23).
49 Agriculturists’ interests were increasingly represented in governmental institutions. As Alain de Janvry and K. 
Subbara write:
While the ratio of representation of agricultural to business and industrial interests was 2:1 in favour of the 
agriculturalists in the first Lok Sabha [Parliament of the central government] in 1951, it increased steadily to 
3:1 in the second (1957), 4:1 in 1976 as the Green Revolution was gaining momentum, 5:1 in 1971, and 9:1 in 
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expand the reach of the TPDS and stabilized it as the cornerstone strategy for addressing the 
nutritional needs of the population.
During the 1970s-1980s, the central government designed a series of welfare programs 
to assist small and marginal farmers, landless labourers, and artisans. Programs such as the Small 
Farmer Development Agency (SFDA), the Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Labourers (MFAL) 
development programs,50 and later the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) and the 
National Rural Employment Program (NREP) were designed to subsidize the means of 
production (i.e., seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, tools, training, animals) and provide supplementary 
employment opportunities to poor rural farmers. These programs were essentially beneficiary-
oriented and depended on a functioning bureaucratic architecture to target poor households (Rath 
1985). The impacts of these welfare schemes on poverty in rural areas were limited. In the Sixth 
Plan (1980-1985), the IRDP was projected to lift a third of poor rural households out of poverty, 
but according to Rath’s (1985) estimates, only about 3% of poor households in rural areas were 
lifted above the poverty line.
A series of nutrition-related programs were also designed and implemented to 
complement the PDS. In 1975, the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) was launched 
to provide food, education, and basic healthcare to children aged six years old or less and their 
mothers (Lokshin et al. 2005). The delivery of these welfare services took place in aganwandi51 
1977 under the Janata government. It returned to 4:1 in 1980 as the Congress boosted the representation of 
business and industry under the influence of the late Sanjay Gandhi . . . [T]he large farmers' interests gained 
control of the Agricultural Prices Commission to the exclusion of representation of consumers' interests. (1986, 
96)
50 The MFAL development programs were eventually integrated into the SFDA (Rath 1985, 238).
51 Anganwadi are community centres originally set up by the government in 1975 to provide health, education, and 
food to children aged six years and younger. 
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(crèches or kindergartens), which are set up in rural villages, urban neighbourhoods, and basti 
(informal settlements) (RTFC 2014a). In 1995, the Government of India also set up a school-
lunch program, initially called the National Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary 
Education and later referred to as the Mid-Day Meal Scheme (MDMS), which was designed to 
provide free lunches to school-goers across the country (RTFC 2014b).52 Like the NREP, several 
food-for-work programs and other employment schemes were also set up across the country, 
including the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS), the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), the 
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), and the National Food For Work Programme 
(NFFWP).
A multiplicity of welfare programs were thus developed to raise targeted segments of 
the population out of poverty. In order to do so, the government constructed poverty lines, which 
are biopolitical instruments established to evaluate the biorhythm of the population (see Patnaik 
2010). Broadly speaking, a poverty line is a calculation of the minimum expenditure necessary to 
attain a threshold of daily caloric consumption.53 In India, attempts to statistically quantify the 
minimum standard of living dated back to the British Raj (Naoroji 1901; Shah 1949), but Vinayak
Mahadeo Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath were the first economists to publish a poverty line 
methodology in 1971.54
Poverty lines are contested tools (Deaton 2006; Deaton and Drèze 2009, 2010), but for 
52 Initially, the National Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education was designed to provide cooked 
meals to primary school students, but according to the Right to Food Campaign (RTFC), most states never really 
gave any food beyond dry rations (RTFC 2014b, 12).
53 Over time, the basket of commodities used to calculate poverty lines has come to include items other than food, 
as sanitation and hygiene products, clean water, and other resources have come to be recognized as essential for 
the “retention of calories” (Deaton and Drèze 2009, 43).
54 In the late 1950s, Nehru appointed six experts to draw the first postcolonial poverty line, but no records have 
been found on the methodologies used (Rath 2011; Srinivasan 2007).
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biopolitical interventions, they have been powerful instruments of government because they 
enable the government to authoritatively and arbitrarily measure the general well-being of the 
population and identify needs that could be satisfied. In turn, this exercise of governmentality 
categorically distinguishes poverty from wealth. According to T. N. Srinivasan: “[a] poverty lines
serves two roles: a normative role and a monitoring role” (2007, 4155; italics in original). Poverty
lines reflect the normative amounts of food and commodities that an individual or household 
supposedly needs; once drawn, these lines divide the population into poor people who cannot 
meet the norm and those who can—and imply, more generally, a politico-ethical obligation for 
the government to pull poor members of the population above the line. What is more, over time, 
government authorities have used poverty lines to measure the evolution of poverty in a given 
area. This is the monitory role of poverty lines. They help the government to statistically compare
one region to the next and one targeted population to another in order to determine appropriate 
actions to be taken. 
In 1971, Dandekar and Rath published in Economic and Political Weekly a seminal 
study that quantified the evolution of various scales of poverty using a single poverty line over an
entire decade.55 Dandekar and Rath’s (1971a, 1971b) findings were shocking: they demonstrated 
that despite a positive rate of economic growth in the 1960s, inequality in India over the same 
period had grown. This proved to be a virulent critique of Nehruvian developmentalism and 
served as a call to the Planning Commission under Gandhi to adopt policies of wealth 
redistribution. “In the absence of such policies,” Dandekar and Rath note:
the processes of economic development, as we have witnessed them in the past, make
55 Based on statistics generated by the National Sample Survey (NSS) in 1960-1961, Dandekar and Rath (1971a, 
29–30) concluded that 2,250 kcal/day is an appropriate minimum level of caloric value to calibrate poverty lines.
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the rich far too rich before the poor can secure even the minimum, widen the gulf
between the rich and the poor intolerably and inevitably undermine the democratic
foundations of the economy. (1971a, 48)
Under Gandhi’s rule, poverty lines quickly became a powerful instrument of government to 
assess the scope of biopolitical interventions and the successes they had. Poverty line 
methodologies were developed and improved over the years. They became much more complex, 
and were reformulated to provide a statistical benchmark against which the performance of 
welfare programs could actually be measured.56 Increasingly, people located below the poverty 
line (BPL) became the target of welfare programs intended to raise them above the poverty line 
(APL). The governmental use of poverty lines has been subject to heavy criticism in recent years 
(Deaton and Drèze 2009, 2010; Ministry of Rural Development, GoI 2009), but during Gandhi's 
tenure, they became popular as a normative and monitoring instrument for implementing welfare 
programs.57
56 Appointed by the Planning Commission, expert committees were formed to study below-the-poverty-line (BPL) 
households and their consumption patterns, or lack thereof. These expert committees set methodologies that 
would later be used by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) to identify poor populations. The first 
expert committee was formed in 1977 to construct a model of private consumption by different sections of the 
population, based on age, sex, and occupation, across India (Planning Commission 1979, 8). In 1988, a second 
expert committee (referred to as the Lakdawala Expert Group) was set up with the mandate to redefine the 
government’s poverty lines, based on metrics of adequate daily caloric-value specific to different states of India.
57 The measurement of Indian nutrient requirements played a critical role in the early establishment of a poverty 
line. In 1944, the Nutrition Advisory Committee of the Indian Research Fund Association (IRFA) established the
first recommended “desirable safe dietary intakes of nutrients for human health” levels, based on a 1937 Health 
Committee Report from the League of Nations (Narasinga Rao 2009, 4). All over the world, nutritionists agreed 
that the need for a normalized adult body was 2,400 kcal (League of Nations 1937, 86). The IRFA 
recommendations considered levels of required energy, protein, iron, calcium, vitamins A, thiamine, riboflavin, 
ascorbic acid, and vitamin D for a normalized body in India. Following two reports by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the first on calories (1950) and the second on protein (1957), the IRFA, which had been 
renamed in 1949 the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), revised its recommendations in 1958. Using 
these revised recommendations, a working group set up by the Planning Commission in 1960 drew the first 
postcolonial poverty line at ₹ 20 per capita per month, which excluded expenditures on health, education, and 
housing (Planning Commission 1993, 8; Srinivasan 2007, 4157; Planning Commission 1979, 8). This rate is 
based on 1960-1961 prices. To be more specific, the ICMR established poverty lines of ₹ 18.9 per capita per 
month in rural areas and ₹ 25 in urban areas. Over the years, these recommendations were improved and updated
by the Task Force of 1979 and the Lakdawala Expert Group of 1993, both set up by the Planning Commission, in
order to develop adequate daily food intake targets that took into consideration a range of bodies, food items 
included in normalized consumption baskets, and varied locations and eating habits across India. The daily food 
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Under Gandhi’s rule, food became increasingly political. As Mooij put it, “[c]heap food
was among the promises with which politicians or political parties tried to win the favour of the 
electorate” (1998, 94). In the 1970s-1980s, in addition to the implementation of other food-
related welfare programs, the PDS expanded its reach to new frontiers in rural areas. Between 
1965 and 1977, the total number of FPSs in operation more than doubled. By the late 1980s, 
more than 300,000 FPSs were formally in operation, three quarters of which were located in rural
areas. Seventy percent of the total procured rice and 55% of the total procured wheat were sold in
rural areas (Mooij 1998, 86). As early as 1977, almost the entire population of India could 
theoretically be covered by the infrastructure of rationing (Chopra 1981, 215), making the PDS 
the largest universal welfare scheme in the world. This was due in part to the gains achieved 
through the increased stocks of food grains that resulted from the Green Revolution and Gandhi’s
Garibi Hatao agenda that helped to dramatically increase the number of FPSs in operation 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, it should be noted that the expansion of the country’s rationing infrastructure 
did not necessarily result in greater reach to the poor. In his book Everybody Loves a Good 
Drought, a gripping account of welfare programs in rural areas of India, the famous journalist and
activist Palagummi Sainath shows that the deployment of infrastructure and public funding, 
including the PDS, has almost inevitably attracted practices of patronage and corruption (1996, 
315–70). Figures of leakages from the PDS are hard to come by, but critics of welfare schemes 
have qualified the populist promises and programs implemented throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
as ephemeral, corrupt, and underperforming (Frankel 2009). While populist food politics 
intake deemed to be adequate corresponded to a total caloric value of 2,100 kcal in urban areas and 2,400 kcal in
rural areas until 1988 (Narasinga Rao 2009, 10).
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continued to mobilize most of the country’s political attention during the 1980s, cutbacks to the 
rationing infrastructure and the abolition of food-for-work programs were gradually implemented
to tame India’s growing public debt (Kohli 1989). In fact, the legacy of Gandhi’s Garibi Hatao 
agenda was reconfigured in the Fifth Plan (1974-78) and Sixth Plan (1980–1985), which shifted 
attention away from improving the overall well-being of the population. Instead, the Planning 
Commission introduced the concept of “basic minimum needs” and a focus on welfare poverty 
reduction mechanisms that aimed not so much to eradicate poverty, but to “[contain and 
ameliorate it] until it gets eradicated in the natural process of [economic] growth” (Guhan 1980, 
1975–76). Once again, a shift in food politics reconfigured the government’s interpretation of 
people’s needs, and by the same token, rearranged the Indian food welfare landscape. These 
mechanisms paved the way to the liberalization of the Indian economy.
2.4 The Liberalization of the Indian Economy
In 1990, the Government of India approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to apply for a structural adjustments programs (SAPs) loan. According to Atul Kholi (2006a), the 
country’s growing fiscal imbalance left no other choice for the Indian government, which was led
by the Congress at that time. This fiscal burden was a precursor to the reforms leading up to the 
so-called “economic liberalization” of the country: investment in the modernization of agriculture
was cut back; conversion of food crops to cash crops intensified; reductions in tariff barriers were
adopted; currency was devalued; foreign investments were liberalized; restrictions to the flow of 
commodities were eased; and wheat and rice exports rose dramatically (Patnaik 1997, 2011). It 
should be noted that the term “economic liberalization” is an ambiguous “grab bag” for many 
different policy measures that are not necessarily cohesive or homogeneous (Kohli 1989, 306). 
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The rhetoric stemming from the economic liberalization of the 1990s in India took the form of an 
ideological reorientation of public policy, which had, since Nehru, been informed by ideals of 
distributive or social justice found in socialism. But, this is only part of the story. 
In this section, I briefly explore the origins of economic liberalization in India and 
examine its impacts on the formulation of perceived nutritional needs for differentiated 
populations. I document how the alignment of the political elites with upper classes triggered a 
restructuring of the PDS into a targeted system, which depends upon a greater use of poverty 
lines as an instrument of government to categorize the Indian population into poor- and wealthy-
enough households. Rather than curbing public spending and transforming the PDS into a more 
“efficient” welfare program, the use of poverty lines enabled government authorities to recast the 
PDS according to a neoliberal interpretation of needs and wants. In turn, the making of BPL and 
APL households changed the distribution process in FPSs.
By the early 1980s, the Indian government had already withdrawn from its populist 
commitments to wealth distribution to focus instead on the promotion of economic growth. The 
alignment of the Indian government with Indian capitalists’ interests began during the last 
mandate of Indira Gandhi, only to gather steam when Rajiv Gandhi, her son, took the office of 
prime minister in 1984-1989 (Kohli 2006a, 2006b). According to Kohli, “Indira Gandhi’s efforts 
at redistribution failed and the democratic socialist tilt evolved into anti-capitalist populism, 
hurting economic growth” (2006a, 1258). To compensate, in the 1980s, under both Indira Gandhi 
(1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89), India’s economic liberalization was carefully designed to 
promote economic growth and foreign investment opportunities. Although the structural 
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adjustment policies of the time echoed concerns of the Washington Consensus58 on development 
in the Global South more generally, the modality of economic liberalization, as Kohli argues:
was considerably more statist and more explicitly growth-oriented; it was also more
pro-business  than  pro-market.  India's  nationalist-capitalist  model  of  development
from 1980 on thus started to share some important traits with east Asia, where highly
interventionist  states  commonly  ally  with  business  and  against  labour,  and  only
selectively  link  their  economies  to  the  world,  often  more  via  trade  than  capital.
(2006a, 1257)
This was of course problematic for the ruling Congress, which had historically relied on the 
electoral support of the poor. It needed to justify the cutbacks in public expenditures. Kohli 
(2006a) argues that the country’s growing fiscal imbalance throughout the 1980s, which notably 
resulted from low levels of taxation, provided the much needed rationale for undertaking the IMF
loans in 1991—and for adopting the radical economic reforms now referred as “economic 
liberalization.” In other words, the rhetoric of Garibi Hatao had to be put on the “back burner,” 
as Kohli (2006a) puts it, in favour of policies benefiting a narrow capitalist and industrial class. 
Once pit against welfare expenditures, economic growth provided the governing 
rationale for cutbacks in welfare programs, including the infrastructure of rationing, which was at
the time the most expensive welfare program of India.59 Until then, the PDS had run as a system 
of universal entitlements that equally distributed coarse cereals, pulses, rice, wheat, sugar, edible 
oil, milk, kerosene, soft coke (a coal product), and clothing, washing materials, and footwear, all 
available from the FPSs upon the waving of a ration card. The logic of structural adjustment 
58 The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in the mid-1980s by John Williamson to illustrate the “principal 
economic reforms that were being urged on Latin American countries by powers-that-be in Washington” (1993, 
1329). These powers-that-be advocated for liberalization in international financial institutions, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, as much as in American political institutions (see also Stiglitz 2003).
59 Roughly half of total spending on poverty alleviation programs in India was on the PDS (Radharkrishna and 
Subbarao 1997, 4).
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suggested that the PDS would have to be severely reformed. According to Deepak Ahluwalia 
(1993), an economist at the World Bank, the financial cost of the PDS had grown exponentially 
over the previous decades: in 1991-1992, the annual tag price of the PDS reached 0.5% of India’s
gross domestic product (GDP), as opposed to 0.04% in the 1970s.60 The PDS was criticized for 
being not only too costly, but also too inefficient and underperforming. The country’s rationing 
infrastructure was thought to have an “urban bias” that prevented it from covering poorer rural 
areas as effectively as it did urban areas (Howes and Jha 1992). Perhaps more to the point, 
endemic practices of corruption and patronage were thought to be a massive waste of public 
funding that severely impaired the allocations of food grains to poor citizens by “diverting” or 
“leaking” food subsidies away from the infrastructure of rationing into the black market.61 In the 
early 1990s, key measures were taken to reform the PDS: prices of commodities sold in FPSs 
were raised, quantities of supplies were reduced, budgetary allocations stagnated, and the 
expansion of the PDS was restricted, despite the fact that PDS coverage remained vastly 
inadequate considering the spread of hunger and malnutrition across the country (Swaminathan 
1996, 1668). 
For the Congress politicians that headed the Government of India until 1996, 
downsizing the infrastructure of rationing was a rather problematic undertaking. Historically, the 
PDS had played a central role in populist politics, especially for the Congress, which had always 
had a strong base of poor and low-caste voters. Particularly given the food insecurity that affected
60 An investment of such sort, Ahluwalia adds, even “exceeds the total annual public investment on major 
irrigation” (1993, 34). To Ahluwalia’s defence, it is true that when considering the rampant corruption and 
leakages from the infrastructure, the PDS may appear too costly and inefficient. Yet, such an argument totally 
dismisses the expansion of the PDS between 1970 and 1990 and the fact that investments in irrigation systems 
help wealthier farmers, rather than poorer peasant, to get richer (Patel 2013, 18–26).
61 Ahluwalia states that “firm estimates [of leakages] are hard to come by” (1993, 34).
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large sections of the country’s population, abolishing the infrastructure of rationing would be 
detrimental to the electoral politics of the time. “This,” Mooij notes, “together with the fact that 
capitalist rice and wheat farmers are a powerful lobby group which demands high procurement 
prices, would mean that the PDS, as a big and costly intervention, is here to stay” (1998, 95). In 
effect, the PDS was simply too important, both for politicians and well-to-do farmers, to be 
removed from the political and welfare arenas. 
To strategically transform the PDS into a more “efficient” welfare program, the 
Planning Commission planned to allocate most of the resources available to poorer households in
order to ensure that available public funding would bear the most tangible results. This reform 
was considered to be more pragmatic and, for advocates of liberalization, unavoidable.62 In 
August 1995, a working group appointed by the Planning Commission designed the blueprint for 
a targeted infrastructure of rationing, the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) (Planning 
Commission 1997, para. 2.3.3).63 According to the Planning Commission, transforming the 
universal infrastructure of rationing into a targeted program would help “[curb] subsidies to the 
barest minimum,” while at the same time “recogni[zing] the need to provide food grains at 
affordable prices to the bottom rungs of the population” (Planning Commission 1997, para. 
2.3.2). In 1997, then, the PDS became the TPDS. Following this restructuring of the rationing 
infrastructure, only wheat and rice, along with kerosene, were to be subsidized by the central 
62 When prices are higher, it benefits the producers rather than the consumers, which positively impacts the 
agricultural sector and the well-to-do farmers of Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh—but it has marginal 
impacts on the poor households that depend on rations to survive (see Mooij 1998, 95). 
63 The Planning Commission undertook this restructuring for three reasons: (a) the gains of the Green Revolution 
had not been effectively translated into increased food security; (b) the minimum support price (MSP) offered to 
farmers to procure food grains sold through the PDS had not increased the price of food items sold on the open 
market; and (c) leakages and practices of corruption within the PDS had prevented the poor from accessing 
subsidized food in states with high incidences of poverty.
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government.64 
Reforms to PDS did not go unnoticed. Proponents of poverty alleviation programs 
critically voiced their concerns—even fifteen years later (Himanshu and Sen 2011)—and 
continued to stress the need for more significant interventions by various levels of government to 
tackle the everlasting issue of undernourishment in India, which would require an expansion of 
PDS coverage, a lowering of prices of subsidized commodities, and an increase in the number of 
rationed items offered at FPSs (Patnaik 2011; Swaminathan 1996, 2000). But such proposals 
were radically opposed to the reforms proposed by the Washington Consensus, implemented by 
the Indian political elite, and supported by a minority of capitalists (Kohli 2006b). For “a 
challenge to the dominant policy framework” to work, or to establish the basis for a “politics of 
need interpretation” (Fraser 1989, 145), greater pressure, notably from voters, was imperative 
(Drèze 2004; Khera 2009; Mooij 1998; Sen 2013). In Chapter Three, I follow this thread and 
examine how such politics of need interpretation led to the formulation of the NFSA and the 
modernization of the TPDS.
At the outset of the process, the overhaul of the PDS into a targeted system reflected a 
compromise to the poor in the era of neoliberal reform of welfare programs and the belief that 
economic growth stemming from liberalization would eventually alleviate the issue of chronic 
hunger. The rationale underlying this belief, explains Philip McMichael, is “that food 
consumption is a market act, [it] is so deeply entwined with the faith in global markets that critics
of this conception of food security are cast as misguided, even immoral” (2004, 113). It is 
precisely this faith in market solutions that led experts of the Planning Commission to redesign 
64 It should be stressed here that the delivery of rationed commodities falls under state jurisdiction. Some states, 
like Kerala, offer more subsidized commodities throughout their infrastructure of rationing than others (see Sen 
and Drèze 2013).
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the TPDS as an alternative to the open market economy, based on the idea that government 
interventions must be complementary to the provision of food on the free market. These 
biopolitical solutions to systemic issues such as chronic hunger would be more serviceable to the 
population as a whole, it was believed, compared to what was thought to be a too-costly and 
comprehensive universal system of rationed food. 
Note, here, that FPSs were also markets before the making of the PDS into a targeted 
system. They were sites of exchange, just like other markets, with the difference that subsidized 
commodities were sold at statutory rates, fixed by the state. Following the enactment of the 
Essential Commodity Act in 1955, FPSs provided a variety of food and other commodities to 
ration card holders. Since ration shops were established to distribute subsidies to households 
irrespective of class and caste, entitlements were equally distributed across cardholders. The FPS 
market eliminated processes of valuation of commodities and activities of competition between 
ration card holders, in order to ensure that every one of them would have access to rations.
However, in the reformation of the PDS into the TPDS, FPSs integrated different 
processes of economic organization, and as such, embodied distinct processes of marketization 
(see Çalışkan and Callon 2009; 2010). First, the Planning Commission assumed that most 
residents would buy most of their food basket outside of the TPDS, on the open market, where 
food and other commodities are distributed according to the laws of supply and demand. FPSs 
became sites of exchange that sold only a few items that were available, oftentimes at better 
quality, on the open market. As a result, a majority of wealthier APL household deserted the 
FPSs. Second, in selling the same rations at differentiated rates to different segments of the 
population, FPSs became market sites where the valuation of rations was based on the class 
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category of the cardholder. In creating a taxonomy of different ration card holders, the Indian 
state generated distinct categories of population, each having a different political stake in the 
TPDS and the distribution of rations more generally.
Ration Cards Wheat (₹/kg) Rice (₹/kg)
APL 6.10 7.95
BPL 4.15 5.65
AAY 2 3
Table 1: Prices of food entitlements according to ration card category.
Between 1997 and 2000, three categories of ration card categories were created: the 
above poverty line (APL), the below poverty line (BPL), and the Antyodaya Anna Yojana 
(poorest of the poor, hereafter AAY). While all categories were allocated 35 kg of wheat and rice 
entitlements, the poorer the household classification, the cheaper the entitlements (see Table 1). 
In Delhi, two other types of ration cards were also issued to people who were considered to be 
temporary residents of the city. The Resettlement Colony (RC) and Jhuggi Jopri (JJ) ration cards 
were valid for a period of six months, after which point they could be renewed. Both RC and JJ 
cardholders could buy rations at FPSs at APL rates.
Here, what is at stake is the interpretation of needs that could be met by the distribution
of rations. By deploying targeting mechanisms in the TPDS, experts and planners of the Planning
Commission overhauled the infrastructure of rationing to better allocate scarce resources to 
poorer households. In the process, however, the distribution of entitlements was conceptualized 
as supplementary to the otherwise mundane act of buying essential foods and other commodities 
on open markets. Subsidies were thought to be supplemental: in the age of economic 
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liberalization, the Indian state interpreted nutritional needs as a market act, and therefore situated 
governmental interventions as a support to such acts. This is important. The Indian state 
interpreted the nutritional needs of its population as a “thin” need (Fraser 1989, 163), by 
providing only staple foods such as wheat and rice. Under the auspices of economic 
liberalization, experts and planners assumed that thicker nutritional needs—such as proteins, 
vitamins, and minerals that are essential components of a healthy diet—were superfluous, and 
their subsidization, unjustified. The provision of food through the TPDS could relieve some of 
the economic burden on poor households, but the state’s interpretation of nutritional needs also 
required such households to navigate the open market on a tight budget. Oftentimes, even with 
entitlements collected at FPSs, these households could not afford more than one meal a day, a 
diverse diet consisting of foods other than rolled up roti [flat bread] with salt or rice, or other 
essential commodities and more luxurious items—such as water, sanitation items, health care, 
education, or alcohol and tobacco.
Drawing poverty lines became a critical technique of government for categorizing 
different types of households according to their nutritional needs. To undertake the monumental 
task of identifying who would be targeted in the TPDS, the Planning Commission exhorted all 
state departments of food and supplies to deploy poverty lines as instruments for identifying poor 
households that were, in fact, poor enough to access food subsidies at cheap rates (see Corbridge 
et al. 2005). This use of poverty lines to measure, classify, evaluate, and target India’s poor 
proved to be a problematic instrument of government. In 1992 and 1997, surveys were 
undertaken across India to document poverty based on indicators that were inconsistent, arbitrary,
and debatable.65 One could even question if these surveys, and thus the production of BPL 
65 In 1992 and 1997, surveys were conducted in various states to quantify the BPL population. Inspectors were 
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households, served the wide-ranging objective of alleviating poverty—or if they were not, in fact,
designed to purposefully compile statistics to show that numbers of poor people in the country 
were in constant decline thanks to the Garibi Hatao initiatives (Corbridge et al. 2005, 75).66
Three reasons explain why poverty lines are questionable instruments. First, when poor
households are targeted and the population is divided into APL and BPL households, errors of 
inclusion and exclusion are bound to happen due to the arbitrary character of indicators used to 
classify households (Corbridge et al. 2005; Drèze and Khera 2010; Khera 2009, 2013; 
Swaminathan 2000). Second, the calibration of poverty lines based on caloric consumption 
remains at best an approximation, based on aggregate factors and variables of consumption 
capabilities and metabolism that are poorly translated into a statistical benchmark; indeed, the 
Indian caloric count for rural and urban areas has proven “to be highly context-specific, 
depending on activity levels, the epidemiological environment, the composition of the 
population, and other factors” (Deaton and Drèze 2009, 59, 2010).67 Third, in the era of economic
liberalization, when welfare programs are designed to be leaner, statistical benchmarks most 
likely deflate the count of poverty, which in turn reflects positively on the design and 
implementation of welfare programs—and state interventions more generally. Thus, the use of 
poverty lines, no matter how precise the underlying methodologies, is conducive to creating 
bureaucratic categories of households deserving welfare or not—but it surely leads to misleading 
instructed to “use their eyes” and to “look inside household cash box” or “look out for a bicycle or other such 
item as proof of the non-existence of poverty or BPL status” (Corbridge et al. 2005, 75).
66 According to the Lakdawala Expert Group’s statistical demonstration (1993), the BPL population was in 
constant decline across the country from 1973-1974 onwards.
67 In 2009–2010, Jean Drèze and Angus Deaton (2009, 2010) and Utsa Patnaik (2010) debated the merits of this 
assertion. Similar to Drèze and Deaton, Patnaik suggests reviewing poverty estimates, but she does so by arguing
that consumer price indices understate the actual cost of living, which deflates official poverty lines. Drèze and 
Deaton (2010), on the other hand, suggest that the official uses of poverty lines obfuscate rather than clarify the 
actual experience of poverty.
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results and interventions that misfire.
In 2005, the Planning Commission published a study on the performance of the TPDS, 
which concluded that only 42% of subsidized food actually reached APL and BPL households, 
implying that the infrastructure of rationing was deeply dysfunctional. In the study, the term 
“leakages” appeared to be a euphemism for the underlying practices of corruption that were said 
to cripple the delivery of food grains.68 Increasingly, the need to curb corruption predominated 
debates about the government’s biopolitical duty to eradicate chronic hunger. The Planning 
Commission’s study revealed that “the transition from the PDS to the TPDS has neither led to a 
reduction of budgetary food subsidies, nor has it been able to benefit the large majority of the 
food insecure households in the desired manner” (Planning Commission 2005, xi; italics added, 
bold in original). According to the Planning Commission, the TPDS failed on two fronts: it failed 
to secure food security for the majority of the country’s poor and failed to reduce the fiscal 
burden of welfare programs. Yet, these failures were not blamed on the transition from the PDS to
the TPDS, which was determined to be “a move in the right direction” (Planning Commission 
2005, vii). Instead, the Planning Commission stressed that in order to plug leakages from the 
system, it was critical to improve methods for identifying BPL households and to ensure that the 
infrastructure of rationing become more “effective, efficient, and transparent” (2005, xii), two 
objectives that were prominent in the design of the TPDS in the mid-1990s. According to the 
68 The Planning Commission notes two ways in which leakages from the infrastructure of rationing occur. At the 
FPS level, owners may divert ration entitlements to the black market in a number of ways. For example, ration 
card holders might not pick up their rations at the FPS, thus leaving it to the owner to sell their subsidized food 
on the black market and pocket the profits. This is typical of APL ration card holders, who are usually more 
affluent and can afford to buy higher quality wheat and rice in the open market. However, rural BPL cardholders 
who seasonally migrate into cities may also leave their rations back in their home state. Some FPS owners also 
arbitrarily refuse to sell full rations to ration card holders. Furthermore, in every state, there exists a number of 
“ghost cards.” These cards are typically not in the possession of their owners, which enable usurpers to grab 
someone else’s rations at FPSs. Anybody working along the infrastructure of rationing, from bureaucrats to FPS 
owners, may own a number of ghost cards.
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Planning Commission, in other words, efforts to address the failures of the infrastructure of 
rationing depended on a recalibration of instruments of government in order to better capture the 
biorhythm of the population and satisfy its needs. 
After having demonstrated that the TPDS had “neither benefited the poor, nor helped 
reduce budgetary food subsidies in the desired manner” (2005, 90), alternatives to the TPDS 
could conceivably be explored. Once the powerful institution had demonstrated that the TPDS 
was inefficient, deeply corrupt, and a black hole for public funding, the Planning Commission 
could therefore arguably frame the infrastructure of rationing as a dysfunctional welfare program 
that ought to be revamped, cut back to an even more narrow system, and perhaps even replaced 
by other initiatives, such as cash transfers advocated by international institutions (J. Das, Do, and 
Özler 2005). In other words, the Planning Commission framed the TPDS within a neoliberal 
rationality, evaluated it as a failure, and opened the door to further cutbacks in government 
spending.
For Reetika Khera, the findings of the Planning Commission were short-sighted:
The Planning Commission study is very outdated. The study was published in 2005,
but the study was conducted between 1997 and 2001. There is a lot of work on this
issue [the TPDS] after that. But the fact is that the data coming out afterwards is not
suiting the arguments that the PDS is the same across the country, that nothing has
changed  [in  terms  of  inefficiency  or  leakages  for  instance]  in  the  last  fifteen
years . . . . and neither of these things are true. (Khera, personal interview, New Delhi,
August 2015)
In 2013, Drèze and Khera argued that the TPDS played a critical role in alleviating hunger in 
India and reducing poverty across the country. Khera showed that the performance of the TPDS 
was largely satisfactory in seven large states and that “signs of revival” were present in five other 
states (2011, 113; see also Drèze and Khera 2013). Plus, Drèze and Khera (2015) showed that 
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leakages from the TPDS were on the decline. More to the point, Drèze and Khera (2015) have 
confirmed what others had suspected for a long time (Planning Commission 2005; Ministry of 
Rural Development, GoI 2009): a large part of the leakages occurred because of the faulty 
targeting mechanisms of food distribution in FPSs. Since many APL households, due to a variety 
of reasons, did not pick up their allocated rations, these entitlements typically remained in the 
FPSs. For FPS owners, the leftover food grain became an important source of additional income, 
once diverted to the black market. Over time, these practices of leakage became customary and 
widely known. Under such light, one could reasonably argue, as have Himanshu and Abhijit Sen 
(2011) and others (Jhabvala and Standing 2010; Svedberg 2012; Swaminathan 2000), that 
perhaps the best path towards plugging leakages rests in the reverting of the TPDS into a 
universal system of rationing. Yet, this proposition has been out of question since the mid-1990s 
because it goes against the logic of the neoliberal food regime and the dominant interpretation of 
people’s needs.
This is not to say that leakages did not occur when the PDS was universal. They did: 
between 30% to 40% of food grains were diverted to the black market (Ahluwalia 1993). 
However, in drawing a clear line between those who had to be elevated above the poverty line 
and those who were already above that line, the Planning Commission shaped different kinds of 
households who had different types of nutritional needs. For BPL and AAY households, having 
access to highly subsidized food remained of crucial importance, since a larger fraction of their 
(perceived) diet came from staple food bought in FPSs. For APL ration card holders, who 
demographically were part of the rising middle class and the elite that typically inhabited urban 
centres, the TPDS became a vestige of past generations that had little impact on their diet. APL 
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households’ chief concerns centred on the delivery of other government services—bijli, sadak, 
aur pani (electricity, roads, and water), rather than roti, kapda, aur makaan (food, clothing, and 
housing) (Baviskar and Ray 2011, 1)—which had been, in the 1970s, the key appeal behind the 
expansion of the PDS and the deployment of the Garibi Hatao agenda. Conceivably, members of 
the rising middle class had benefited from economic liberalization, and ostensibly, their stake in 
the TPDS lay not so much in the proper distribution of subsidized food to the poor, but rather in 
its ability to operate efficiently, at low cost, and without corruption. Ironically, in the age of 
economic liberalism, not only did the reform of the TPDS create a category of population that 
had a low political stake in the provision of subsidized food in general, but it also simultaneously 
generated mechanisms through which practices of corruption could be sustained and a rationale 
for the wealthier segment of the population to question, given the high rates of leakages, the 
raison d’être of the TPDS.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have emphasized the fluidity of the infrastructure of rationing in India 
over a period of national development and economic liberalization. More precisely, I have traced 
the history of the TPDS by situating its deployment in contexts that were key to the food politics 
of three contrasting rationalities of government: Nehruvian developmentalism, Indira Gandhi’s 
populism, and economic liberalism. In each of these three periods, I have shown how biopolitical 
interventions were largely responsive to the rationality of government based on perceived needs 
of the population as a whole.
If the infrastructure of rationing was ostensibly designed to secure both food access for 
the country’s most vulnerable populations and food availability, there is some evidence that the 
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(T)PDS has also been intricately embedded in other political concerns. During the Nehru era, the 
stabilization of the PDS served the national objective of urban industrialization, which was 
considered at the time to be fundamental to the movement of India into modernity (Chatterjee 
1997). When India adopted Green Revolution technologies, and proceeded to become food self-
sufficient, food policies morphed to sustain the country’s production and, thus, increased the 
market value of cheap food more generally. Institutions such as the FCI and the APC gradually 
came under the influence of well-to-do owner-cultivators, who have directly benefited from the 
Green Revolution (George 1996; Mooij 1998). While the planning of food policies became 
increasingly centralized and institutionalized (and powerful), the PDS and welfare programs 
more generally expanded in rural and urban areas. Indian rulers and planners came to realize that 
economic growth alone could not alleviate experiences of poverty and hunger. To maintain and 
centralize its rule, the Government of India attempted to meet the needs of wide segments of the 
poor population by using poverty lines. During the era of economic liberalization that followed, 
the PDS was reformed into the TPDS, a system that directly targets the country’s poor as part of 
efforts by the political elite and some capitalists to restructure the government’s biopolitical 
interventions. Nutritional needs were reassessed and reformulated. To shrink welfare 
expenditures, the Indian state deployed poverty lines to categorize households according to their 
perceived nutritional needs. Largely relying on the open market, the Indian state kept the TPDS 
infrastructure, but items sold in FPSs were reduced to address the most basic nutritional needs of 
poor households. Meanwhile, most of the wealthiest households abandoned FPSs and their 
rations, leaving them to be leaked from the infrastructure. 
The overhaul of the PDS into the TPDS system has revealed some of the shortcomings 
97
of the infrastructure of rationing. First, errors of inclusion and exclusion are bound to happen, and
they either help to divert subsidized food to the black market or, worse, lead poor households to 
spend more money on food than what they should (Swaminathan 2000). Second, poverty lines as 
benchmarks of poverty are a poor indicator of food security (Deaton and Drèze 2009, 2010; see 
also Patnaik 2010). In fact, methodologies for drawing poverty lines poorly capture the contexts 
and experiences of chronic hunger (Deaton 2006; Deaton and Drèze 2009) and, thus, serve more 
as a bureaucratic category rather than an effective tool for eradicating undernourishment.69 Third, 
the production of APL and BPL households has considerably helped to sustain practices of 
leakages in the country. 
At the turn of the 20th century, a famine spread in Northern India, touching millions of 
households, and patently revealed the systemic failures of the Indian state to protect the most 
vulnerable against hunger. It is in this context that activists have begun to voice concerns on the 
ability of the TPDS and the commitment of the government to actually tackle the endemic issue 
of chronic hunger in India. This is the topic of my next chapter. Here, I explored how successive 
food regimes and their discursive rationalities have shaped the interpretation of different 
populations’ nutritional needs used in the design of governmental interventions. In the next 
chapter, I explore the politics of need interpretation in India, as human rights discourses have 
framed debates and struggles on the question of food security in the 21st century.
69 Other criteria have been designed to count the poor (Ministry of Rural Development, GoI 2009), but the 
manipulation of these indicators by government officials has proven to be inadequate to take a realist account of 
poverty (Saxena 2015).
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Chapter 3: The Politics of Need Interpretation of 
the Right to Food Entitlement in India
In the previous chapter, I detailed the history of the infrastructure of food rationing 
from the 1940s to the early 2000s. I described how successive food regimes have shaped Indian 
food policies and, with them, governmental interventions in the food economy and welfare. I 
contextualized the construction of the infrastructure of rationing in India, which was first called 
the Public Distribution System (PDS) and later overhauled into the Targeted Public Distribution 
System (TPDS). In this chapter, I explore how human rights discourses shaped Indian food 
politics, and ultimately techniques of government, after the implementation of the TPDS. I 
examine the formation of democratic spaces in which state and non-state actors have formulated 
claims about needs that should be satisfied by the government. I engage with the analytical grid 
of “politics of need interpretation” to chart how diverse claims about needs either challenge or 
reproduce the “dominant policy framework” (Fraser 1989, 145). This investigation leads me to 
interrogate how the rhetoric of “good governance” is articulated by state and non-state actors—
and how this discourse has framed debates about the nature and scope of the Indian right to food 
entitlement. In this chapter, I question how certain perceived needs of food security are addressed
by the right to food entitlement, while others are not. In doing so, I shed light on food politics that
emphasize notions of accountability and transparency as key provisions of national food security 
legislation.
3.1 Introduction
At the turn of the millennium, almost half of Indian children under the age of six years 
old were undernourished (Deaton and Drèze 2009; RTFC 2006).70 Meanwhile, the Food 
70 More precisely: “About half of all Indian children are undernourished, more than half suffer from anaemia, and a
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Corporation of India (FCI), which oversees the operation of the TPDS across India, was storing 
more food grains than necessary, often beyond their shelf-life (Chaturvedi and Raj 2015; Drèze 
2001). This practice of storing food, Jean Drèze (2001) explains, drives the value of food grains 
up, which has an inflationary impact on the cost of food more generally in the open market. By 
2001-2002, the FCI had built a buffer stock of food grains nearing 50 to 60 million tons. In an op-
ed entitled “Starving the poor,” Drèze71 argues that:
The Indian public  is  so used to  large numbers that  it  is  easy to  lose sight of the
staggering scale of this hoard. It may help to think of it as the equivalent of one tonne
of food for each household under the poverty line. If all the sacks of grain lying in
FCI godowns [storage facilities] were lined up in a row, the line would stretch for a
million kilometres—more than twice the distance from the Earth to the moon. When
millions of people are undernourished if not starving, hoarding food on this scale—at
enormous cost—is nothing short of implicit mass murder. (2001)
Releasing food grains and thereby decreasing their market value would be beneficial for all, with 
the exception of cultivator-owners who sell their produce at a higher minimum support price, 
Drèze argues. It would have an impact on food markets, making food items more affordable for 
the population as a whole. This deflationary pressure on food markets would be particularly 
beneficial for poor people, whose diets are typically less balanced than those of wealthier 
households (Deaton and Drèze 2009, 47). When the PDS was overhauled into the TPDS in 1997, 
the commodities available in fair price shops (FPSs) were limited to wheat and rice.72 These food 
similar proportion escapes full immunization” (RTFC 2006, 1).
71 When Drèze wrote this op-ed for The Hindu, the country had witnessed a series of poor harvests due to droughts 
between 1995-2002. After a small respite in 2001, the drought of 2002 was particularly severe. The state of 
Rajasthan was notably touched by this natural disaster, which affected not only food production and 
consumption, but all aspects of everyday live for rural people, who live at the mercy of state relief in times of 
drought. According to the Relief Department of the Government of Rajasthan, in 2002, 44.8 million people were 
reportedly affected by drought in 96.98% of the state’s districts (in Rathore 2005, 8, 11). Food became too 
scarce. When a natural disaster of this scale hits, people cope as well as they can, including through urban 
migration, taking up credit to feed those close to them, or braving the storm by living with hunger (Khera 2004).
72 While the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) is a welfare program put in place across the country, it is 
the prerogative of each state government to complement entitlements of wheat and rice with other commodities, 
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commodities were made available to ration card holders at differentiated prices: below-the-
poverty-line (BPL) cardholders had access to food grains at cheaper rates than their above-the-
poverty-line (APL) counterparts, whose entitlement rates were fixed at near-market prices. Once 
reformed, the infrastructure of rationing sought to address the most basic nutritional needs of 
different categories of the population by subsidizing staple foods and leaving them to acquire 
other essential nutrients on their own. As such, nutritional food security, including the 
consumption of protein, vitamins, and other essential nutrients, came to depend on the ability of 
different households to access nutritious food on the open market. Obviously, this was more 
difficult to achieve for BPL ration card holders than their APL counterparts, and even more so for
other groups, such as migrant workers, agricultural labourers, and other daily-wage workers, who
for various reasons, do not all have access to ration cards and subsidized food. 
Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that vast quantities of food were rotting in 
godowns. Food grains, as opposed to non-food items, cannot be stored for an extended period of 
time without declining in quality. Commenting on “the low quality of PDS food grains,” Drèze 
writes:
In some areas, it is reported that even BPL (below poverty line) households see little
advantage in purchasing food from ration shops rather than from the market, because
the price differential is too small to compensate for the quality differential.  These
households, in other words, effectively gain nothing from subsidised PDS sales; on
the other hand, they bear the burden of high food prices on the market as a result of
the FCI's hoarding operations. (2001)
When stored for a prolonged period of time, food grains get eaten by rats and weevils, which in 
such as sugar. For instance, during my fieldwork in Delhi, onions were sporadically sold in FPSs, and other 
household items such as toothbrushes and toothpaste were allowed to be sold in there, but not at subsidized 
prices. In other states, like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, a large variety of food items were subsidized in FPSs, 
along with wheat, rice, and sugar. Kerosene is also made available through the PDS.
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times of severe droughts, end up better fed than neighbouring humans. 
This situation is all the more concerning when one considers the condition of the TPDS
more generally. By the turn of the millennium, most APL households had deserted FPSs, due to 
the low quality of food grains sold there compared to what they could buy elsewhere. 
Entitlements distributed through the FPSs for APL households were set at prices similar to food 
grains sold on the open market, and for many, the slightly lower price tag was not worth the 
difference in quality. Moreover, it was not unusual for fraudulent actors in close contact with the 
TPDS to systematically redirect APL rations for their own benefit (see Drèze 2001). With the 
value of food grains already high, diverting them to the black market was all the more profitable. 
In 2001, during a meeting organized by the People’s Union for Civic Liberties (PUCL) 
in Rajasthan, Drèze took human rights senior advocate Colin Gonsalves for a visit to a village 
located close to Jaipur to witness the extent to which repeated droughts had afflicted the local 
agrarian population. Villagers were eating “in rotation,” which is to say there was not enough 
food to feed everybody every day. On any given day, only a fraction of each family would eat. 
The following day, the rest would eat. Meanwhile, to their dismay, Drèze and Gonsalves were 
told by local residents that there was a nearby godown replete with food grains. Locked behind 
closed gates, the food grains in the storage facility had fermented in the rain—“some of it rotting 
and a feast for rats,” Gonsalves (2002) writes, describing this scene as “the spectre of starving 
India.”73 
In response to the patent inaction of local and national governments in securing the 
73 In December 2000, months after the low monsoon, the grain stored in Rajasthan’s godowns was planned to be 
dumped in the sea to make room for upcoming crops. This was known by the Government of Rajasthan, the 
union minister for Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution in New Delhi, and the senior regional manager of 
the FCI (Gonsalves 2002).
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well-being of its population, and given the plentiful stock of food grains available in the FCI’s 
godowns, on April 16, 2001, the PUCL submitted a writ petition to the Supreme Court of India to 
demand that the right to food be recognized. Led by Gonsalves, a team of human rights 
petitioners endeavoured to convince the Supreme Court magistrates of the FCI and national and 
local governments’ failures to abide by their biopolitical duties and secure access to food for the 
country’s (starving) population. Meanwhile, activists for a right to food started the Right to Food 
Campaign (RTFC) and began to mobilize popular support. 
The RTFC is an informal network of organizations and individuals committed to a 
human rights approach to issues of hunger and undernourishment in India. According to the 
RTFC’s Foundation Statement that was written later in 2007:
Realising this right [to be free of hunger] requires not only equitable and sustainable
food systems, but also entitlements relating to livelihood security such as the right to
work, land reform and social security. We consider that the primary responsibility for
guaranteeing  these  entitlements  rests  with  the  state.  Lack  of  financial  resources
cannot be accepted as an excuse for abdicating this responsibility. (RTFC n.d.)
The authors position the provision of entitlements related to livelihood security as a fundamental 
biopolitical duty of the state.
The RTFC has used what political scientist Shareen Hertel calls a “three-pronged 
strategy” to popularize human rights discourses as a response to the government’s inaction in 
fulfilling its duties (2016, 611). The strategy focuses on: (a) judiciary activism; (b) popular 
mobilization, which has notably built on other human rights campaigns for the right to 
information and the right to work; and (c) advocacy with parliamentarians, via collaboration 
through a special para-public institution, the National Advisory Council (NAC). This led, in 
2013, to the enactment of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), a piece of legislation that 
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guarantees four types of entitlement: (a) subsidized food grains to 67% of India’s population; (b) 
universal delivery of lunch to school-goers; (c) universal provision of warm meals to children 
aged 0 to 6 years; and (d) maternity entitlements of ₹ 6,000 per month (about 90 USD). 
In this chapter, I examine each prong of Hertel’s three-pronged strategy and come to 
three distinct conclusions. The first is that if the state is far from a unitary and homogenous entity
(Gupta 1995; Mitchell 2006), so is the social movement for a right to food. Put in simpler terms, 
the categories of “state” and “civil society” often encompass a range of actors that make 
competing normative claims about the needs of the population and the strategies that should be 
deployed to satisfy them. The assumption underlying Hertel’s analysis is that actors from both the
social movement and the government have negotiated the nature and scope of an Indian right to 
food in three different milieus: within the judiciary system, in para-public forums like the NAC, 
and through the legislative process. Building on the work of Deepta Chopra (2011a, 2011b, 2014)
and Hertel (2016), which focuses on the formulation of the Indian right to work in the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA),74 this chapter maps the “politics of need 
interpretation” (Fraser 1989: 163) in such a way as to show that the right-to-food movement, just 
like the state, is composed of a myriad of heterogeneous and diverse (even conflicting) voices. I 
demonstrate that welfare policy-making is complex and messy, but it is always articulated to 
(re)produce the appearance of a centralized state power in the materials, practices, and techniques
through which welfare is delivered—what Timothy Mitchell calls the “state effect” (Mitchell 
2002, 2006; see also Chopra 2011b; Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
My second conclusion is linked to the first. Throughout the decade-long struggle 
74 In 2010, NREGA was renamed Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREA). Since
I refer to the formulation of NREGA in this dissertation, which took place in 2004-05, I use the acronym 
NREGA instead of MGNREGA.
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leading up to formulation of the NFSA, human rights discourses have informed the construction 
of an implementable food security bill. Co-occurring debates conducted first within the judiciary 
system, then in para-public forums, and finally through the legislative process, established a 
relation between the interpretation of nutritional needs of a (rather diverse) population and how 
these needs could be satisfied in the form of implementable policies and programs. This process 
brought to fruition what Nancy Fraser has termed the “politics of need interpretation,” defined as 
“the processes by which welfare practices construct . . . needs according to certain specific—and, 
in principles, contestable—interpretations, even as they lend those interpretations an aura of 
facticity that discourages contestation” (1989: 146). Here, Fraser considers politics not 
necessarily as an ideological struggle between different political groups, but rather as norms and 
assumptions that lend credence to welfare techniques, programs, policies, and laws. In tracing the
formulation of an Indian right to food entitlement in this chapter, I explore competing 
interpretation of needs in the above-mentioned milieus to probe how normative claims have come
to be woven into the NFSA.
Third, I take under consideration how corruption and leakages have taken a prominent 
place in Indian politics (Giri 2011; Gupta 2005; Parry 2000; Shapiro Anjaria 2011). In the debates
leading up to the formulation of the NFSA, state and non-state actors pegged their claims about 
food security, or food sovereignty, within the rhetoric of good governance. In this chapter, I 
explore how narratives of accountability and transparency have been central to the articulation of 
the right to food entitlement, positioned as techniques of government to make bureaucratic 
practices incorruptible. I examine how claims about accountability and transparency have been 
translated into techniques of government with the purpose of shaping the role, functions, and 
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expectations of government in satisfying the need for food security for the population.
Drawing on the work of Nikolas Rose (1999, 57), I ask: which need(s) was the right to 
food entitlement designed to satisfy?75 The right to food entitlement is generally, and perhaps too 
simplistically, conceptualized as freedom from hunger. I argue that the right to food entitlement 
has served competing meanings, objectives, and rationales, some of which have been intended 
and others unintended. In the next section, I closely examine the tactics and narratives employed 
and voiced by activists, economists, politicians, and human rights lawyers to use and translate 
normative claims of governance about food security into a technical and implementable law and 
program. First, I trace the origin of the right to food on the international scene. I examine how the
rights-based approach framed debates about the formulation of the NFSA. The language of good 
governance provided a vocabulary to establish moral claims about the state’s responsibility to 
alleviate the social problem of hunger. I use this discussion of human rights discourses to 
delineate the dominant framework of public policy in the first decade of the 21st century. Then, I 
delve into this dominant framework to explore how it has shaped the history of the NFSA. I trace 
the formation of the Indian right to food entitlement in three milieus: judiciary activism, para-
public forums, and the legislative process. I show how competing claims about the nature and the
scope of an Indian right to food entitlement were debated over a decade to result in 
implementable legislation deployed with the aim of establishing principles of good governance. I 
conclude the chapter by examining how the language of good governance, and notably the 
governing rationale for state accountability and transparency, has been so closely aligned with the
75 Building on Rose, who has argued that “[a]nalytics of government are diagnostic,” or in other words, an exercise
of symptomology deployed in such a way as to establish a relation of “singularity of particular strategies within a
field of relations of truth, power, and subjectivity” (1999, 57), one could legitimately ponder the strategic 
rationales behind the push for a right to food.
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issue of food insecurity that it became a primary catalyst in the design of instruments to deploy 
the NFSA and more specifically modernize the TPDS. 
3.2 Human Rights Discourses and Good Governance
In India, a vernacular of “human rights” has emerged in the context of economic 
[neo]liberalization (Robinson 2009). “This is not a historical coincidence,” Shannon Speed 
argues, “[y]et the relationship of human rights and neoliberalism is unclear, at best” (2005, 31). 
For Speed, neoliberalism is a political project, much like David Harvey’s “construction of 
consent,” through which the “role of the government was to create a good business climate rather 
than look to the needs and well-being of the population at large” (Harvey 2005, 48). As a 
rationality of government, neoliberalism reorganizes the techniques of government and function 
of the state and (civil) society along the lines of privatization, consumerism, individual freedom, 
free trade, and greater expectations for non-state organizations to undertake some of the welfare 
functions of the government. In the neoliberal context, some authors have argued that human 
rights either fill the void left by the retrenchments of the welfare state (Donnelly 2013) or provide
a line of defence against the alignment of government and capitalist interests in order to promote 
ideals of equity and social justice (Ignatieff 2003). Human rights, as forms of protestation or 
protection against neoliberal processes, are confined to the modalities of the rule of law and 
mechanisms of good governance. They are articulated to shape states into institutions void of 
undemocratic, inefficient, and unlawful practices. These mechanisms turn political issues into 
solvable problems with implementable solutions according to neoliberal precepts (Bornstein and 
Sharma 2016; Merry 2006), thus running the risk of reproducing the logics of power against 
which human rights advocates struggle (Brown 1995; Speed 2005). This is precisely why the 
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notion of human rights has been treated as panacea for addressing structural issues such as 
chronic hunger and undernourishment in the neoliberal age: it points to implementable solutions 
informed by narratives of good governance that reproduce the rule of law, discursively 
constructing and making the state according to democratic norms of accountability and 
transparency, while foreclosing any debates on structures of economic and political domination 
and exclusion that populate bureaucratic practices and processes (see Gupta 2012).
In this section, I chart the history of the right to adequate food, and at the same time, I 
explore how the language of good governance is intricately intertwined with human rights 
discourses. I emphasize that while the right to food entitlement has been discursively constructed 
against the sentiment that government institutions must protect the population from chronic 
hunger, it has been designed according to principles of accountability and transparency to address
welfare failures of the state rather than structural inequalities (see Merry 2006, 40). 
In 1974, after a global food crisis hit populations in the early 1970s, the World Food 
Conference set up goals to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, while framing the proposed 
solutions to chronic hunger and famines in Malthusian terms. Increasing food production and 
stabilizing food supplies were the two main measures proposed to end chronic hunger by the mid-
1980s, an objective that was never met. Over the ensuing two decades, the rhetoric of food 
security gradually shifted from questions of food availability to include concerns about household
and individual livelihoods. The concept of food security incrementally incorporated an emphasis 
on poverty (as opposed to food availability) as the driving explanation for chronic hunger. The 
works of Amartya Sen (2013) on food entitlement and the publication of Drèze and Sen’s Hunger
and Public Action (2013) critically contributed to this reconceptualization of food security (Shaw 
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2007: 385).76 
In 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) convened government 
representatives and other key actors at the World Food Summit (WFS) in Rome, in order to 
debate the development of a new global plan for eradicating hunger. It is during this summit that 
a definition of food security was coined:77 “Food security exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, [social]78 and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996). Widely accepted 
by most scholars, this definition highlights the responsibilities of national governments and 
institutions to not only take necessary measures to ensure that available food be adequately 
distributed to the population, but to also address the integral dimension of cultural nutritional 
preferences in the distribution of food (Pinstrup-Anderson 2009: 5). The WFS definition is based 
on four pillars that schematically frame the practice of food security at the national level: 
76 John D. Shaw delineates five successive phases or turning points in the evolution of food security after the World
Food Conference of 1974: (1) the arrangement of the global food security system; (2) Sen’s approach to food 
entitlement as a critique of food availability and the structural adjustments programs (SAPs); (3) the publication 
of UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face (2007), which further criticizes the impacts of SAPs in Africa; (4) 
the publication of Hunger and Public Action (Sen and Drèze 2013); and (5) a series of international conferences 
on the deterministic relationship between poverty and chronic hunger (Shaw 2007, 385).
77 In 1993, Marisol Smith, Judy Pointing, and Simon Maxwell compiled as many as 194 different definitions of 
food security, drawn from academic publications, reports from national and international organizations, and 
unpublished manuscripts. They note that earlier conceptions of food security first emerged in the second half of 
the 1970s, but the bulk of definitions were developed in the 1980s, first in relation to food production and then in
relation to other manifestations of power, such as relations of class or gender. All definitions are based on the 
notion that food insecurity is occasioned by failures of economic mechanisms to either produce or distribute 
sufficient food items to those in need, thus conveying a form of economic determinism (Smith, Pointing, and 
Maxwell 1993). 
78 The adjective “social” was added to the definition in 2002 (FAO 2002; Simon 2012, 4).
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availability,79 access,80 utilization,81 and stability.82
One of the key objectives of the 1996 WFS83 was to clarify what the right to food 
entails. Historically, the right to food had already been protected as part of the right to an 
adequate standard of living established in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UN General Assembly 1948) and the fundamental right to be free from hunger in Article 
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN General 
Assembly 1966). However, members of the WFS urged the international community to come up 
with provisions that would make the right to food, and the WFS’s commitment more generally, 
legally implementable. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), a 
United Nations (UN) body of experts charged with overseeing the implementation of the 
ICESCR, was tasked with drafting a legal interpretation of the right to adequate food (UN 
General Assembly 1966, sec. 11). Published in May 1999 in a document entitled General 
Comment 12 (UN CESCR 1999), the committee defines the right to food in terms of access and 
distribution: “The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or 
79 “Food Security exists when all people . . . have . . . access to sufficient food . . . ” (emphasis added). This refers 
to the production of sufficient and adequate food for a given population. The WFS estimates that to feed the 
world, the total agricultural output will have to increase by 70% before 2050 (Simon 2012, 5).
80 “Food Security exists when all people . . . have physical, social, and economic access to . . . food” (emphasis 
added). Food commodities need to be made accessible to consumers who would otherwise not have access to 
food, but also to those who are either economically excluded from entitlements or prevented from accessing 
them due to their religious beliefs, gender identity, health issues, or other types of vulnerabilities (Simon 2012, 
6–7).
81 “Food Security exists when all people . . . have . . . access to . . . safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences” (emphasis added). Clean water, sanitation, and access to health care facilities are 
crucial for ensuring the proper utilization, processing, preparation, consumption, conservation, and elimination 
of food items (Simon 2012, 7).
82 “Food Security exists when all people, at all times, have . . . access to . . . food” (emphasis added). Food security
implies a continuous supply of food to prevent episodic catastrophes (Simon 2012, 8).
83 Objective 7.4 of the WFS seeks “to better define the rights related to food in Article 11 of the Covenant [on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights]” (FAO 1996).
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in community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or 
means for its procurement” (UN CESCR 1999, sec. 6). The right to adequate food shall therefore 
not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense that equates it to a minimum package of 
calories. Rather, the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to understandings of human 
dignity and ideas of social justice, oriented towards the total eradication of poverty (UN CESCR 
1999, sec. 6). “Fundamentally,” the committee notes, “the roots of the problem of hunger and 
malnutrition are not lack of food but lack of access to available food, inter alia [among other 
things] because of poverty, by large segment of the world’s population” (UN CESCR 1999, sec. 
5; italics and underlining in original document). 
Emphasizing the duty of governments to enable access to available food, the authors of 
General Comment 12 insist on the responsibility of states to adopt social and economic policies 
to ensure that: (a) dietary needs are satisfied at all ages (1999, sec. 9); (b) available food is 
culturally appropriate, with respect to occupation (or class), gender, age or location (1999, secs. 
9–11); (c) available food is free from toxins (1999, sec. 10); and (d) special attention is paid to 
economically vulnerable populations or those living in disaster-prone areas (1999, secs. 12–13).84 
Thus conceptualized, the right to adequate food consolidates a governmental approach to food 
security, “in all its conceptual lucidity, simplicity, and universalism . . . as a normative ordering 
principle around which social practices are increasingly organized and invested with meanings” 
(Goodale 2006b, 26). In other words, the right to adequate food discursively constructs the state 
as an entity embodying normative principles of good governance to respect, protect, and fulfil 
84 Based on the recommendations of the General Comment 12, in 2005, the FAO adopted the Voluntary Guidelines 
to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, 
which in the words of the then recently appointed director-general of the FAO, Senegalese Jacques Diouf, 
provides “practical guidance to States in the implementation of the progressive realization of the right to 
adequate food in the context of national food security, in order to achieve the goals of the World Food Summit 
Plan of Action” (2005). 
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individuals' right to adequate nourishment. These normative principles, here, configure the 
government’s responsibility to act with respect to dietary norms and approaches to food security 
within the rule of law, under which the well-being of individuals should be promoted.
Compared to the rather instrumentalist view of human rights according to which 
inalienable rights are provided to empowered subjects, a discursive approach sheds light on the 
normative elements of human rights as a category of analysis. It gives us the tools to explore how
regimes of knowledge are normatively constituted in practices, policies, and governmental 
interventions (see Chapter Two). As Mark Goodale stipulates:
This does not mean that human rights is simply studied or analyzed as norms rather,
normativity  is  understood  as  the  means  through  which  the  idea  of  human  rights
becomes discursive, the process that render human rights into social knowledge that
shape social action. (2011: 8)
As key constitutive elements of the analytics of governmentality, human rights as discursive 
operations constitute a particular kind of politico-normative project—one that “help[s] people to 
help themselves” (Ignatieff 2000, 57 in Brown 2004, 454)—one that works to mitigate suffering 
and social ills, but only within the parameters of social justice protected by the legal institutions 
and political authorities that deploy them. The right to food, then, constitutes a field of 
knowledge that renders food insecurity issues intelligible and translatable into particular types of 
bureaucratic practices, in which, as the FAO puts it, “people hold their governments accountable 
and are participants in the process of human development, rather than being passive recipients” 
(FAO 2005, 7; see also Mechlem 2004).85 In other words, a discursive approach to the right to 
food delineates an arena in which issues of food security are discussed and debated. Here, of 
85 This notion of “passive recipients” is particularly interesting since it suggests that struggles to implement the 
right to adequate food can, and perhaps even should, be implemented from “below,” from the (civil) society onto
the state. 
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course, the nature of claims may vary. But to be seriously considered in the legislative process, 
claims must conform to a particular field of knowledge that is congruent with a rights-based 
approach. As the FAO (2005) stipulates, this field of knowledge is built upon principles of good 
governance: accountability, transparency, citizen empowerment, and participation in democratic 
processes. It precludes other solutions to the endemic issue of chronic hunger that challenge the 
stability of property rights, capitalist food economies, liberal regimes of trade, or class-based 
access to land, forest, or water.
To understand human rights as discourse is to posit that human rights are constituted in 
practices: it implies that human rights are not solely conceptual, analytical, universal, or formal—
but that they shape, and are shaped by, people’s everyday lives. It stipulates that human rights 
exist in universal declarations, texts, analyses, court of laws, and bills, but also in the regimes of 
knowledge through which they operate and act on cultural practices (see Foucault 1991). Since 
human rights emerge locally within a cultural matrix of conventions, meanings, and rules, “the 
discursive approach to human rights is itself internally diverse,” Goodale states (2007, 8). As 
such, competing norms and assumptions inform the variegated forms that discursive human rights
may take in practice. Fraser refers to these norms and assumptions as “thick needs” (1989, 163), 
which are positioned at the centre of a series of nested interrogations about possible forms of 
governmental provisions (see Chapter Two). The interpretation of what comprises thick needs is 
an object of acute public debate, unraveling in a series of struggles to affirm what should and 
should not be framed as implementable interventions. This is what Fraser refers as the politics of 
need interpretation.
For instance, by the mid-2000s, against the state's perennial inertia on issues of chronic 
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hunger and undernourishment, human rights discourses came to take a prominent position in 
public debate in India. On the issue of food security, it was widely acknowledged that levels of 
government should intervene to distribute resources to the poorest segments of the population—
what Fraser refers as “thin needs” (Fraser 1989, 163). But questions remained, as to what extent 
and how the government should intervene. How could needs be articulated and addressed in a 
thicker form to better address the issue of chronic hunger in India? For instance, could cash 
replace food distributed through the TPDS? Were there interventions that should be better 
implemented? Were there new initiatives that should be deployed? Should India prioritize the 
protection of its most marginalized populations, especially children and young mothers, rather 
than distributing entitlements to all? Did everybody need to be food secure? Should the 
government impart rations equally among poor and wealthy households? And if not, how much 
food should be distributed to different groups? What methodologies could be use to demarcate 
the wealthy from the poor? Was it the duty of the state to meet more than the population’s basic 
nutritional needs? Were wheat and rice nutritious enough? Is it the duty of the state to provide 
more than the basic nutritional needs? What does nutritional food entail? Was the current 
infrastructure of rationing too corrupt to adequately ensure food security? What kinds of 
mechanisms could be deployed to ensure that governmental interventions conformed to principles
of good governance? These questions were just some of those raised in the many debates that 
animated the formulation of the NFSA. 
In the following section, I trace the history of these debates. Using the politics of need 
interpretation as an analytical grid, I undertake the task of probing the discursive politics of the 
right to food entitlement in the spheres of judiciary activism, para-public forums, and legislation 
114
processes. I emphasize how the language of good governance is central to the right to food 
entitlement and, thus, attempt to chart its trajectory in the formulation of the NFSA.
3.2.1 Judiciary Activism: Leveraging the Supreme Court
In 2001, shortly after Drèze and Gonsalves’ visit to Rajasthan, in light of the waves of 
starvation-related deaths affecting the country, the PUCL submitted a writ petition to the Supreme
Court of India (PUCL 2001). The PUCL argued that starvation-related deaths that had occurred in
six different states86 could have been avoided, if only the Government of India and the FCI had 
released some of the 50 to 60 million tons of food grains stored in their godowns. Its petition 
raised three questions:
• Starvation deaths have become a national phenomenon while there is a surplus stock of
food grains  in  government  godowns.  Does  the  right  to  life  mean  that  people  who are
starving and who are too poor to buy food grains free of cost by the State from the surplus
stock lying with the State, particularly when it is lying unused and rotting?
• Does not the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India include the right to
food?
• Does not the right to food, which has been upheld by the apex Court, imply that the State
has a duty to provide food, especially in situations of drought, to people who are drought
affected and are not in a position to purchase food?87
Article 21 of the Constitution of India ensures that “no person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law” (see Kent 2002). The PUCL 
petitioners, led by Gonsalves and a team of human rights lawyers from his non-governmental 
organization (NGO), Human Rights and Law Network (HRLN), argued that the constitutional 
obligations of the Government of India had been neglected (Chhibbar 2001). They sought support
from the Supreme Court to compel government authorities to finally abide by their biopolitical 
86 The states included Chattisgarh, Himachal Pradeash, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Rajasthan.
87 The petitioner’s questions were retrieved from the PUCL Bulletin, November 2001 (http://bit.ly/2v6Nt6N) on 
October 29, 2017.
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duties. I show how the writ petition constituted a field of knowledge, from which non-state actors
could make normative claims on possible governmental interventions on the issue of food 
security.
The writ petition was filed as a public interest litigation (PIL). In India, a PIL is a legal 
proceeding conducted in the public interest of the population, protected by Article 32 of the 
constitution. Soon after the Emergency, a period in India when democratic rights and duties were 
suspended from 1975-1977, Justices P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, and others created a path
to social justice in the Indian legal system for those who would otherwise be incapable of 
accessing the courts. By doing so, these justices championed human rights, especially social and 
economic rights, for the poor and the oppressed (Mate 2015, 175). According to Dan Banik, in 
India, “the Constitution empowers the judiciary branch to protect the fundamental rights of 
citizens and to intervene when legislative and executive actions are found to be unconstitutional” 
(2010, 264). In 1982, Chief Justice Bhagwati abolished the “standing requirements,” a legal term 
connoting the ability of a party to show the connection between the petitioner and the harm 
incurred from the law. This opened the door for representative bodies to bring to the courts any 
cause with compelling evidence on behalf of anyone who, “by reason of poverty, helplessness or 
disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, [is] unable to approach the court 
for relief” (Chief Justice Bhagwati in Birchfield and Corsi 2010, 716). Since the 1980s, hundreds 
of PILs have been filed at the Supreme Court (Banik 2010), to the extent that an entire NGO 
sector in India has been founded on the sole exercise of PIL. It is this constitutional provision that
enabled the PUCL to file its writ petition in the name of people starving to death and allowed 
HRLN to litigate what would become the right-to-food case. 
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As Hertel (2016) writes, claims for the right to adequate food were made against the 
domestic rule of law. While India has been a signatory of a number of international documents 
pertaining to the right to food, including the UDHR and ICESCR, the entire right-to-food case 
rests on domestic legislation, “as a national fundamental right, founded on unique principles of 
Indian constitutional law” (Birchfield and Corsi 2010, 703; italics in original). In fact, in India, 
the Supreme Court seldom relies on international law, but it must “as far as possible give effect to
the principles contained in those international instruments” (Anand 1999), especially when there 
is some degree of inconsistency between international and domestic law or when there is a certain
gap or void in domestic law (see Rana 2009 in Birchfield and Corsi 2010, 704).88 In the context 
of the right-to-food case, judiciary activism consisted of building a domestic legal framework in 
order to leverage the power of the law onto the legislative and executive branches for the 
promotion and protection of human rights—“as a court of good governance over the rest of 
government” (Banik 2010; Robinson 2009, 3). As Nick Robinson clarifies, “the Supreme Court 
has expanded its role . . . in an attempt to combat the perceived governance shortcomings of 
India's representative institutions” (2009, 3–4). The Supreme Court has become an arena in which
normative claims of accountability about what these shortcomings are and how to address them 
are formulated. The work of translation from the Constitution of India to interim orders—
judgements passed by the court that are applicable for the duration of a case—has come to be an 
88 In the case Apparel Export Promotion Council vs A. K. Chopra, Supreme Court Justice V. N. Khare declares 
that:
This Court has in numerous cases emphasised that while discussing constitutional requirements, court and 
counsel must never forget the core principle embodied in the International Conventions and Instruments and as 
far as possible give effect to the principles contained in those international instruments. The Courts are under 
an obligation to give due regard to International Conventions and Norms for construing domestic laws more so 
when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in domestic law. (Anand 1999)
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operative element in the formulation of these claims.89 This is especially patent in the right-to-
food case, where the Supreme Court directly intervened in other domains of the state. In 2001 
alone, the Supreme Court issued five interim orders to compel levels of government to take 
immediate action to deliver relief to people suffering from undernourishment due to repeated 
droughts. 
Perhaps no interim order had a broader scope than the one issued on November 28, 
2001. In July, August, and September 2001, the court urged levels of government to quickly 
implement and properly deploy already-existing food welfare schemes, including the TPDS.90 
Since governments were slow to comply, on November 28, 2001, the Supreme Court issued 
another interim order that marked the emergence of the RTFC. The court engaged in “something 
strikingly close to lawmaking” (Birchfield and Corsi 2010, 700) by identifying nine nutrition-
related programs and outlining, in detail and with deadlines, the required courses of action for 
various levels of government. These interim orders stretched the original object of contention in 
the case, which was food relief for alleviating starvation-related death, to include welfare benefit 
provisions in already-existing programs. The PIL redirected the Supreme Court’s attention from 
the delivery of food relief to a normative understanding of good governance on the terrain of 
chronic hunger. It opened up a space of negotiation between the petitioners and the state, in 
which the Supreme Court Justices, in the name of the Constitution of India, played a critical role 
in transforming normative state obligations related to food security into concrete and 
implementable interventions that ought to be taken. It compelled the government to act on 
89 Since the Emergency in 1975, to act as a court of good governance, the Supreme Court has had to be responsive 
and capable of projecting the voice of marginalized groups in the public arena (Gloppen 2005). 
90 In addition to the TPDS, these welfare schemes also included the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), the Mid-Day 
Meal Scheme (MDMS), the National Old Age Pension Scheme, the Annapurna Scheme (food security for 
seniors), the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), and the National Family Benefit Scheme.
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already-existing welfare programs: the interim order of November 2001 granted, among others, 
legal rights to children to receive a nutritious meal in school via the Mid-Day Meal Scheme 
(MDMS); it granted legal provisions to ration card holders to receive their rations from the 
TPDS; it compelled state governments to pay minimum wage on public work; and it forced state 
governments to fund anganwadi (crèches or kindergartens) across India and to provide meals for 
every child between 0 and six years old via the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). 
These programs, according to the interim order, had been either partly or poorly implemented and
were dysfunctional. 
The RTFC saw, in these legal entitlements, a powerful lever to force governments to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the population's right to adequate food. As an extended network of 
organizations across the country, the RTFC sought to reach people of all castes and classes, 
students, workers, politicians, and administrators, including gram panchayat (local institutions 
ruling over villages),91 to evaluate the deployment of welfare schemes under the court’s interim 
orders via informal discussions or formal surveys. As the RTFC noted: “Without public pressure, 
the orders typically remain on paper. The orders are just a helpful ‘stick’ to keep the government 
on its toes. But hands are needed to lift the stick and use it” (2008, 50). This statement is 
strikingly similar to the FAO’s characterization of the right to adequate food, which stipulates that
rights-bearing individuals should be active rather than “passive recipients” in holding their 
government accountable to issues of food insecurity (FAO 2005, 7).
91 The RTFC leaders notes that gram panchayat should not be classist or casteist instruments of oppression:
it is important to ensure that they are fair and ‘inclusive.’ If, say, a Gram Panchayat is dominated by upper-caste
landlords, it is unlikely to do much for the poorer households. Similarly, if Dalits are excluded from the local 
Mahila Mandal [organizations for women’s empowerment], something must be done about it before the 
Mandal can be actively involved in the implementation of midday meals. (RTFC 2008, 53)
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In May 2002, the Supreme Court took an additional step to address poor compliance 
with its interim orders by instituting a commission for the right-to-food case. The court entrusted 
two commissioners with the responsibility of verifying that state authorities were respecting the 
interim orders, mandating them to investigate violations and demand restitution. Narendra C. 
Saxena92 and S. R. Shankaran93 were first appointed, but when Shankaran retired two years after 
his appointment, Harsh Mander94 was authorized to assist Saxena as special commissioner. The 
commissioners have been prominent figures in the movement for a right to food, due to their 
particular positions as representatives of the judiciary branch. Part of their mandate was to 
develop a network of consultants, or state advisors, across the country to help investigate and 
monitor the extent to which the interim orders were being implemented. Over subsequent years, 
the commissioners drafted nine reports to the Supreme Court, each of which was more 
comprehensive than the last, to comment on levels of accountability and transparency in efforts to
secure a nutritious diet for the population as a whole. 
Constraints to judiciary activism exist, however. The power of the judiciary branch to 
compel state governments to provide food security benefits to the population was, at best, limited.
In every report, the commissioners note various degrees of non-compliance and reticence from 
some state authorities to fully cooperate with the Supreme Court's orders.95 With close to no 
92 Dr. N. C. Saxena is a former Indian civil servant in the Planning Commission, Government of India.
93 Dr. S. R. Shankaran is a former secretary in the Rural Development Department, Government of India.
94 Harsh Mander is also a former civil servant, who abandoned his work to join social movements on various 
causes, including the right to information, tribal and Dalit rights, bonded labour, and homelessness, and he has 
become one of the public faces of the RTFC.
95 In the fifth and perhaps most virulent report, Saxena and Mander preface their conclusions by critiquing the state
government’s first line of defence, the lack of public funding, as spurious. In fact, Saxena and Mander write: 
Direct the states to earmark fully to meet the cost of the nine food based and welfare schemes, and then only 
divert the rest for salaries and other expenditure. This is in light of recent reports of diversion of funds and 
discussions with non-complying states whom often try to take shelter behind the excuse that they have no 
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resources and little authority over elected representatives, the commissioners had minimal clout 
to ensure that the right to food was realized (Hassan 2011). What is more, very few sanctions, if 
any, were levied against officials or individuals that did not comply with the orders (Banik 2010, 
277). The interim orders may have been potent instruments, as the RTFC (2008) suggests, but 
these tools were hard to leverage for a large section of the population, either due to gaps in the 
dissemination of information or structural barriers to people having their grievances heard. As 
legal scholar Unpendra Baxi states, courts are “never an instrument of total social revolution: 
they are at best . . . instruments of piecemeal social engineering . . . never a substitute for direct 
political action” (2000, 164 in Banik 2010, 277). 
It should be noted that judicial activism efforts were not totally unproductive either. 
Over the course of the right-to-food case, close to 500 affidavits were presented to the Supreme 
Court, which resulted in the issuance of 49 interim orders (RTFC 2008, 7). In the four years that 
followed, 20 more interim orders were added to the lot.96 These interim orders delineated the 
arena in which debates about the thick needs of the population were associated with 
implementable solutions, if only government authorities abode by principles of good governance.
The RTFC used these interim orders to bring legitimacy to the right-to-food movement and its 
claims, especially those claims that pointed to the inertia of central and state governments in 
funds. This is factually not correct as they [state governments] have received a total of Rs 1,66,749 crore 
[approximately $3.6 billion USD] as central transfers from the GoI [Government of India] according to recent 
estimates. (2004, 99)
Rather than low public funding, Saxena and Shankran point to the debilitating effects of corruption and gaps in 
information dissemination as prominent obstacles to compliance with the interim orders (Supreme Court 
Commission 2003, 2002). In the sixth report made to the Supreme Court, Saxena also condemns the 
normalization of apathy through practices of patronage and corruption that are, at once, widely acknowledged 
yet ignored (2005, 5).
96 This information was retrieved from the RTFC’s website available at http://bit.ly/2quGxvm, last consulted on 
March 14, 2017.
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delivering on welfare obligations that were already in place. Programs to alleviate food insecurity
already existed when these orders were promulgated, and the primary purpose of these orders was
to make the state accountable and transparent in its delivery of welfare services, which would, it 
was thought, obliquely help to alleviate chronic hunger in the country. 
The commission and the right-to-food case contributed to produce a rhetoric of good 
governance in terms of food-based welfare delivery. They both consolidated a narrative and an 
approach to the right to food in the country and, to various degrees, have helped to inform other 
means of direct political action. Members of the RTFC have also written several accounts about 
the failures of the state to address chronic hunger, based on the narrative of state accountability 
and transparency found in the interim orders issued by the Supreme Court (Drèze 2004; Khera 
2013; RTFC 2008). In the next sections, I examine how the Indian right to food entitlement 
emerged from a politics of need interpretation. 
3.2.2 Towards a Legislative Path: the National Advisory Council
In what follows, I explore how the RTFC established strong alliances with other rights-
based campaigns, such as the right-to-information and the right-to-work campaigns, and here I 
show that without the existence of a para-public institution such as the National Advisory Council
(hereafter the NAC I), these rights-based campaigns would perhaps not have been as successful 
as they were in bringing human rights into law. In this section, I trace how the NAC I constituted 
a space of debate for the politics of need interpretation.
In the first few years of the right-to-food case, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led a 
coalition inclined to pursue processes of economic liberalization, which had been well under way 
since the late 1980s. When elections were declared in January 2004, bidding on impressive rates 
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of economic growth and the rising popularity of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of the BJP, 
a coalition led by the BJP, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), used the slogan “India 
Shining” (Bharat Uday) to conjure up symbols of consumerism that were only possible because 
of economic growth. “India Shining” was coined as a marketing strategy—a rebranding of India 
on the global scene. It became the catchphrase of the outgoing government to represent the 
promise of a shiny future (Jha 2004).
Of course, life stories about death by starvation or chronic hunger in the previous 
drought years, popularized by the right-to-food case and RTFC activism, did not resonate well 
with the BJP election campaign. Shortly after the beginning of the 2004 elections, Sonia Gandhi, 
widow of late Rajiv Gandhi and president of the Congress,97 asked in a basti (informal 
settlement) of North Delhi, “Where is India Shining?” (The Hindu 2004). Polarized along a left-
right axis, the BJP bid on the fruits reaped from more than a decade of economic liberalization, 
while the Congress argued for the merits of economic inclusion, social justice, and anti-poverty 
measures. The Congress formed a coalition with left-leaning political parties and created a 
political alliance, called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), chaired by Sonia Gandhi. The 
UPA secured the support of low-caste and poor voters, who have historically constituted a 
significant portion of the electoral base of the Congress. 
In May 2004, at the culmination of a tight race, Vajpayee conceded victory to the UPA. 
However, the mandate of the coalition remained ambiguous. In describing its mandate, Yogendra 
Yadav, a political commentator, perhaps puts it best: “[UPA’s mandate] was not and could not be 
a mandate against economic reforms, but there was an element of protest against exclusion from 
97 Due to Gandhi’s Italian origins, a faction of the Congress seceded and formed the Nationalist Congress Party. 
The rest of the Congress is known as the Indian National Congress (Chatterjee 1997). 
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benefits and opportunities in the realm of the economy” (2004, 5398).
Difficult to stabilize, the UPA coalition attempted to reconcile diverse positions on the 
orientations of economic policy and reservations about the Italian origins of Sonia Gandhi 
(Sridharan 2004, 5425).98 Days after the elections, to avoid further turmoil, Gandhi declined the 
position of prime minister and recommended that Manmohan Singh, former finance minister and 
key architect of the economic liberalization turn of 1991, take the role. In turn, a few weeks later, 
Singh formed the NAC I, a para-public institution comprised of a range of experts in various 
social and economic domains, to advise the prime minister. Still president of the Congress and 
chairperson of the UPA, Gandhi was then appointed as chairperson of the NAC I. 
At its inception, the UPA drafted its Common Minimum Programme, outlining the 
political agenda of the government. In itself, the programme was meant as a conciliatory 
document, a kind of middle ground, upon which the cohesion of the UPA’s fifteen member 
parties, including the Congress, was established. In addition to a pledge of accountability, 
transparency, and responsibility, the programme lists a series of principles and norms that echo 
concerns for social justice, good governance, and the maintenance of economic growth and 
liberalization (Government of UPA 2004, 2005).99 As an advisory body, the NAC I provided a 
space for deliberation among appointed experts to realize the objectives of this programme, from 
98 Sonia Gandhi is the widow of Rajiv Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi and grandson of Jawaharlal Nehru. When 
Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother, serving until 1989. He remained 
president of the Congress until 1991, when he was assassinated during elections. Sonia Gandhi became president
of the Congress from 1998 until 2017. Her son Rahul Gandhi has since replaced his mother as president.
99 The principles of governance comprise: the maintenance of social harmony under the rule of law; an economic 
growth at a rate of 7-8%; the protection of welfare and well-being of farmers, farm labours, and workers; the 
empowerment of women; the protection of equality of opportunities for members of all castes; and the 
promotion of a productive and creative economic environment. The domains of governance are fairly large and 
comprehend as many sectors as possible. Among them are employment and the enactment of a National 
Employment Guarantee Act, agriculture, education and health, women and children, food and nutrition security, 
good governance at local levels (Panchayati Raj), welfare of minorities, infrastructure, water resources, and 
inter-relations of governance between the centre and state authorities.
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which policy formulation was given credence, accountability, credibility, and authority (Chopra 
2011a, 160–61). The importance of Gandhi’s presence as the head of the NAC I was not 
negligible (Drèze, personal interview, Ranchi, May 2014; Ramesh, personal interview, New 
Delhi, August 2015). “The NAC was powerful because Mrs. Gandhi was its Chairperson,” Jairam
Ramesh, minister of rural development between 2011 and 2014, said in a personal interview. He 
stated: 
The National Advisory Council was conceived of in 2004 as an institution to give a
role to Sonia Gandhi. She was not going to be the prime minister, she was not going
to  be  the  president,  she  was  not  going  to  be  a  minister,  but  you  needed  her
involvement in policy-making.  In reality, [the NAC I] was an instrument created to
give her some meaningful role in policy formulation. So the thinking was: ‘let us get
people from outside the government because, from within the government, you will
be getting ideas though ministries and different governmental institutions. So let’s
create  NAC,’  which  would  give  a  position  to  Sonia  Gandhi,  and  it  would
institutionalize  her  position.  And the  NAC took upon itself  the  responsibility  for
focusing  on  those  aspects  of  the  program  that  were  pro-poor.  So  this  is  the
background to the NAC. (Ramesh, personal interview, New Delhi, August 2015) 
The NAC I, in other words, provided an institutional arena in which debates over people’s need 
and how to satisfy them took place. Armed with her “immense political power both within the 
Congress and the UPA” (Chopra 2011a, 161), Gandhi was able to give the NAC I a crucial role in
translating normative claims rooted in human rights discourses into technical policies, programs, 
and legal protections for the poor. In what follows, I examine the trajectory within the NAC I of 
the Right to Information Act (RTI) and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA), enacted during the first mandate of the UPA. Both pieces of legislation paved the way 
to the formulation of India’s right-to-food legislation. RTI and NREGA were the first pieces of 
legislation that emphasized the recasting of bureaucratic practices according to principles of good
governance (Mathur 2012; Sharma 2013). In exploring their history, I highlight how normative 
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claims about accountability and transparency in the delivery of welfare were rooted in social 
movements but intricately embedded in a politics of need interpretation by state and non-state 
actors. I shed light on how actors popularized human rights discourses in India, and how 
institutions such as the NAC I provided a space for policy-making.
The Right to Information. In 1987, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)100 
was founded in a hut in rural Rajasthan by Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, and Shekhar Singh. Initially, 
MKSS fought for a minimum wage for peasants and rural workers in Rajasthan. Quickly, 
however, the activists realized that rampant patronage and corruption thwarted welfare programs 
and the payment of a minimum wage, guaranteed in Rajasthan under the Minimum Wage Act. 
This became apparent in the implementation of governmental relief work schemes during 
droughts, in which peasants were registered to work but unable to find employment. MKSS 
activists began to ask questions: “How do the poor know what happened to the minimum wage 
that would have made them survive one more day? By demanding information contained in the 
official documents!” (Mishra 2003, 1). MKSS demanded access to governmental muster rolls—
the registry in which the names of work relief program participants were kept. State authorities 
refused, despite two hunger strikes by members of MKSS (Baviskar 2007; Das 2013; Mishra 
2003; Aruna Roy and Dey n.d.).101 
In the first half of the 1990s, as the social movement against corruption gained 
momentum across the country, MKSS sought the opening of consultative spaces in which citizens
100 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan means “Workers and Farmer Power Union.”
101 It should be noted that social movements in the 1980s and 1990s had to rely on leaked information from the 
state. Without being able to access sound and reliable information, social movements struggled against the 
imposition of development projects and were thus framed as “not ‘constructive’ and that they did not want India 
to develop” (Baviskar 2007, 6).
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could voice their concerns about practices of corruption. These spaces took the form of village-
based public hearings, called jan sunwai (Aruna Roy and Dey n.d.), in which MKSS explored 
development spending by local political leaders (gram panchayats). The jan sunwai were forums 
conducted in a horizontal deliberative mode, in which people could express themselves in front of
a panel of independent observers that was convened to listen to their grievances. The jan sunwai 
embodied processes similar to courts of law locally, providing a place for people who were 
otherwise excluded from the judiciary system to speak fearlessly against the political elite. 
Speaking in front of the gathering not only empowered villagers and provided democratic 
legitimacy to the jan sunwai, but it also illuminated the gap between official records and actual 
practices of government (Baviskar 2007, 6–7), as much as it highlighted development projects 
failures and electoral scams (Aruna Roy and Dey n.d.).102 Evidently, it also shed light on the 
critical relation between the RTI and entitlements to welfare programs, including the TPDS (Das 
2013, 39). Through the jan sunwai, MKSS was able to establish a relation between Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India, the right to life, and the RTI—a strategy that was replicated in the right-
to-food case. MKSS compiled, challenged, and cross-checked reports of patronage and evidence 
of corruption (Baviskar 2007). In this relation, the RTI functions as a democratic tool that enables
people, through organizations like MKSS, to scrutinize governmental practices in order to ensure 
access to welfare programs that are, in times of drought for instance, crucially important for their 
survival (Das 2013, 39; Sharma 2013). 
In 1996, the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) was 
launched. The campaign still exists today. Its stated objectives are “transparency in public life, 
102 “Development scams” describes the discrepancies between development expenditures and on-the-ground 
realities. As for “electoral scams,” it relates to how panchayat leaders, sarpanches, are, in a nutshell, 
administrators of vote banks “who can organise and deliver votes” during elections (Aruna Roy and Dey n.d., 8).
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empowerment of people, deepening democracy, and fighting corruption and malgovernance” 
(Baviskar 2007, 3). Based in Delhi, the main mandate of the NCPRI is to keep state authorities in 
check. Between 1996 and 2005, the organization set up dharna (marches), jan sunwai (popular 
tribunals), and sammelan (conventions) asking for greater accountability at various levels of 
government, and it sought to institutionalize a people’s audit of state machinery (Aruna Roy and 
Dey n.d.). Over this period of time, nine states (out of 28) enacted a form of the RTI (Baviskar 
2007, 3). 
The social movement for the RTI was so effective that in 2004, as India headed towards
general elections, Gandhi contacted members of the NCPRI to develop a short statement about 
the RTI to include in the electoral program of the Congress. At that time, no one expected the 
Congress to win, but the opportunity was too good to let go. According to Amita Baviskar, “[t]he 
NCPRI did not expect much to come out of this: election Manifestos are notorious for being 
quickly forgotten after coming to power, and in any case, no one expected the Congress to win” 
(2007, 19). But once the elections were over, the NCPRI’s statement made its way into the 
Common Minimum Programme and into the working groups of the NAC I. In 2004, members of 
the NAC I—including a former civil servant and founder of MKSS, Aruna Roy; a development 
economist and founder of the RTFC, Jean Drèze; and a Supreme Court commissioner for the 
right to food, Naresh C. Saxena—were important supporters of the democratic principle of access
to information (Baviskar 2007, 19). Based on a previous right-to-information bill drafted by 
MKSS, the NAC I wrote a bill that was quickly sent to the Lok Sabha. Within a year, in May 
2005, the RTI was passed by the Lok Sabha, and in October 2005, it was implemented across 
India.
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The Right to Work. While the NAC I was set up to develop legislation to protect and 
empower the poor, certain prominent members of the Congress, including Prime Minister Singh, 
were more inclined towards economic liberalization and limits on budgetary spending for welfare
programs. Even though, soon after the 2004 elections, the NAC I benefited from a considerable 
influence in the Lok Sabha and in the Congress, its efficacy remained fragile as it relied on a 
large coalition and the authority of Gandhi (Baviskar 2007, 19–20). For human rights activists 
and members of the NAC I, such as Drèze, Roy, and Saxena, there was little time to waste before 
working on another element of the Congress’s manifesto: the enactment of a national 
Employment Guarantee Act, which, in the words of Drèze, entered national debates “like a wet 
dog at a glamorous party” (2011, 6).
The right to equal access to government-sponsored work relief had been an initial 
demand formulated by MKSS and later by the RTFC and played a central role during the right-to-
food case. During the drought in Northern India in 1999-2003, activists who would later 
participate in the RTFC highlighted the need for employment relief programmes in times of 
natural calamity (Drèze 2011, 6). In the right-to-food case, two early interim orders were issued 
on employment guarantee schemes. The first, dated from May 2002, urges each level of 
government to take responsibility and adequately fund work relief across the country. The 
second, issued a year later, condemns the poor coverage of existing food-for-work schemes and 
suggests that allocations of both food grains and cash should be at least doubled. These two 
Supreme Court orders were used by members of the RTFC to draft a national rural employment 
guarantee bill (Drèze 2011, 7). Called the “citizen draft,” this bill was rather path breaking: it 
guaranteed work in every rural district, within a radius of 5 kilometres of every household, to 
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both men and women, who were entitled to work 15 days after request at a minimum statutory 
wage. The citizen’s draft includes provisions for state transparency and accountability, which are 
to be achieved through social audits, monitoring, and grievances mechanisms. Funded by the 
Government of India and state authorities, the right to work was designed to be decentralized in 
its implementation in gram panchayats and local rural districts. As early as August 2004, two 
months after the formation of the NAC I, Gandhi forwarded an almost identical copy of the 
citizen’s draft to the prime minister, with an additional clause that limited the right to work to 100
days per year and to only one adult per household, which corresponded to the engagements of the
Common Minimum Programme. 
After recommendations were provided by the NAC I through the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) changed some minor provisions and tabled a 
draft right-to-work bill in December 2004 (Chopra 2011b, 96–97; Drèze 2011, 8). Following the 
conventional legislative process, the MoRD's bill was then referred to the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Rural Development, where several safeguards were watered down, including 
commitments for guaranteed work and other provisions for transparency, accountability, and 
universality. According to Deepta Chopra, “[i]t was from this point onwards that the [diluted] bill 
entered into a phase of intense contentions” (2011b, 98). It did so because human rights activists 
formed an organization called People’s Action for Employment Guarantee (PAEG), which much 
like MKSS, campaigned for the enactment of a right to work. For Chopra (2011b), members of 
the PAEG103 have redrawn the blurred boundary between the state and society and actively 
103 Chopra writes that the social movement that supported the enactment of a more substantial right-to-work bill was
the PAEG, a “loose conglomerate of various individuals and organizations . . . to lobby for the passing of an 
improved act” (2011b, 98). The contours of this loose conglomerate overlapped with the RTFC, with some actors
playing decisive roles in both networks.
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moulded the Indian right to work (see Gupta 1995). The PAEG lobbied the Standing Committee 
in an effort to amend the bill. To sensitize the population and garner public support, the PAEG 
organized protests and marches, including the Rozgar Adhikar Yatra (Journey for Employment 
Rights), which consisted of 50 days of protest across 10 states. At the end of the Yatra, 
parliamentarians and the media were convened in a public forum, much like MKSS’s jan sunwai, 
in which grievances could be voiced and heard. Additionally, members of the PAEG also lobbied 
parliamentarians, the Planning Commission, and the MoRD through informal networks, while the
NAC I continued to put pressure on the Prime Minister’s Office. 
The PAEG was in the end largely successful. Following recommendations from the 
Standing Committee, the MoRD re-drafted a right-to-work bill that including most of the civil 
society members’ demands. In July and August 2005, notable concessions were made by the 
Government of India to pass the NREGA, which contains provisions that were initially present in
the citizen’s draft (Drèze 2011, 7–8). A year after the initial intervention of the NAC I, right-to-
work legislation was passed at the Lok Sabha in August 2005 (Chopra 2011a, 2011b; Drèze 
2011). 
Interestingly, if the burden of legitimacy and transparency usually lies with the 
government, it is through the NAC I that these obligations were realized during the first term of 
the UPA, even though the advisory body had no “legal mandate or legitimacy” to construct policy
(Chopra 2011b, 97). Substantiated by its political weight, its wide support and interrelationship 
with civil society and left-leaning political parties, and its adamant pursuit of good governance 
objectives through the realization of human rights as ideals of social justice, the NAC I formed a 
crucial political platform that was significant for what was characterized as “progressive 
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legislation” (Chopra 2011a; Khera 2013, 12). The NAC I provided a space to develop a rights-
based approach to the interpretation of need and the integration of good governance principles in 
bureaucratic practices. When the 2009 elections loomed on the horizon, the Congress was quick 
to put together another manifesto that included a reminder of the successes of the RTI and 
NREGA: an electoral promise to enact the right to food as an additional progressive measure 
(Congress 2009). On the front page of its manifesto, both Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi 
appear as a symbolic pledge of continuity from the first to the second UPA term.104
3.2.3 On to the National Food Security Act
In 2002, the RTFC emerged on India’s political stage organically, months after the first 
hearings of the right-to-food case at the Supreme Court. Following the publication of the 
Supreme Court’s November 2001 interim order, India’s central and state governments had until 
February 28, 2002 to effectively implement already-existing nutrition welfare programs—an 
ultimatum that was never met.105 On April 9, 2002, across nine states, in 100 different districts, 
people took to the streets to voice demands regarding the implementation of the Supreme Court’s 
orders. Lunches were symbolically distributed to children in order to shame the government for 
its inability to turn already-existing programs into governmental action (Khera 2006). It is this 
Action Day that marked the beginnings of the RTFC. In the years that have followed, the RTFC 
has grown from a few members located in Delhi, brought together in support of the right-to-food 
case, to a large network across the country. The RTFC comprises a decentralized horizontal 
network of national organizations and individuals, each bringing to the table a different set of 
104 It is worth noting that members sitting at the NAC I, and in umbrella-organizations such as the PAEG and other 
NGOs such as MKSS, typically have worn more than one hat (Hertel 2016) and easily moved from one group to 
the next.
105 Later on, the deadline was extended to 2005 (Khera 2006).
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topical and regional concerns in relation to the realization of the right to food in India. A steering 
group is responsible for formulating the strategic direction of the RTFC. An advisory group, 
formed out of the steering group, oversees the activities of the RTFC’s secretariat. Coordinated 
by one remunerated worker and a team of volunteers, the secretariat carries out the daily 
operations of the RTFC. The RTFC is solely funded through donations, with no strings attached, 
from individuals and organizations of India, in addition to proceeds from the sale of promotional 
materials. The Supreme Court Commission of the right-to-food case is formally independent 
from the RTFC, but members of the commission are closely associated with it and take a 
prominent and indistinguishable role in its activities.
After the World Social Forum (WSF) that took place in Mumbai in January 2004, the 
RTFC convened members of civil society and other stakeholders to the First National Convention
on the Right to Food and Work in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, in June 2004. The convention 
followed a format similar to the WSF: workshops, panels, discussion groups, and cultural 
activities were organized to promote reflexive thinking and debates on ideas, experiences, and 
proposals on issues related to food security. The RTFC provides a rallying point for stakeholders 
to strategize on the best course of action for the state to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to 
food in India. Rather than formulating focused demands and grievances articulated around a 
unitary project, the needs identified by the RTFC have always been writ large, including for 
instance, the decommercialization of seeds and grain markets and a minimum income for 
farmers. A series of concerns have been considered to be central to the realization of the right to 
food: the full implementation of the Supreme Court’s interim orders; the abolition of gender, 
caste, class, indigenous, and religious discrimination; the promotion of small-scale farming; the 
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firm engagement of government in the complete eradication of chronic hunger, especially for 
children; the condemnation of coercive displacement; the universalization of welfare services; 
and critical compliance with good governance fundamentals, including measures to ensure 
accountability and transparency.106 
During the 2009 election, given the support of the Supreme Court and the recent 
successes of the RTI and NREGA, there was a solid case for optimism. Just like it did for the RTI
and the right to work, the Congress included in its manifesto a commitment to enact a right to 
food. Behind the scenes, there were negotiations between members of the Congress and 
prominent figures of the RTFC to include in the Congress’s manifesto an electoral commitment to
free health care (Drèze, personal interview, Ranchi, May 2014; Khera, personal interview, New 
Delhi, August 2015). Instead, members of the Congress chose to promise a right to food, since it 
was considered to be easier and cheaper to implement. However, in its manifesto, the nature and 
scope of the Congress’s electoral commitment about the right to food remained fairly vague. 
After the elections, the RTFC's optimism quickly deflated. The right to food imagined 
by the Congress was narrower than that envisaged by the RTFC. With the electoral commitments 
made by the Congress, the window of opportunity to enact a right to food was wide open (Khera 
2009), but the interpretation of the right to food widely differed between the Congress and the 
RTFC. Partly attributable to its positive image among voters, with respect to “good governance 
records and welfare measures” (Yadav and Palshikar 2009, 33), the Congress won 61 additional 
seats, which destabilized and weakened the clout of the leftist parties of the UPA. Soon after the 
106 Members of the RTFC were united in their commitment to: (a) the unionization of NREGA workers; (b) the full 
implementation of the Supreme Court’s orders, especially for child nutrition programs; (c) the universalization of
the PDS and, thus, elimination of the targeted system; (d) the need to develop a strategy to counter the agrarian 
crisis; (e) the granting of greater attention to disadvantaged and marginalized groups; (f) accountability, 
transparency, and good governance; (g) the extension of NREGA in urban areas. 
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elections, in her presidential address to parliament on June 4, 2009, Shrimati Pratibha Patil 
framed the right to food in terms of entitlements allocated via the TPDS in unambitious terms: 
My Government proposes to enact a new law—the National Food Security Act—that
will provide a statutory basis for a framework which assures food security for all.
Every family below the poverty line in rural as well as urban areas will be entitled, by
law, to 25 kilograms of rice or wheat per month at Rs. 3 per kilogram. This legislation
will also be used to bring about broader systemic reform in the public distribution
system. (Patil 2009, 24)
The president of India also announced, as part of broader systemic reforms to the TPDS, the 
creation of a new ration card under the National Food Security Act (NFSA): a bureaucratic 
instrument—a rationing document—that would become central in the deployment of accountable 
and transparent measures of entitlement exchange. 
Needless to say, the government’s commitment to food security was much less 
ambitious than the goals of the RTFC. Days later, on June 9, 2009, the Department of Food and 
Public Distribution issued a “concept note” that expanded on the commitment of the president. It 
limited the scope of the right to food to mere entitlements from the TPDS—rather than 
entitlements to nine different food-related programs as ordered by the Supreme Court in 
November 2001—and it focused on the attribution of grains only to an identified population—
BPL households—at lower prices than those established under the TPDS between 1997 and 2009.
In terms of food security, the government’s promise called for, in a nutshell, the 
modernization of the TDPS, or the computerization of the entire infrastructure of rationing—
which to say the least, fell significantly short of the RTFC’s core goals. However, the RTFC was 
not ready to propose an alternative to the Congress's proposal. Unlike the organizers of the right 
to information and the right to work, members of the RTFC did not have a consensual draft ready 
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to submit for debate. “NREGA was successful because we have done a lot of work before it 
became a party political issue,” Reetika Khera maintained, during a personal interview. This was 
not the case with the NFSA:
There had been lots of discussions. Before NAC was formed, there was already a
[NREGA] draft  ready on which  there  was  consensus  in  the  civil  society.  So  the
minute the NAC I was formed, this draft was submitted. . . . With the right to food,
that had not happened. The Right to Food Campaign didn't start with the belief that
someday it would result in an act. Then, suddenly, these political parties said that we
are going to enact a right to food. So when that window opened up, we had to get our
act  together  outside  government.  (Khera,  personal  interview,  New  Delhi,  August
2015)
Members of the RTFC met in New Delhi in June, July, and September 2009 to formulate the 
RTFC’s essential demands. 
In the movement for the right to food, interpretations of people’s needs were 
variegated. The politics of need interpretation pivoted around the role of the government in 
securing two aspects of food security: food availability and access. Instead of playing out 
different needs against one another, the RTFC integrated them all in their claims for food security.
These thick needs included: the strengthening of sustainable agricultural practices, especially for 
small-scale farmers; the protection of employment, livelihood, and equitable rights over land, 
water, and forest, with special attention paid to structural exclusion from access to food; and 
finally, the delivery of welfare entitlements. A list of 17 essential demands was drafted. Among 
others, these demands included:
• an  entitlement  bill  that  holds  the  government  accountable  to  food  security  and  the
development of mechanisms for monitoring, social audits, compensation, and grievances
redressal to promote accountability and transparency;
• the recognition of every interim order issued by the Supreme Court in an entitlement bill;
• the adoption of a “life cycle approach,” in which various food security programs would
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address the needs of different population groups, especially children; and
• a universal PDS that distributes entitlements of at least 35 kg of food grains per household
(or 7 kg per person) at a rate of ₹ 2/kg of wheat and ₹ 3/kg of rice.
Building on these 17 essential demands, the RTFC drafted its own food security act, which it 
called the Food Entitlement Act because members of the RTFC believed that the concepts of food
security and right to food were much broader than the distribution of mere entitlements through a 
modernized TPDS (Sinha 2014). 
Using these 17 essential demands, the steering committee of the RTFC mandated 
Drèze, Gonsalves, Mander, and Anuradha Talwar107 to draft the Food Entitlement Act that 
comprised the RTFC’s most fundamentals demands: the decentralization of procurement 
mechanisms by the FCI; a universal PDS expanded to include cereals, but also pulses, millets, 
and oil; special provisions for vulnerable groups; pensions; protection of small and marginal 
farmers; and a moratorium on genetically-modified crops (Sinha 2014, 21). Drèze recalls:
By then, we were trying to push a particular act through, but that's not the kind of
work for [which] the campaign was built. The RTFC was well built for decentralized
actions,  but  not  to  draft  an act. Now, the campaign did come up with  a  kind of
consensus draft act through a very long process of consultation, but I have never been
convinced . . . I feel that it would have been better to formulate certain clear and
strong demands, and then push for these demands. The draft act was circulated to
some members of parliament who . . . may have used handouts and petitions and
letters of the campaign. I think that was useful . . . but for that, they don't need a 30-
page act. 
The RTFC's act was trying to take everybody on board and ended up being not very
realistic.  You know, one act  cannot  serve every purpose.  Because the priority  for
different people was different, and when you try to accommodate everybody in one
[single] act, actually you produce something that is not practical. This is my personal
view. (Drèze, personal interview, Ranchi, May 2014) 
107 At that time, Talwar was strongly involved in the RTFC. In addition to representing the New Trade Union 
Initiative in the campaign’s steering committee, she also occupied the role of state advisor to the Supreme Court 
commissioner in West Bengal.
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The RTFC's act may have been too consensual for policy-making, but it generated enough 
enthusiasm among activists to challenge the dominant framework, and to push for needs that 
were not being seriously considered in political circles. Members of the RTFC worked to grant 
legitimacy and political status to their list of thick needs. On November 26, 2009, 5,800 people 
from 58 different organizations and networks gathered in the streets of New Delhi to raise 
awareness of food security issues and to hear concerns and recommendations from the public on 
the RTFC’s essential demands (Sinha 2014). Days later, a delegation led by Annie Raja from the 
National Federation of Indian Women, Kavita Srivastava from the PUCL, and Drèze met with 
UPA Law Minister M. Veerappa Moily to convey the grievances voiced during the rally and share
the RTFC’s essential demands.
Frictions between the RTFC and the Government of India remained. Within the RTFC 
(and in the civil society in general), not all activists agreed on the interpretation of needs that 
must be satisfied in order to secure the nutritional well-being of the population. Yet the RTFC’s 
essential demands served to challenge the government’s rather minimalist view of need 
interpretation. This politics of need interpretation continued within the legislative instances. More
than a year after his re-election, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reinstated the NAC (hereafter 
NAC II) as a forum for both civil society and the government to shape food security legislation. 
Still acting as chairperson of the UPA and president of the Congress, Gandhi was once again 
named chairperson of the advisory body. The NAC II became the key institution where the 
politics of need interpretation played out. Members included, among others, M. S. 
Swaminathan,108 Drèze (who resigned shortly thereafter), Roy, Saxena, and Mander, the convenor
of the NAC II Working Group on the National Food Security Bill. Unlike the NAC I, the NAC II 
108 M. S. Swaminathan is a geneticist who is widely recognized as the father of the “Green Revolution” in India. 
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was formed without a clear mandate.109 Instead of a Common Minimum Programme, the NAC II 
was given the responsibility of “[giving] attention to the priorities stated in the address of the 
President of India to Parliament [shortly after the election] on 4 June 2009” (Gupta 2011), which 
vaguely stated that the TPDS would be overhauled to be accountable and transparent, reflecting 
concerns about rampant practices of patronage and corruption rather than the systemic nature of 
chronic hunger.110 Furthermore, in contrast to the NAC I, the NAC II included key members of 
the Congress to ensure that the recommendations proposed by the NAC II would be much more 
conciliatory to the Congress’s agenda. Referring to the right to food, Drèze even characterized the
NAC II’s “recommendations [as] very mild, coming as they did at the end of a long process of 
consultation with various ministries, when the government went out of its way to ensure that the 
NAC did not hatch any ‘unreasonable’ proposal” (in Gupta 2011). Despite sharing the same 
advisory functions, the NAC II had a different mandate than the NAC I. While the NAC I was 
designed as an advisory body to the Prime Minister’s Office to provide a forum for non-state 
actors to voice claims and write laws to enforce norms of social justice and good governance over
ruling institutions, as well as legally protected entitlements, the NAC II provided a space of 
negotiation in which the ruling government was able to contain the normative claims of human 
rights activists (Gupta 2011). 
It is within the confines of the NAC II that the National Food Security Act (NFSA) was
first negotiated. The NAC II Working Group on the National Food Security Bill (NFSB) held 
109 During its second tenure, the UPA coalition of left-leaning political party members was much less influential in 
setting the NAC II’s agenda. 
110 Ruchi Gupta quotes Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: 
the National Food Security Act — that will provide a statutory basis for a framework which assures food 
security for all. Every family below the poverty line in rural as well as urban areas will be entitled, by law, to 
25 kilograms of rice or wheat per month at Rs 3 per kilogram. This legislation will also be used to bring about 
broader systemic reform in the public distribution system. (Gupta 2011)
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consultations with government officials111 and members of the RTFC to work on the scope of 
proposed food security legislation. Negotiations occurred on three fronts: (a) the question of 
whether an overhauled (T)PDS should be universal or not; (b) the inclusion of food welfare 
programs other than rationing through the (T)PDS; and (c) the constitution of mechanisms 
conducive to good governance practices. The following year, building on the Supreme Court’s 
orders, the NAC II’s NFSB adopted a “life cycle approach,” in which different already-existing 
nutrition-related programs were integrated in the bill to respond to the nutritional needs of 
various populations at different stages in the life cycle.112 Additionally, the working group quickly
abandoned the RTFC’s demand for a universal PDS, in order to develop, instead, a targeting 
mechanism based on the Saxena Report.113 In fact, the universalization of the PDS was never on 
the table: “The government imposed certain boundaries and the act needed to be within certain 
parameters,” Drèze affirmed during a personal interview. He added: 
It didn't give space, for example, for a universal PDS or even a universal PDS in the
200 poorest districts, which, I think, was a really good idea. . . . At one point, there
were discussions around proposals of this sort [within the NAC II], but then it became
very clear that universal coverage was something that Mrs. Gandhi didn't support. So
that was that because she was the chairperson. (Drèze, personal interview, Ranchi,
May 2014) 
In fact, the issue of universalization of the PDS was fiercely debated outside of the NAC II, but 
within the government, the idea to revert to a universal infrastructure of rationing “did not fly.” In
111 Senior officials were drawn from the Department of Food and Public Distribution, the Department of School 
Education, and the Planning Commission.
112 Key food welfare programs protected by the interim orders were abandoned in the redaction of the NFSB, such 
as the elimination of the National Old Age Pension Scheme.
113 The Report of the Expert Group to advise the Ministry of Rural Development on the methodology for conducting
the Below Poverty Line (BPL) Census for 11th Five Year Plan (2009)—written by a group chaired by Saxena, 
with members such as Mander and Roy—assesses the strengths and weaknesses of poverty lines as technologies 
of government for identifying poor and marginalized households and better targeting welfare program to people 
in socio-economic need. 
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a personal interview, former Minister of Rural Development Jairam Ramesh explains that for the 
government, a universal PDS made little sense economically and politically:
Frankly, from day one, I was telling him [Jean Drèze] that a universal PDS will not
fly. It’s not wise politically and not desirable from an economic point of view as well.
The cost associated with the universal system plus the amount of food you will have
to procure for a universal  system were too high.  .  .  .  But [more importantly]  the
[main]  argument against  the universalization was that  it  is  morally wrong. It  was
economically burdensome. Also, administratively, it  was a heavy cost because the
amount  of  food  you  will  have  to  procure.  But  ultimately,  there  was  a  universal
consensus [in the parliament] that it  should not be universal. Only the communist
parties wanted universal food distribution system, and no one else wanted it. Even the
Congress party did not want the universal system. Only the communist party wanted
it. (Ramesh, personal interview, New Delhi, August 2015)
The NAC II Working Group came up with a targeting system to overcome the errors of inclusion 
and exclusion associated with the poverty line methodologies used in the TPDS since 1997. It 
granted responsibility to the state for developing visible indicators, such as the presence of an 
electric fan or latrines, rather than arbitrary lines, to better allocate entitlements to those who 
(allegedly) really need them. Additionally, the NAC II had to design a rather complex 
architecture of ration distribution, due to the maximum allocations of food rations made 
available. According to Drèze: 
The NAC was quietly but firmly told that the government would never agree to go
beyond a food grain allocation of 60 million tonnes for the national food security act.
This undermined its endeavour to extend the coverage of the PDS while retaining the
norm of 35 kg per month per household. The tension was resolved by proposing a
very  complicated  framework,  with  multiple  categories  of  cardholders  and
differentiated entitlements. (Drèze, personal interview, Ranchi, May 2014) 
The working group proposed a rather convoluted TPDS that would cover 90% of rural and 50% 
of urban populations, which were divided into general and priority populations, each of which 
would be allocated different maximum entitlements (7 kg/person and 4 kg/person, respectively) 
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at the same per-kilogram price. 
Other critical demands from the RTFC, such as land reforms and a focus on small-scale
food producers, were abandoned. According to Mander, the convener of the working group: 
in the context of the food security law, the principal disagreements are not about
whether such measures are critical to ensure food security; few would disagree that
sustainable food systems need to be revived and developed, and that the crisis  in
agriculture  needs  to  be  addressed.  Rather,  the  debates  are  about  whether  these
measures should be part of a single omnibus food security law. (Mander 2012a, 2015,
16)
For Mander, development projects such as a right to food should not be ideological but rather 
implementable, or to use Erica Bornstein and Aradhana Sharma's (2016) wordings, “technical” 
(see also Mitchell 2002; Rose 1999). To achieve this goal, the provisions of the NAC II’s draft 
bill focused on nutrition-related programs and mechanisms of government accountability and 
transparency, such as proactive disclosure, social audits, the creation of local vigilance 
committees, and inspections of activities, documents, and records, as per the Right to Information
Act, as well as the creation of a National Food Commission, which would be mandated to 
oversee the implementation of the right to food. In other words, the NAC II's bill included 
nutrition-related welfare programs, with strong provisions for civil society to monitor 
bureaucratic activities in order to ensure that practices deemed immoral—such as leakages—
would be alleviated.
Once submitted to the government, the NAC II’s draft bill went through the 
parliamentary process. It was first examined by an expert committee led by chairman of the 
prime minister’s Economic Advisory Council, Chakravarthi Rangarajan. Composed of 
economists, this expert committee watered down the NAC II’s recommendations, notably in 
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terms of TPDS coverage and provisions for good governance. Based on the expert committee’s 
recommendations, the government created a draft NFSB that was tabled in December 2011 and 
submitted to the Standing Committee in January 2012. 
Meanwhile, members of the RTFC multiplied interventions in the public space to 
criticize the minimalist framework—the thin-need approach—of the government’s bill. As 
Chopra mentions, “[e]motions for and against NFSB run high, and are intertwined with debates 
around the PDS” (2011b, 94). Members of the RTFC condemned the minimalist framework of 
the government’s bill, notably because it fell short of addressing the much larger objective of 
food security as defended by the RTFC, the Supreme Courts, the CESCR (1999), and the FAO 
(2005). They critiqued the absence of provisions related to agriculture, the lack of attention paid 
to nutrition, and the highly centralized character of the NFSB (RTFC 2012). However, what 
really captured the attention of the public was the debate on the universalization of the PDS and 
the lack of effective mechanisms for grievances redressal. Debates on the universalization of the 
PDS raged on two fronts. The first set of debates, often argued among economists, addressed the 
burden that a universal PDS would place on government expenditures and, ultimately, the 
(middle-class) taxpayer (Basu 2011; Himanshu and Sen 2011). The second set of debates focused
on the benefits and limits of targeting mechanisms for properly distributing resources to the poor 
and the impacts of errors of inclusion and exclusion on people likely to suffer from chronic 
hunger (Drèze 2011; Khera 2009; Mander 2012a; Ministry of Rural Development, GoI 2009; 
Saxena 2015).
The RTFC also denounced the lack of decentralized mechanisms available for people to
ensure that they receive their entitlements. The NFSB did include provisions for social audits, 
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vigilance committees, and mechanisms of grievance redressal, such as helplines and the 
appointment of district grievance redressal officers, as a way to empower citizens to access 
entitlements; however, these worked sporadically.114 To curb practices of patronage within the 
TPDS, the NFSB also included provisions to expand governmental surveillance of the movement 
of grains, including the “end-to-end computerization” reforms of the TPDS and the leveraging of 
unique identification instruments used to confirm the authenticity of ration card holders and plug 
leakages from the TPDS. Members of the RTFC insisted that end-to-end computerization 
measures could not replace wider provisions for accountability and transparency, which in their 
current form were not sufficient, since “[t]oo much of discretion has been left to the Government 
to decide the modalities of inspection” (2011a, 4).
During most of 2012, the Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public 
Distribution invited input from the public on various provisions included in the NFSB. Drèze and
Khera were particularly involved and influential in the consultative process; their contributions 
were notable in shaping the entitlements covered by the TPDS. While admitting that they were in 
favour of a universal system, Drèze and Khera insisted that people excluded from the TPDS 
should not include more than 25% of the country’s rural population and 50% of its urban 
population, since higher rates of exclusion may create an untenably large population with no 
stake in the TPDS or too vulnerable to chronic hunger. Drèze and Khera suggested that if 
rationing should be capped at 75% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population, then 
entitlements should be distributed among this population without any distinctions—with the 
exception of the poorest of the poor, the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) category. With these 
114 To note, after over two years of fieldwork in New Delhi, we discovered that mechanisms for social audits and 
the formation of vigilance committees were either never set up or not functional. Help lines were functioning 
episodically and poorly.
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measures, the coverage of the TPDS would not be universal, but it would be simpler and more 
uniform and thus help to limit errors of inclusion and exclusion in the infrastructure of rationing. 
While Drèze and Khera supported the provision of 7 kg of rations per person, the Standing 
Committee recommended that 5 kg of wheat and rice be distributed per person per household at a
uniform rate of ₹ 2/kg of wheat and ₹ 3/kg of rice. For the poorest of the poor households, 
otherwise refereed as AAY, the Standing Committee’s allocation of wheat and rice reached 35 kg 
per household per month, at the same price. The NAC II’s “life cycle approach” was preserved, 
with the provision of cooked meals in anganwadi once a day for children aged six years or less 
(ICDS), school lunch programs (MDMS), and maternity entitlements of ₹ 6,000.
These provisions marked a clear retreat from the needs defined by the Supreme Court’s 
interim orders and, more generally, from the initial demands of the RTFC, since pensions, 
additional rations for senior citizens, and social assistance in the case of death or injury of the 
bread winner were not included in the final version of the NFSB. As for mechanisms for 
grievance redressal, the Standing Committee discarded the NAC II Working Group’s suggestion 
to form a national commission on food security, but it supported the establishment of local 
vigilance committees to oversee the implementation of the food security legislation and social 
audits. Largely built out of the recommendations of the Standing Committee, the NFSB was 
passed at the Lok Sabha in August 2013, thus becoming the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 
just in time for the general elections that took place in Spring 2014. 
The formation of the NFSA was complex and, to large extent, controversial. For 
members of the RTFC, who had varied and contested perspectives on what the right to food 
should look like, the NFSA fell short on several front. In the process of its formation, the RTFC 
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lost its momentum, falling prey to a certain fatigue among members of the media, in public 
discourse, and within its own membership. Colin Gonsalves questions whether the NFSA was 
really worth the effort:
See, a law [like the NFSA] is much more stable than policies. . . . But this act took
away  the  35  kg  of  rations  per  household.  It  leaves  it  open  to  replace  in-kind
entitlement by cash. It's not the same. Suppose you take all the Supreme Court orders
into an act, then I'd be happy. I'm not saying that I'm unhappy with an act. I'm saying,
should  you spend five  years  of  a  movement's  time with  that  obsession? Suppose
today you take the judgement and make it the act, I have no problem with that. But
[in the process of legislating on a food security act], we've lost the social movement
in the meanwhile .  .  .  we've lost  it  completely.  .  .  .  What  is  your end results?  Is
malnutrition any better? It's the same. (personal interview, May 2014, New Delhi)
According to Gonsalves, efforts to secure right-to-food legislation undermined the larger social 
movement and some of the claims that the RTFC could make on nutrition-related issues. 
Many of the “thicker” claims over people’s needs made by the RTFC ranged too widely
or were too ideologically driven to be included in the right-to-food legislation, which served the 
primary purpose of providing an implementable framework for legally protecting welfare 
entitlements. Transforming normative claims into technical policies, programs, or laws is the first
operationalization of the politics of need interpretation. It frames the ways in which claims are 
first considered, before they are even negotiated and debated within the political process. In the 
case of the NFSA, the NAC II as a para-public forum took the shape of a legislative space in 
which state and non-state actors could negotiate and submit an implementable bill to the 
legislative process, based on at least some of the thick-need claims made by members of civil 
society and Supreme Court interim orders. In exploring the politics of need interpretation of the 
Indian right to food, I have shed some light on the processes through which normative claims 
make their ways into technical governmental interventions.
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3.3 Conclusion
If the right to food entitlement was enacted as an answer to a social problem, which 
normative claims was it designed to resolve? It appears to be a response to perceived issues of 
accountability and transparency in the deployment of food security programs. In this chapter, I 
have made three primary arguments. The first builds on the existing anthropology of the state 
literature: Gupta (1995) and later Chopra (2011a, 2011b) and Hertel (2016) have theorized on the 
extent to which, in the exercise of government, the state is a heterogeneous and translocal entity, 
constituted by actors that produce the bureaucratic state in their everyday life. In this chapter, I 
have paid particular attention to these processes to show that the conception of an Indian right to 
food has indeed involved a myriad of actors and state institutions—including the Supreme Court, 
the NAC I and II, and the legislative and executive branches of government—that have 
competing interpretations of the needs that the government should satisfy. One consideration that 
has perhaps been underexplored in the anthropology of the state literature is that if the state is a 
heterogeneous and fragmented entity, then so too is civil society. As an umbrella-organization, the
RTFC encompasses a range of individuals and organizations with variegated visions of what a 
right to food signifies and how to transform these ideas into welfare goods and services protected 
by laws. 
The second argument relates to the first. Within both the state and civil society, actors, 
organizations, institutions, and other entities have entered into debate over competing claims to 
circumscribe the nature and scope of a right to food. The processes through which these 
negotiations have taken place are strikingly antipodal. When forged out of the WSF model, in the 
confines of the RTFC, the discursive construction of the right to food has been inclusive, 
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multidimensional, and expanded to include variegated interpretations of needs, without which the
most vulnerable populations may suffer from chronic hunger and undernourishment. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court, the NAC II, and other members of the legislative branch have framed 
the right to food in the language of good governance. This framework has restricted both state 
and non-state actors in their ability to creatively construct the right to food outside of the 
discursive field in which these debates have been pitted (see Merry 2006). 
Third, within state institutions, the language of good governance has charted the 
debates leading up to the enactment of the Indian right to food. In this chapter, I have 
demonstrated that even though the discourse of food security has taken shape against the 
backdrop of chronic hunger and undernourishment, the long and convoluted process through 
which the right to food has been formulated is not necessarily an answer to chronic hunger. 
Instead, the right to food entitlement is a purported technocratic panacea negotiated by state and 
non-state actors in an attempt to shape implementable bureaucratic techniques deployed to meet 
the nutritional needs of a segment of the Indian population. These techniques have been 
formulated with the goal of shaping the role, functions, and expectations of government, in order 
to render bureaucratic practices accountable and transparent in a way that is congruent with 
human rights discourses. Building on campaigns for the right to information and the right to 
work, the social movement for the right to adequate food in India was planned as a struggle in 
which members of civil society were able to leverage normative claims to compel the 
government to adopt legislative measures to eradicate chronic hunger, while also ensuring 
accountability and transparency in the delivery of these services. 
What ensued from the politics of need interpretation of the right to food is a set of 
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instruments designed specifically to secure the state's accountability and transparency. It is in this 
context that the iconic ration card was re-materialized to bear normative principles of 
governmental transparency. In compounding digital technologies of authentication with the 
rationing document, the bureaucratic state has deployed a new technical instrument, engineered 
to eradicate practices of corruption that have crippled the infrastructure of rationing for decades. 
In the next chapter, then, I examine this rationing document in relation to the socialities that it 
mediates.
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Chapter 4: Re-Materialization of Ration Cards: 
The Agency of Objects to Curb Corruption
In the previous chapter, I described the Indian right to food entitlement as a techno-
political intervention anchored in bureaucratic practices of accountability and transparency. I 
recalled how the country’s food security legislation, the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 
resulted from what Nancy Fraser (1989, 145) calls “politics of need interpretation” that have 
framed the scope and meanings of the right to food entitlement in India. In the process, I 
examined how some normative elements of the discourse of food security were evacuated from 
the formulation of the NFSA in order to shift the focus of the law to technical aspects of the 
delivery of entitlements. In fact, claims and concerns about transparency and accountability led 
the state to redesign a 70-year-old document—the ration card—by digitizing some of its elements
to enable closer monitoring of the exchange of food entitlements in ration shops, called Fair Price
Shops (FPSs).
In this chapter, I ask: what does the ration card do? Building on recent literature on 
documents and bureaucracy in anthropology and cognate disciplines (Hull 2012a, 2012b; Mathur 
2012; Sharma 2013), I frame the ration card as a “rationing document” (see Sriraman 2014). 
Instead of treating the rationing document as a text bearing representations that are readily 
legible, I examine it as a mediator “that shape[s] the significance of signs inscribed on them and 
their relations with the objects they refer to” (Hull 2012a, 253). I argue that the production and 
circulation of the new ration card have been designed to establish bureaucratic control through 
the use of new technologies of information and knowledge to remove human agency from the 
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). This has resulted in unexpected consequences, 
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including the systematic exclusion of some members of the population from the infrastructure of 
rationing and other culturally constituted practices.
4.1 Introduction
On a sunny afternoon in November 2014, my research assistant and I were waiting in a 
deserted alley for a FPS to open. To fight boredom, we spied on a rat going back and forth under 
the large metal sliding door of the FPS, scavenging for wheat grains lying around the front of the 
store. The ration card holders would arrive much later, closer to the store’s opening hours. We 
waited for two hours in front of the FPS, scrutinizing every passer-by in the hope that we would 
meet a ration card holder. Finally, a rickshaw puller stopped his rickshaw right in front of the 
FPS. An old lady climbed down from it, glanced at us for a second, and sat down on a nearby 
dusty scooter. We approached her and asked when the FPS would open its door. “At 5,” she 
replied promptly, before turning her head away. She did not seem to be interested in pursuing the 
conversation any further. We stepped back and, like her, waited in silence for the FPS owner to 
reach his shop around 5:00 pm. 
While FPSs are supposed to stay open six days a week, very few do.115 Ration cards 
holders later told us that some owners do not open their FPSs at all, or only do so on rare sporadic
occasions. Since there are only a few FPSs in every neighbourhood, ration card holders are 
typically aware of the informal schedules of their respective FPSs. Most get that information 
from their neighbours or from the shops located around the FPS. This particular owner opened 
his shop regularly on the 20th of every month for a few days, from 5:00 pm to 8:00 pm, because 
115 According to a few of the FPS owners that I interviewed, FPSs should be opened six days a week, from 
10:00 am to 1:00 pm and from 4:00 pm to 7:00 pm. I have not been able to find the official regulations on this 
subject. In practice, these rules are never observed, and nobody tries to enforce them.
151
it is more efficient to sell most of the rations that his shop received all at once116 rather than 
keeping an empty shop open for an entire month. While we waited for the FPS owner to arrive, 
ration card holders—a women and her teen daughter, a daily-wage worker, a group of two or 
three female relatives—began to show up just before 5:00 pm and waited around the FPS until 
the owner’s helper unlocked the sliding door only minutes later. By then, the rat had disappeared 
from view, and the ration card holders began to form a line across the alley.
I knew the helper, Dheeraj, from the grocery store next to my apartment building, 
where he also worked. I did not know it at the time, but the FPS owner, Ashok, also owned a 
grocery store—a practice that does not conform to the regulations in place in Delhi, since it 
facilitates the diversion of food grains from FPSs to the black market. After Dheeraj opened the 
door, he began to dust the desk at the front of the FPS. He brought up the store’s electronic 
balance to prepare for the distribution of rations. He swept the shop, collected the wheat from the 
floor, and sieved it to remove dust, rat droppings, bidi (eucalyptus cigarette) butts, pieces of jute 
and string, and other impurities. Once sieved, Dheeraj poured the wheat grains back into a jute 
bag, from which the first few rations would be drawn. Meanwhile, the FPS owner walked down 
the alley. He recognized me and waved. I asked him if we could watch the distribution of food 
grains. He acquiesced awkwardly, before silently sitting down behind his desk as the queue 
lengthened. As if there was no one else there, he took his time to get ready, barely glancing at the 
cardholders waiting patiently in front of him. His decades of experience in delivering rations had 
transformed the exchange of entitlements into a series of weary gestures.
Manush and his wife, Pramila, were waiting in line. Pramila was a mother of two, in 
116 Every month, the Department of Food, Supplies, and Consumer Affairs (DFSCA) of Delhi subcontracts the 
delivery of rations to FPSs. 
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her late 40s. She grew up in a small village on the outskirts of Delhi, but she had moved to the 
city in her late teens when she married Manush. He was a tall thin man in his 50s, wrapped in a 
blue coat with a broken zipper, with shaggy hair and an unshaven beard. For the last 35 years or 
so, Pramila and Manush had lived with their three children in a small jhuggi (habitation in 
informal settlements), a house located in a nearby basti (informal settlement) at walking distance 
from the FPS. Manush ran a small electric shop. While his business was far from flourishing, it 
provided sufficient income to feed his family twice a day, which was not the case less than ten 
years ago. His two younger daughters, who were quickly approaching marriageable age, were a 
source of stress for him, as he wondered how he would manage to amass a large enough dowry 
for each to attract a suitable husband. Over the next few months that I would spend with him, 
Manush did not smile much. He was becoming a grumpy old man. That evening was no different.
Holding his winter jacket closed with one hand, he clung to a white envelope sent from the 
DFSCA with the other. Inside was their freshly delivered ration card. Pramila and Manush were 
about to use it for the first time.
That evening, about 75 ration card holders came to the FPS to draw their rations. 
Manush was one of a few men that queued up to receive monthly entitlements. The other 
cardholders were women of all ages—grandmothers, mothers, wives, and sisters—who lived in a 
neighbouring basti and visited the FPS in groups of two, three, or four. When his turn arrived, 
Manush opened the envelope, slid the plastic credit card-like ration card free of its new green 
cover, and handed it to the FPS owner. On the card, Ashok wrote down the number 277117 to 
identify the cardholder. He then pulled a small registry from one of the drawers in his desk and 
117 The number 277 is not the actual number used by Ashok. I randomly chose this number to preserve the 
anonymity of Manush and Pramila.
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recorded on line 277 the cardholder’s name, address, ration card number, and the number of 
household members registered to the card. In an even larger red registry, Ashok entered the 
details of that day’s transaction, as he does for every cardholder. For this transaction, for instance,
Ashok wrote the number 277 and the quantity of grain that Manush and Pramila bought from 
him. In theory, both of these registries may be audited by an inspector from the Department of 
Food, Supplies, and Consumer Affairs (DFSCA) to monitor the operations of the FPS and ensure 
that diversion of subsidized food does not occur; if some of the rations delivered to the FPS are 
not distributed to card holders, those remaining rations are supposed to be deducted from the next
month’s delivery. In reality, at the end of every month, most FPS owners doctor their registries to 
various extents; this allows them to divert any remaining stock of rations to the black market. To 
maximize the profitability of their ration shops, FPS owners ensure that in their registries, the 
quantity of entitlements sold to cardholders corresponds to the total amount of food grains 
delivered by the DFSCA.118 In doing so, they ensure that unsold entitlements are not carried over 
to the next month, and they pocket the excess profits.119 This, I was told by more than two FPS 
owners and several other interlocutors, is a widespread practice across the capital. In fact, this is 
perhaps the most mundane and ubiquitous way that leakages take place from the TPDS in Delhi
—a technical problem that could be solved by closely monitoring the exchange of entitlements at 
FPSs. 
As he inputted the information in his registries, Ashok glanced at Pramila for a second 
and turned towards Manush. He told him that with their new ration card, they could buy 16 kg of 
118 According to one FPS owner that we later interviewed, this is a widespread practice that has historically been 
conducted at every FPS since the development of the TPDS in 1997 because above-the-poverty-line (APL) 
households do not, generally speaking, pick up all of their rations from their FPSs.
119 Ration card holders were also quick to point out that some FPS owners refuse to sell rations altogether, in order 
to divert even more food to the black market.
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wheat and 4 kg of rice. “And what about sugar?” asked Manush, who either ignored the fact that 
his entitlements did not cover sugar or assumed that he could barter with the FPS owner.120 With 
me around, however, there was little chance that the FPS owner would bend the rules. “When the 
government allows it, I’ll give it,” Ashok responded. “If you don’t trust us, go to the government 
and ask. And if you get it, I’ll give you double [your ration]. It is not available on this card. 
Would we keep anyone’s right? This is your entitlement.” Resigned, Manush bought 16 kg of 
wheat. He threw his money on the old beaten desk that separated them. Ashok wrote a receipt and
quickly noted down the quantities of grain and money exchanged. He tore up the bottom of the 
receipt, a gesture that signifies that an exchange is completed, and put it back on the desk, along 
with a few rupees of change. As he did so, Dheeraj fetched a half-empty jute bag of wheat from 
the back of the almost empty FPS and poured grains from it into the worn plastic bag brought by 
Pramila until the digital scale read exactly 16.0 kg. Since his household did not eat rice, Manush 
did not buy it. With this transaction completed, Manush picked up the plastic bag and put his left 
hand in it to feel the quality of grain. When he removed it, his hand was covered in dust, a sign 
that the wheat had been infested by wheat weevils. The quality of food grains varies from one 
FPS to another and from one 50 kg jute bag of rations to the next. To avoid leakages, wheat and 
rice grains are routinely repackaged, both in governmental godowns and FPSs, and sold to ration 
card holders. This minimizes the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and FPS owners’ losses. But in 
a warm climate such as Delhi, repackaging food grains like this increases the likelihood of 
120 While wheat and rice are considered to be staples, sugar is not. However, it is a crucial ingredient for the 
preparation of chai. Every day, Pramila used sugar with milk, black tea, and spices to brew a few cups of chai, 
which she served to her husband, mother-in-law, two daughters, and herself. Tea is drunk all year around in 
India, twice or thrice a day, but the sweet treat is especially appreciated in the cold months of winter, especially 
among basti inhabitants who resort to wool blankets, large scarves, and the occasional fire lit on the side of the 
street to warm up. In the months that followed, I would share my fair share of chai with Manush right in front of 
his home. Cinnamon, cloves, and cardamom are very expensive and usually not used by poor households or at 
roadside tea stalls.
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infestation by pests. In Delhi storage facilities owned by the FCI, the food grains are regularly 
tested and treated with pesticides. At FPSs, however, outlets are typically located in inexpensive, 
poorly maintained, and badly ventilated places, which are more conducive to infestations. When 
FPSs have low-quality food grains in stock, they typically mix it with freshly delivered wheat or 
rice to keep the proportion of rotten grains in each cardholder’s allocation down. Doing so also 
helps to preserve the stock of good-quality food grains available for diversion to the black 
market.
The rations sold in FPSs are, as a general rule, of better quality than what Manush 
bought that day. He was unlucky. For the ration card holders that followed him, Dheeraj 
distributed food grains from a different jute bag, which contained better quality wheat.
Frustrated, Manush showed his hand to the FPS owner and asked for better grains. But 
the owner was not moved and refused. “This is not dirt, it’s dust” [Dhool hoti hai, mitti nahi 
hoti], Manush said. He tried to make the case that the wheat was not fit for consumption, but 
Ashok let him know that he had other cardholders to serve and no time for Manush’s grievances. 
“Ye tumera entitlement hai” [This is your entitlement], Ashok repeated, using an amalgam of 
Hindi and English, “Chaalo!”[Now, go!] 
Followed by Pramila, Manush stepped away from the queue, not without mumbling 
quite loudly about his dissatisfaction with their entitlements. The term “entitlement,” voiced in 
English, was a rather charged term in this context. Activists and human rights lawyers working 
under the banner of the Right to Food Campaign (RTFC) have endeavoured for more than a 
decade to transpose the concept of entitlement into a discursive instrument set up to describe the 
rightful prerogative of the poor over welfare goods and services. The notion of entitlement has 
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been central to the normative right-to-food project, which was formed in part around issues of 
government accountability and transparency in the domains of food security. However, in the 
everyday transaction of rations, the term entitlement has been depoliticized, only to be 
discursively re-packaged as an ostensibly apolitical exchange of commodities. Manush was 
entitled to 20 kg of food grains every month, and as long as the electronic balance read 20.0 kg of
food grains, his own agency to negotiate or contest his household’s entitlements was limited. In 
the infrastructure of rationing, Pramila and Manush's right to food entitlement was realized 
through their access to the TPDS, not necessarily through the quality of the entitlements that they 
received. Here, the new ration card played a critical role, since it embodied in its materiality 
Pramila and Manush's access to the TPDS—but only in ways that had been designed in the 
blueprint of the NFSA.
In this chapter, I explore the role of the new ration card in the mundane practices of 
entitlement exchanges at FPSs in the aftermath of the NFSA. Since the infrastructure of rationing 
was first established in India, the ration card and other identification documents have had their 
own “lives that escape rationales of bureaucratic authorities and discussions of power” (Sriraman 
2014, 3–4). Over subsequent decades, the rationing document has become at once a mundane 
object present in millions of households across India and a potent thing embodying, to various 
degrees, the capacity of the state to identify, catalogue, and govern a population. Once distributed
in Delhi, this object—charged with bureaucratic power (see Das 2004)—has enabled access to 
welfare services and predisposed its holder to formal identity and belonging to the city, but it has 
also brokered other kinds of everyday socialities, “affective energies and . . . emotional 
responses” (Sriraman 2014, 4). Following the enactment of the NFSA, the re-calibration of this 
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powerful bureaucratic document into a new technology of identification has been deployed, I 
argue, to tame alternatives uses of the ration card in Delhi—or to control what political scientist 
Tarangini Sriranam (2014), drawing on Arjun Appadurai (1986), calls the social life of the 
rationing document in India. 
In this introductory section, I have described an exchange of entitlements that took 
place at an FPS in the first few months after the integration of the new ration card into the 
infrastructure of rationing. While both FPS owners and ration card holders have been getting 
accustomed to the manipulation of this new bureaucratic document, the new ration card has 
embodied bureaucratic power aimed to achieve new formal welfare objectives—namely, the 
elimination of corruption in the distribution of allocated food grains to ration card holders. In 
subsequent sections in this chapter, I will concentrate on the material qualities of the new re-
materialized ration card. Paying attention to the materiality and embodied meanings of the new 
rationing document, I believe, will shed light on how the instrument rearranges associations of 
humans and things in respect to the biopolitical objectives of the government.
4.2 The Ration Card: A Bureaucratic Document
The ration card is iconic in India. Throughout my fieldwork in New Delhi, I 
encountered different generations of ration cards in different places: Manush had two ration 
cards, one in his wallet and another at home; another interlocutor protected her ration card from 
theft by storing it between the pages of a colouring book; in the National Archives of India, I 
found one of the first ration cards issued, yellowed by time and misplaced among other archival 
folders; many new ration cards were piled up in sealed white envelopes in post offices because 
mail carriers could not (or would not) find the addresses inscribed on them; we found a 
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surprisingly large number of ration cards in transparent garbage bags withheld at a DFSCA field 
office, months after applicants had submitted their claims for them; several pictures of ration 
cards are stored online; one of my friends kept a digital photocopy of his parents' ration card on 
his computer; another interlocutor kept her ration card sealed in a worn, plastic, water-resistant 
bag during the monsoon, hung from a ceiling of a jhuggi; and others locked their cards away in 
chests among other valuables. Many of these ration cards had long passed their expiration dates. 
Others were new, but had never been used. After more than a year of fieldwork on issues 
pertaining to the deployment of the NFSA in New Delhi, I got the sense that most interlocutors 
treasured their ration cards. Accordingly, these documents became important to me as well (Jacob
2008, 250).
As I cover more fully in the next chapter, ration cards are coveted objects. In the rather 
rich literature of “urban citizenship” (or belonging) and everyday exclusions in New Delhi 
(Baviskar 2010; Cowan 2015; Ghertner 2010; Kumar Routray 2014; Rao 2010a), the ration card 
is almost always referred to as an identification document (ID) that secures formal access to the 
city (Das 2011; Sriraman 2011, 2013). In fact, in urban contexts, as Veena Das puts it, ration 
cards have “become material embodiments of the right to dwelling” (2011, 327). These 
documents authenticate identity. This is especially true for members of populations that reside in 
basti and other informal settlements, who typically have little to no access to other formal proofs 
of identity and residence, such as passports, driver's licenses, or Permanent Account Number 
(PAN) cards, a type of ID issued by the Indian Income Tax Department.121 
121 This is not to say that no other types of ID could be used as identification or proof of residence. Bureaucratic 
identification documents such as passports, driver's licenses, and PAN cards are all available to Indian citizens, 
but they are hard to access for most members of the urban population who would not travel overseas, cannot buy
a car, and do not pay income taxes. 
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Bureaucratic documents have attracted attention from ethnographers interested in the 
dynamics of biopolitics and the means through which modern states design and deploy 
instruments to document, constitute, classify, and assess the welfare of populations (see for 
instance Corbridge et al. 2005).122 Evidently, the ration card is no different (Sriraman 2011), 
especially since 1997, when the introduction of targeting mechanisms to the public distribution 
system (PDS) led the Indian government to distribute a range of different ration cards formally 
designed to meet the different nutritional needs of various socioeconomic strata of the population.
As instruments of government, ration cards have contributed to the construction of social groups. 
These cards are objects that render social, cultural, and economic phenomena legible and 
intelligible; they arrange the population into discrete groups according to (interpreted) 
consumption habits and, thus, frame and organize specific social issues (such as food insecurity) 
according to metrics that bureaucratic instruments can perceive and schematize (see Barry 2002; 
Rose 1999).123 In this sense, the manipulation of ration cards produces a form of technocratic 
knowledge that shares similar features with a Foucauldian reading of bureaucratic documents: 
ration cards embody a function of representation, as much as they generate a work of social 
122 While the ration card is used as an ID, it should be noted that most people apply for or use their ration cards to 
draw entitlements from FPSs. Research in anthropology tends to emphasize elements that are unfamiliar, 
informal, uncanny, or illegal (Hull 2012b, 234). While it is important to uncover the multidimensional aspects of 
the ration card, I believe that we should be wary about framing this rationing document as something that is 
radically and unmitigatedly different from, or more than, the object it was designed to be: a document that grants
access to food entitlements.
123 This was particularly patent when the Planning Commission (2005) commissioned a study on the TPDS. The 
study suggests that the introduction of targeting mechanisms, and APL and BPL ration cards, has not helped to 
significantly mitigate leakages and diversion of food grains from the TPDS. However, rather than admitting that 
targeting mechanisms have failed to improve the TPDS, or that reverting to a simpler universal system of 
rationing may in the end be more beneficial, the study recommends the further refinement of poverty line 
methodologies in order to better target APL and BPL households. While the Planning Commission's study has 
been criticized for its own methodology (Khera, personal interview, New Delhi, May 2015), it is interesting to 
note the extent to which the ration card, an instrument that classifies the population into discrete social groups 
according to the perceived welfare support that they need, has been so closely enmeshed with the rationality of 
government that the state itself cannot envisage a return to a universal system of distribution. 
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construction (Riles 2006). According to such a framework, documents are texts bearing 
denotations and representations ready to be interpreted. In other words, documents are 
intermediaries to the signs they bear. Due in part to how well researchers operating within a 
Foucauldian framework have studied representations and the construction of objects (see Cabot 
2012; Corbridge et al. 2005; Riles 2006; Sriraman 2011), recent work on documents, according to
Matthew S. Hull (2012b), tends to move beyond the textual qualities of objects to focus instead 
on the materiality of documents, “to look at rather than through them” (2012a, 13). Informed by 
science and technology studies (STS), recent literature on bureaucratic documentation 
emphasizes the agency of objects and the role of mediation that they perform (Hull 2012a; Larkin
2013). For Bruno Latour, there is a fundamental difference between the notions of intermediaries 
and mediators: “An intermediary . . . transports meanings or force without transformations . . . 
Mediators, on the other hand, . . . transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the 
elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005, 39; see also Hull 2012b, 13). In treating 
documents as mediators rather than textual representations, anthropologists have attempted to 
explore the gap between the indexical role of documents and how they may act on social relations
(Hultin 2008; Jacob 2008). 
Seminal to this research project is Hull's Government of Paper (2012b). Hull uses the 
term “graphic artifacts” to encompass “the material form of documentation and communication” 
to argue that in Islamabad, “governing paper is central to governing the city” (2012b, 1). In this 
ethnography, Hull builds on the work of Latour (1987, 1993, 2005) to demonstrate that graphic 
artifacts constitute, and are constituted by, associations between people and things in two 
interrelated ways. First, as they circulate, graphic artifacts generate relations between people and 
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things, forming a terrain in which bureaucratic power exerts control over the population. Second, 
while they circulate, graphic artifacts carry with them signs and reference to places, objects, or 
people, thus bringing these objects into the association of people and things under the rule of the 
government (see Das 2004). In framing documents as a fluid object always in movement, Hull 
captures how certain graphic artifacts carry with them idiosyncratic bureaucratic power and how 
their circulation renders each constitution of associations unique. Paper, bureaucratic files, 
archives, writing notes, and ration cards are as much recipients of information or knowledge as 
they are key objects that bring together a number of people and things (Hull 2012a, 2012b; 
Sriraman 2014).
James Ferguson (1990) and Tania Murray Li (2007b) demonstrate that development 
experts and knowledge always fail to adequately capture and thus improve the lives of targeted 
populations, which leads to unanticipated ramifications for both the rulers and the governed; 
similarly, I argue, the circulation of documents has effects that are impossible to foresee and 
anticipate. Once in movement, documents rearrange people and things in such a way that is 
impossible to predict, let alone control (Hull 2012b, 134). Historically, for instance, Indian ration 
cards have been designed to curb the proliferation of corrupt practices through the inclusion of 
security measures that mark the documents in such a way, as Sriranam explains, “to render its 
misuse difficult and make any offence related to it traceable” (2011, 57). Thumbprints, serial 
numbers, and coloured backgrounds have, for instance, been inscribed on the ration card to ward 
off abuse and misappropriation. This is precisely why these security measures have made the 
ration card such a widely used identification document. Concerns for practices of corruption have
led bureaucratic authorities to implement measures of authentication on rationing documents, in 
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order to prevent theft of these documents, embezzlement of rations, and extortion (Sriraman 
2011, 56–57). However, in practice, these inscribed security measures have enabled the document
to mediate other practices that would otherwise not have been possible, including for instance, 
the mortgaging of rations in exchange for loans (Sriraman 2011) or the construction of socialities 
where ration cards can be procured outside of state institutions or formal bureaucratic channels 
(Srivastava 2012).
For the circulation of documents to happen, for the bureaucratic object to mediate 
performance or enactment, materiality matters. In compounding the ration card with the unique 
identification (UID) technology—the aadhaar card—the state has fabricated a rationing 
document with novel security measures, designed with the sole purpose of finally transforming 
the TPDS into an accountable and transparent welfare program. Security measures that used to be
central features of the old ration card have been digitized, withdrawn from the materiality of the 
card itself to operate through an online database. This has significantly altered the ways in which 
the ration card can circulate to create associations of people and things, which is precisely the aim
of the “end-to-end computerization” process that has been undertaken to digitize the TPDS 
infrastructure.124 In this chapter, I explore how the digitization of ration cards has, just like 
graphic artifacts, drawn things and people under bureaucratic control. Building on Sriranam 
(2011, 2014), I trace the circulation of the new ration card and highlight the associations of 
people and things that this rationing document constitutes and is constituted by. Historically, the 
introduction of new forms of bureaucratic instruments has helped to exert (colonial) government 
124 The National Informatics Centre (NIC), a science and technology organization of the Government of India, 
points toward the manipulation of transactions at FPSs as the main site of diversion and leakages of food grains 
from the infrastructure of rationing. Therefore, the NIC proposes, in bold, that: “The solution lies in distributing 
the essential commodities using biometric authentication of any member of beneficiary in order to restraint (sic) 
the diversion at the FPS level” (2015, 8).
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power in the everyday lives of its subjects (Raman 2012). It is not unreasonable to be wary of 
similar consequences from the re-materialization of the rationing document. 
In India, recent ethnographic research on the implementation of human rights 
legislation has critically examined how documents mediate normative principles that are 
constitutive of rights-based discourses. In her research on the right to information, for instance, 
Aradhana Sharma states that “documents are the primary sites of state transparency” (2013, 309).
For Sharma, transparency in the age of neoliberal governmentality is technocratic and 
instrumentalist; it is reduced to a procedural administration that depoliticizes an otherwise 
political rhetoric of citizen empowerment, democratic participation, or claims about good 
governance (see Hetherington 2011). The Right to Information Act, in Sharma’s words, 
“governmentalizes social life and fosters bureaucratized activism and procedural citizenship” 
(2013, 319), and the knowledge required to manipulate or manufacture documents certainly 
contributes to this effect. Similarly, Nayanika Mathur has explored how, in the implementation of
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), “transparency is made by documents” 
(2012, 167). But her ethnographic work in bureaucratic worlds led her to conclude that the 
generation, circulation, and uses of document to render practices transparent is so vast and 
complex that it hinders rather than facilitates the right to work. 
In this chapter, I build on insights from Mathur (2012) and Sharma (2013) to explore 
how the re-materialization of the ration card—that is, the transition from a paper to a digitized 
rationing document—has rearranged bureaucratic practices and other socialities. I explore, 
through ethnographic vignettes, revealing glimpses of how the re-materialized ration card has 
rendered the exchange of rations in FPSs more transparent and, in the process, constituted new 
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associations of humans and things that have historically helped ration card holders to assert their 
place in the city. I argue that the re-materialization of this rationing document has exerted 
bureaucratic control in practices of entitlement distribution that were otherwise difficult to police 
or discipline.
In the next section, then, I begin by exploring the materiality of the new ration card as it
compares to the old ration card, in order to “self-contextualize” the digitization of the rationing 
document (Das 2011; Latour 1999, 91 in Hull 2012a, 255). Then, I show how the ration card is 
deployed in relation with other objects to eliminate human agency from the TPDS, with the goal 
of ensuring accountability and transparency in the delivery of entitlements. Finally, I explore the 
systematic exclusions from entitlements that this document fosters—and the impacts it has as an 
instrument used by basti-dwellers to secure their position in the city.
4.3 A Plastic Ration Card
In this section, I describe the materiality of ration cards. I do so in order to describe the 
new ration card introduced in New Delhi in the aftermath of the NFSA (2013), but also to 
compare the discrepancies between the new rationing document with previous ones used since 
the public distribution system (PDS) was transformed into a targeted program (TPDS) in 1997. 
Following the implementation of the NFSA, the population targeted by the TPDS in 
New Delhi was capped to 7.3 million people—which is in the vicinity of half of the population. 
In total, 1.9 million ration cards were distributed on a household basis across the National Capital
Territory (NCT). Before the NFSA was enacted, every household could apply for a ration card. 
These rationing documents—the above-the-poverty-line (APL), below-the-poverty-line (BPL), 
and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) ration cards introduced in Chapter Two—consisted of colour-
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coded booklets used to communicate the category of household they represented.125 In Delhi, red 
ration cards were given to AAY households, which are the poorest of poor households; yellow 
cards were granted to BPL households; and white cards were issued to above APL households.126 
The colour coding of these cards was designed to allow FPS owners and ration card holders to 
easily identify the rates at which their entitlements should be exchanged. Entitlements were 
exchanged at cheaper rates to AAY households than to BPL households. In turn, BPL households 
could access entitlements at cheaper rates than APL households. To APL households, entitlements
were sold at near-market prices. 
These different categories of ration cards served the same functions: they allowed 
cardholders to access food at FPSs, as described above, and they formally situated the holder and 
their family in the city. All colour-coded ration cards authenticated holders’ identities and, 
accordingly, granted them access to governmental services, empowering them to not only collect 
food from the TPDS but also engage in a range of other practices, such as registering children in 
schools, applying for voter IDs, or opening bank accounts. For APL households, the identification
function of the ration card was not as critical as it was for BPL or AAY households. APL 
households could still use their ration cards as a form of ID, but most of them also had access to 
other kinds of ID—including passports and PAN cards distributed for income tax purposes.127 In 
contrast, BPL and AAY householders generally resided in basti and other informal settlements. 
125 In the post-war period, ration cards were distributed to household units rather than individuals because it was 
considered to be easier to administer and cheaper to issue them on a household basis (Sriraman 2011, 56). Since 
then, ration cards have been issued to households rather than to individuals.
126 Two other types of ration cards, the Jhuggi Jhopdi Clusters Ration Card and Resettlement Colony Ration Card, 
were granted with APL rates to residents of Jhuggi Jhopdi clusters and resettlement colonies. These cards were 
typically temporary and could be renewed after a period of six months.
127 It is also interesting to note that if the ratio of entitlement collection at the FPS was lower among people holding 
white cards than other colour-coded rationing documents, some more affluent households still did draw their 
monthly rations from FPSs (see Planning Commission 2005).
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For them, the ration card was one of the only bureaucratic documents at their disposal to use as 
proof of residence. With the exception of voter ID cards that were distributed just before 
elections, very few other forms of ID were readily available to them before the issuance of the 
aadhaar card—a card on which a unique identification number (UID) is written.
While it is true that the state created both old and new ration cards to enable eligible 
citizens to draw rations from FPSs, the two documents are in many ways fundamentally different.
Old ration cards were booklets printed on paper and designed to be malleable. Inscriptions were 
made on each booklet to record transactions and other bureaucratic information, such as the 
Illustration 3: Manush's AAY ration card.
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period of validity, dates of renewal, signatures of bureaucrats, and official stamps. Each month, 
when cardholders drew rations from an FPS, the owner would write in the booklet the date and 
quantity of rations drawn. In contrast, the new ration card is made of plastic and has been 
designed to make it almost impossible to inscribe additional information on it.128 It is shaped like 
a credit card.129 On the front, the cardholder’s photograph, name, and address are printed. The 
cardholder’s circle number, designated FPS number, and the name of the FPS owner also appear 
on the front of the card, indicating where the cardholder can draw rations. At the very bottom of 
the card, a seal of approval indicates the time and location at which the cardholder’s application 
was processed at one of the DFSCA field offices, located in one of the 70 circles (or 
circumscriptions) of Delhi. This seal sanctions the cardholder’s use of the card. The old ration 
card reproduced patriarchal understandings of power by attributing it to the male head of each 
household. In a move to empower women, the NFSA has christened older women as heads of the 
household and delivered the new ration card to them. Policy-makers believe that designating 
women as heads of the household will promote the regular retrieval of rations from FPSs, since 
mothers or grandmothers are more likely to provide for their family than men are.
On the front of the new card, beside the cardholder’s name, the initials PR, PR-S, or 
AAY appear. These initials represent the new categories of households designed following the 
enactment of the NFSA: priority, priority-sugar, or Antyodaya Anna Yojana. Previously, every 
cardholder in the TPDS in Delhi could buy sugar from a FPS. After the enactment of the NFSA, 
the distribution of sugar was discontinued for cardholders who had not been previously issued 
128 While it is true that the FPS owner wrote a number on each ration card to associate it with an entry in his 
registry, the new ration cards were designed to limit inscriptions.
129 The DFSCA has at times dubbed the new cards “Household Consumer Cards,” but they are also commonly 
referred to as either “MasterCards,” “fresh ration cards,” or “new ration cards.”
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AAY or BPL ration cards. Under the new system, these households would be categorized as PR 
households and allocated wheat and rice at a fixed rate of ₹ 2/kg and ₹ 3/kg respectively.130 
Although Pramila and Manush had once owned an AAY ration card, it had subsequently been 
deemed invalid; as a result, they were classified under the PR category in the new system, which 
explains why their FPS owner refused to sell sugar to them. In contrast, households that held a 
valid BPL or AAY ration card under the old system could obtain a PR-S or AAY ration card under
the new system. PR-S and AAY ration card holders are entitled to the same wheat and rice rations
as PR householders, but they are also theoretically entitled to subsidized sugar; however, in 
practice, sugar is often not available at FPSs.131 To note here, the NFSA legally secures four types
of entitlements. Three of them target children and mothers. These entitlements should in theory 
deliver meals to all children of six years or less in anganwadis (crèches or kindergartens), mid-
day school meals to all school-goers, and cash entitlements to all mothers. To access these 
entitlements, no ID is necessary. The ration card only enables access to the collection of rations in
FPSs.
130 These rates make the rations quite inexpensive. To compare, at the time of my fieldwork, a bottle of 350 ml of 
soft drink would go for about ₹ 10 to ₹ 12.
131 To note here, the NFSA legally secures four types of entitlements. Three of them target children and mothers. 
These entitlements should in theory deliver meals to all children of six years or less in anganwadis (crèches or 
kindergartens), mid-day school meals to all school-goers, and cash entitlements to all mothers. To access these 
entitlements, no ID is necessary. The ration card only enables access to the collection of rations in FPSs.
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On the back side of the new card, a table of two columns by eight rows contains the 
names of every household member that has been approved for entitlements by the DFSCA. A 
similar table appeared on the last page of the old ration card, in which every member of the 
family was listed for identification purposes. However, on the new ration card, the list of family 
members determines the total quantity of monthly entitlement that each cardholder can withdraw:
the longer the list, the greater the household’s entitlement will be. Since the very beginning of the
infrastructure of rationing, rations have been distributed on a household basis (see Sriraman 
2011). For instance, Manush used to be able to collect 35 kg of rations every months with his old 
AAY ration card. However, with the passing of the NFSA, only AAY ration card holders were 
entitled to a bundle of rations totalling 35 kg of food. PR and PR-S household are entitled to 
monthly rations of 5 kg of wheat and rice per each family member that holds a UID—an aadhaar
card. To be entitled to 5 kg of rations, to be enrolled in the TPDS, or to be inscribed on a ration 
card, one must submit a UID. For example, on Pramila and Manush’s card, four family members 
were registered with a UID, entitling the household to 16 kg of wheat and 4 kg of rice, for a total 
of 20 kg of subsidized food. The table on the old ration cards served no other function than 
providing proof of identity and residence for each household member. In contrast, the list of 
Illustration 4: Sample of the new ration card available on the DFSCA's website. In reality, the new ration cards 
distributed in Delhi frame the cardholder’s portrait in the middle of the card, in between the pictures of rice and 
wheat. Note here that, on the back of the card, the third column is entitled Aadhaar number. Source: bit.ly/2GVY5La,
last consulted on April 13, 2018.
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family members on the new card determines the quantity of rations that the cardholder can draw 
at the FPS. This is not to say that the new ration card cannot be used as an ID. However, to apply 
for the ration card, one must submit an ID that authenticates one’s identity—the aadhaar card. 
Therefore, the utility of the ration card for securing identification in the eyes of the state has 
become, in the aftermath of the NFSA, much more negligible, since the aadhaar card already 
serves this function.
At the heart of the “end-to-end computerization” strategy to curb leakages and 
diversion of food grains is the idea that the transformation of the paper ration card into a plastic 
document makes it much less “susceptible to forgery or mimicry,” to use Hull's words (2012a, 
260). In this process, however, the circulation of the new ration card has engendered a set of 
novel bureaucratic practices that have not only limited possible alternative uses of the ration card,
but have also enabled the state to control information and knowledge in new ways. The 
digitization of information has replaced older writing practices. In the following sections, I 
provide ethnographic evidence of how the transition to the new ration card has resulted in greater 
bureaucratic command and unexpected socialities.
4.4 The Making of (Dis)Empowered Bodies
In 2015, the DFSCA deployed a pilot project to digitally monitor the exchange of 
rations in FPSs. Hand-held machines, called point of sale (PoS) machines, were distributed to 42 
ration shop owners across the NCT of Delhi to track the circulation of food along the 
infrastructure of rationing. Equipped with a print reader and touchscreen and connected to the 
cellular network, the PoS machine could be used with either the ration card number or the UID 
number of a ration card holder. Since the name of every household member who has a UID 
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number is listed on the back of the new ration card, any of these members are eligible to draw 
rations from a FPS, using either the ration card or their UID number. Once presented with this 
information, the FPS worker can input the last four digits of the cardholder’s number into the PoS
device and then ask them to press one of their fingers firmly on to the print reader. Once the 
device recognizes the cardholder’s fingerprint, the screen displays the total quantity of rations 
that they can buy from the FPS. 
As it has been designed, this machine is the latest instrument in a series of 
identification technologies to be used with the UID number as a replacement for the manual 
registries that are easily doctored by FPS owners. Used in combination with the new ration card, 
the overt purpose of this device is to plug leakages from the TPDS. By cross-checking the body’s 
fingerprint with a database secure in the Food Security Portal (see Illustration 5), the device is 
meant to not only ensure that rations are allocated to empower population members targeted by 
the TPDS, but to also monitor every single transaction that takes place at FPSs. In theory, the 
DFSCA validates the exchange of entitlements at FPSs by authenticating ration card holders’ 
body markers or “biometrics.” This technology of government enables the DFSCA to control the 
distribution of rations and adjust the allocation of food grains for the following month according 
to the stocks remaining in each ration shop.
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The locations of the 42 FPSs that were equipped with the PoS machine had been kept 
secret by the DFSCA, but they were quite randomly shared with me towards the end of my 
fieldwork.132 I undertook the task of visiting one of these FPSs in Old Delhi, which was rather 
close to one of my field sites (see Chapter Five). Lost in the maze of small streets and alleys, 
hidden from sightseeing destinations and culinary treats that attract tourists from all over the 
world, my research assistant Ritesh and I found the FPS in a dark alley between three- to four-
story-high buildings. Above the maroon sliding door, which was locked down, the number of the 
FPS and the name of the owner were clumsily painted in worn-out white paint. We waited 
132 I received the list of these FPSs during an impromptu visit to the DFSCA. While working in the Department of 
Archives of the Delhi government, I met with the director of the department, who also occupied, it turns out, the 
position of assistant commissioner at the DFSCA. Usually, researchers working in the archives have to submit an
application to be approved by the director in order to be able to undertake archival research. These procedures 
tend to be solely administrative and do not require formal meetings. In my case, however, thinking that my 
research centred on the postcolonial history of wheat consumption in urban areas, the director sought to meet 
with me. During our short meeting, in a moment of surprising candour, the director-cum-assistant-commissioner 
gave me the list of the 42 FPSs. He took good care to mention that the list should not be shared with any 
activists, fearing that they would disrupt the pilot project. 
Illustration 5: Source NIC (2015: 14).
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awkwardly in front of the FPS for a few minutes, until a young teenage boy appeared in a 
window, two floors above. After a short exchange, in which we informed him of who we were 
and the reasons for our presence in front of the FPS—which turned out to be his father’s shop—
he asked us to come back tomorrow, early in the morning, when we could see the PoS machine in
action. The ration shop was closed for the remainder of the day. 
Early the next morning, we reached the FPS just as cardholders were beginning to 
collect their rations. The FPS owner’s son, Ansar, stood at the entrance of the FPS, carefully 
processing transactions with the newly installed PoS machine in his hand. Before the end-to-end 
computerization of the infrastructure of rationing had begun, the distribution of rations was 
conditional on the presentation of a colour-coded ration card, without which entitlements would 
not be delivered. Typically, a cardholder drew the entitlements allocated to their entire household,
but it was also not unusual for people to stand in line and pick up rations for a relative or a 
neighbour using their card, since over time, FPS owners and cardholders grew familiar with one 
another. However, the digitization of the new ration cards has made such exchanges impossible. 
With the PoS machine, the delivery of entitlements is contingent on the authorization of the 
transaction by the Food Security Portal database, which requires each empowered body to press a
finger on the device. 
With the purpose of preventing leakages through the manipulation of bogus ration cards
(Planning Commission 2005), the PoS machine works in conjunction with the re-materialized 
ration card to remove the arbitrary decision-making power of FPS owners from transactions and 
make exchanges more legible to the state and anyone that accesses the database online. This is, in
fact, the core rationale for the introduction of the PoS machine to the FPSs. The use of these 
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devices carefully calibrates the delivery of entitlements according to biometric information 
displayed by the PoS machine. Since all transactions are computed via the PoS machine, the 
DFSCA can monitor the stocks available in FPSs and adjust subsequent deliveries of rations 
accordingly. The PoS machine limits the agential power of FPS owners to conduct or refuse a 
transaction for a plethora of reasons, in order to serve the purpose, it is believed, of plugging 
leakages from the infrastructure of rationing and delivering rations to rightful cardholders.
In implementing the end-to-end computerization of the TPDS, the government has 
heavily relied on the digitization of identification information to plug leakages. In the process, it 
has re-materialized the ration card in such a way as to ensure that exchange of entitlements are 
conducted with accountability and transparency. The government's blind faith in this technology 
opens a window for us to explore how new bureaucratic practices of accountability and 
transparency are conjured in documents of identity and authentication. As Ritesh and I quickly 
realized, the re-materialization of the new ration card, in combination with the PoS machine, has 
changed practices of entitlement exchanges at the FPSs. Out of habit, most likely, each ration 
card holder handed their ration card to Ansar. However, since the entire infrastructure of rationing
now relies on the digitization of information and the use of the UID technology, the material 
ration card is no longer required for the collection of rations at FPSs. One could, in fact, simply 
present one’s ration card number or UID number to the FPS worker. 
Initially, Nandan Nilekani, co-founder of the multinational corporation Infosys and 
later chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), introduced the aadhaar 
card (and the UID) as a bureaucratic document that could provide formal, and portable, ID to 
poor members of the population across state boundaries. But to be empowered by the aadhaar 
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program, to get access to rightful entitlements and governmental services, one had to hand over 
one’s biometrics. As Nilekani stated in November 2012: “If you do not have the Aadhaar card, 
you will not get the right to rights” (Ramakumar 2014). However, as Usha Ramanathan puts it, 
the function of the UID crept into welfare delivery: “it became a precondition for underserved 
and socio-economically vulnerable people to get any manner of state assistance” (2017). In 
compounding the UID with the ration card, the new rationing document became a conduit for the 
state to control the ways in which the exchange of entitlements were conducted. The new ration 
card has been designed in such a way as to keep its manipulation to a minimum, while the UID 
technology seems to have been granted a more important place than the card itself, giving far 
greater agency to things than FPS owners in the state dispensation of welfare services. Under this 
regime, only empowered bodies get to benefit from governmental interventions.
After Ansar computed the last four digits of each customer’s ration card or UID 
number, the PoS machine crosschecked the identity of the cardholder with their fingerprint stored
in the database on the UIDAI's portal. It was only after the ration card holder had been verified 
by the system that the PoS machine allowed the delivery of entitlements granted to their 
household, at the rate of 5 kg of food grains per registered household member. Once the ration 
card holder had been verified, Ansar selected the amount of rations that would be exchanged, 
since not all ration card holders chose to buy, at the FPS, the total amount of rations allocated to 
them. To complete the transaction, each cardholder finally purchased their rations at the 
prevailing rate and left the FPS with their entitlements and a receipt printed from the PoS 
machine itself. 
If the use of the UID technology helps the government to closely track the circulation 
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of food grains, it does not guarantee that rations are actually distributed to cardholders. To receive
one’s entitlement, one must present a readable fingerprint, and as anthropologist Ursula Rao 
reminds us in her ethnographic account of homeless people’s enrolment into the UID technology, 
this is not always possible: 
Lost  fingers,  damaged  fingertips,  and  rubbed-off  skin  contours  made  fingerprints
unrecognizable  to  a  system  that  posits  healthy,  young  bodies  as  the  norm.  Age,
exposure to  nature,  and hard  manual  labour  had worn  off  those  marks  that  were
perceived as infallible signs of physical individuality. (2013, 74)
If “unhealthy” bodies face difficulties in acquiring an UID number, they also face challenges in 
collecting entitlements. It turns out that empowered bodies need to be intelligible and readable by
the state’s technologies of authentication in order to access entitlements. By design, via its 
targeting mechanisms, the NFSA has attempted to allocate available entitlements to populations 
that are more vulnerable to having their fingers ravaged by labour or age. In addition to ill or 
aged beneficiaries, the targeted populations also encompass a large proportion of men and women
who work on a daily basis with dangerous materials and tools. The very occupations that allow 
these workers to survive in the city may hinder their rightful access to entitlements. In 
implementing a system in which the material ration card has lost its most basic formal function—
enabling access to food subsidies—to readable biometrics, the DFSCA has systematically failed 
to secure entitlements to members of arguably the most vulnerable populations who cannot 
provide intelligible identifiable biometrics such as fingerprints. These cardholders can be 
understood as “disempowered bodies.”
Over the course of my short presence at the FPS, I met with two disempowered bodies: 
one ration card holder was returned home empty-handed and another nearly was. On my first 
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morning with Ansar, a man in his late 30s came to pick up his rations. The cardholder was a 
daily-wage worker who most likely had not found anyone to hire him that day. After glancing at 
his hands, Ansar threw the man a small rag to clean the tips of his fingers before he apposed them
to the device’s reader. Just when Ansar was about to give up at the fifth attempt, the PoS machine 
was finally able to read the man’s fingerprints. The following day, battling what appeared to be 
Parkinson’s disease, an elderly cardholder made her way to the FPS. She did not wait for long 
before Ansar brought the hand device to her in the middle of the alley. The PoS machine did 
register the card number that Ansar computed onto the screen, but it could not read the woman’s 
fingerprints. A quick look at the ration card was all it would take for a person to recognize that 
the cardholder was in fact entitled to rations, since the picture on the ration card clearly portrayed
her. However, Ansar had to wait for the PoS machine to verify her fingerprints before he could 
hand over her entitlements. Ansar wiped the woman’s fingers repeatedly with his rag and asked 
her to firmly press her thumb on the print reader. The machine failed to read her thumbprint. At 
the third shot, Ansar actually clamped the woman’s shaking right index finger onto the device, to 
no avail. The young FPS worker tried two other fingerprints before giving up, despite her 
repeated laments that she and her husband were both enrolled. She left frustrated, not without 
mentioning that for two consecutive months, she had not been able to collect her rations. She 
disappeared from the alley with her useless ration card in hand. 
Of course, by definition, abnormal and unhealthy bodies are much less numerous than 
normal and healthy bodies. Statistically speaking, the compounded ration card/UID is likely to 
function with more people than it does not. But here, I am not making an argument based on 
statistics. As I have described above, it took very little time in the presence of the PoS machine 
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for me to see that the new rationing document does not function for some rightful cardholders. 
For some, the modernization of the TPDS has disempowered rather than empowered them. It is 
critically important to point out that while, under the promise of empowering bodies, the UID has
been designed to eradicate the diversion of food grains from the infrastructure of rationing, it has 
in practice become a major hindrance to the delivery of entitlements to at least some abnormal 
bodies because of its very design. 
Such exclusions are often mundane and go unreported. Yet sometimes, when they are 
dramatic or spectacular enough, they do make their way into public discourse. For instance, in 
2017, in Jharkhand, a young girl died of hunger after her mother's ration card was cancelled 
because she failed to link it with her UID (Mander 2017). In July 2017, in Karnataka, three 
members of a Dalit family died of starvation. According to the report, they used to have a BPL 
ration card, but they could not draw rations because they did not have a UID number (The New 
Indian Express 2017). Similarly, during my fieldwork, I met with an elderly widow, introduced in
Chapter One, named Alka, the head of a household of eight members, who had received a 
photocopy of her ration card 14 months after she had submitted her application.133 She had not 
received her new plastic ration card, but she had a photocopy approved by clerks from the 
DFSCA and was able to draw rations from the TPDS. However, after her first successful trip to 
the FPS, Alka realized that she was only entitled to 5 kg of food grains per month, rather than 40 
kg, because none of her children or grand-children had UID numbers. Likewise, where Manush 
lived, several other mothers were unable to enrol their children on their ration cards because they 
were too young to have been granted UID numbers. The retina and print scanners used at the time
to record biometrics were unable to read the small retina and fingerprints of children aged three 
133 Alka was able to draw rations from her FPS 8 months after her application had been approved.
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years or less. UID numbers were therefore not granted to children younger than three years old, 
which substantially reduced the total quantity of entitlements that could be collected by young 
families. In the next chapter, I explore much further how bureaucratic practices are excluding 
almost entire families from drawing entitlements at the FPS due to the introduction of the UID 
technology to the rationing document.
If the PoS device fails to accommodate every empowered cardholder, especially those 
with abnormal bodies, it also fails to exclude some of those who should by design be omitted 
from the infrastructure of rationing. Exclusion criteria clearly list a number of situations in which 
ration card applicants should be automatically denied entitlements delivered through the TPDS. 
The exclusion criteria for the TPDS are: possession of a four-wheel vehicle; receipt of subsidized 
food under a different food-related welfare program; employment in the formal sector (paying 
taxes), including any governmental body; an electric connection that consumes more than 2 KW 
per month; and ownership of land of categories A to E.134 However, if an applicant who should be
excluded from the distribution of entitlements successfully obtains a ration card, either through 
relations of patronage or errors of exclusion, the PoS machine is unable to detect what are, in 
theory, leakages from the TPDS. 
For example, on the same morning that I had seen that elderly woman turned away, 
another woman arrived at the FPS in a car. Ownership of a car is one of the exclusion criteria of 
the TPDS. She presented her ration card to Ansar, who inputted her number and pressed her right 
thumb on the reader to identify her. The PoS device noted that the ration card holder was entitled 
to 35 kg of food grains, which means that her household comprised seven people covered by the 
134 In Delhi, the NCT is divided into eight different categories (A to G) that are scaled according to the market value
of land and property. 
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TPDS. Once the transaction was completed and the ration card holder was far enough away that 
she could no longer hear us, Ansar muttered that she worked as a personal assistant for a member 
of the legislative assembly (MLA) and was not, therefore, supposed to draw rations. Since 
bureaucrats are, in theory, automatically excluded from the TPDS, the cardholder would have had
to circumscribe the rules of ration card allocation twice to receive one. 
Ansar’s allegations were difficult to substantiate, but according to his father, Aftab, 
ration card holders who should be excluded from the TPDS are easy to recognize and more 
numerous than one may think:
Aftab: In this circle, there are 20,000 cards, and 16,000 of them have some links in the 
government. How come you are poor when you are coming in a vehicle of one 
lakh rupees [₹ 100,000] to take rations? How is that person poor? They took the
rights of real poor people. This is the reality. You have seen it [referring to the 
MLA personal assistant]. Government [officials] gives them ration cards. Poor 
are not getting it, but wealthy people have it.
Guillaume: But how can you know that a person is too rich to be entitled to a ration card or 
work for the government?
Aftab: Face! Look at their face. Face can tell you reality. Face is one thing that can tell 
you the truth. I have 40 years of experience. Trust me. People do not know their
MLA [member of the legislative assembly] as much as they know me.
Strangely enough, this is how the PoS machine functions. Just like Aftab used to observe people 
to judge whether or not they should be entitled to rations before the pilot-project, the PoS 
machine scans people’s bodies to authenticate their rights to entitlements. Unlike Aftab, however,
the PoS machine cannot decipher, or nor can it register, situations that exclude rightful 
cardholders from their entitlements or grant access to rations to fraudulent cardholders.
According to Aftab, the end-to-end computerization process has not stopped the 
distribution of ration cards to people who are not, in theory, targeted by the NFSA. These sorts of 
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leakages do and will continue to occur once the end-to-end computerization process has been 
fully implemented (Drèze and Khera 2018; Kotwal and Ramaswami 2018; Mehtal 2018). 
Expanding nonhuman agency to curb practices of leakages has been central to the rearrangement 
of the infrastructure of rationing in New Delhi. However, in the process, the use of the UID 
technology has hindered, rather than facilitated, access to rationed food for at least some 
members of vulnerable populations. 
4.4.1 Nonhuman Agency to Eradicate Corruption
The following day, we arrived early at the FPS, only to realize that it was closed once 
again. Ansar saw us from his window and came downstairs to welcome us. The PoS machine had 
stopped functioning for a reason that Ansar had ignored, so his father had decided to close shop. 
At that time, the daily maintenance of the PoS machine was the sole responsibility of FPS 
owners. The SIM card, used to connect the machine to the Internet and thus to the Food Security 
Portal, had to be paid for by each shop owner. Other costs, such as the electricity needed to 
charge the device or the rolls of paper needed to print transaction receipts, which had never been 
employed by Ansar, were also the responsibility of the shop owner to cover. However, when the 
PoS device did not function, the FPS owner was expected to contact the DFSCA and wait for 
further instructions. In the meantime, since the device’s use was mandatory for FPS owners that 
were participating in the pilot project, the owner could not distribute rations to cardholders. This 
was a cause for concern among cardholders who had not yet collected their rations for the month.
Ansar introduced us to his father, Aftab, who ran his FPS from his electronic store, 
which was located on a busy street of Old Delhi. The FPS was located behind the electronic store 
in the same building, which was owned and occupied by Aftab's family. Aftab’s father acquired 
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his first license to run a FPS from the DFSCA in 1967. At the time, the license cost ₹ 500. Now, 
every three years, Aftab renews his license for ₹ 10,000. Over the same period of time, FPSs have
become much more profitable.
Since the FPS was closed, many ration card holders walked into his electronic store to 
ask questions about their rations. Many others called Aftab directly on one of his phones. They 
were worried that they would not be able to collect their rations that month, since the PoS 
machine had stopped functioning. For example, I observed the following exchange between 
Aftab and one ration card holder:
Cardholder: It is the last day of the month and we will not get ration. Last time, the same 
happened . . . 
Aftab: You will get the ration. The machine is not working right now. My son has gone
to get it fixed. But it’s coming, it’s coming. Please don't worry, I would not let 
you stand in line. Please come after 2:00 pm. 
The ration card holder looked angry. At her side, her daughter, holding a new ration card and an 
old plastic bag, kept her eyes on Aftab.
Cardholder: My mother-in-law cannot walk and my daughter lives with her grandmother, 
but when she comes, she never gets rations. So tell me, what should I do now?
Aftab: See, your mother-in-law needs to leave her home and to get the rations herself 
because now, it is biometric. First listen to me and don't get angry. Go and tell 
the commissioner or minister to kill us [to terminate our FPS]. My son and I are
running here and there to give ration to you, people. I suggested them [the 
government] to give ration directly, but they asked me to not give without the 
machine and my son has gone to get that. I am fighting for you and asking them
to give you ration for the previous month. This is what I am doing for you. Now
tell me what else do you have to say? People, please come after 2:00 pm. 
She grumbled a few words of frustration and, followed by her daughter, awkwardly exited the 
narrow electronic store, manoeuvring between empty chairs, the glass counter protecting the 
items for sale, and the door. Once the door closed behind them, Aftab turned to me and said: “I 
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told the same thing to the assistant commissioner [of the DFSCA] yesterday. We are tired of this. 
We are ready to resign. We can't hear abuses anymore.” Up until the end of that month, he was 
unable to distribute entitlements to his cardholders. 
There are many FPS owners who fear the introduction of the new ration card and the 
PoS machine. When I first attempted to meet with FPS owners, many of them showed me a 
medical declaration, signed by a doctor, that exempted them from selling rations. None of these 
FPS owners did in fact suffer from medical conditions, but several FPS owners kept their medical
note handy as a way to counter the government's plan to introduce the PoS machines. FPS owners
were hoping at the time to compel the Delhi government to bring the pilot project to an end if 
enough FPS owner would stop selling rations all at once. “If [after the pilot project] that machine 
comes, then all the shops will close,” said Aftab. He looked at a text he had just received from 
one of his cardholders and then told me:
These owners are applying for medical, but none of them are actually sick. Let the
machines come, and you will see that all these shops will shut. They do not want it to
work. See, the new card is similar to an ATM card. In most FPS, you just need to put
the number [in the registry]. You use the card, but you don't use thumbprint [scanner].
There  is  no  verification.  You  can  use  anybody's  thumbprint.  Any  person.  No
verification.
While it is true that the DFSCA may send inspectors to verify any FPS's registry, in reality, 
according to Aftab, many of these inspections are feeble, if not futile. Without a PoS machine, 
then, an FPS owner can more easily pocket some of the rations.
Aftab: Inspectors from the DFSCA come for verification, but FPS owners give them 
money, and then they go. Whatever the inspectors do, the FPS owners pay 
them. If they ask for like one lakh [₹ 100,000], owners give them ₹ 10,000. If 
you want to stop corruption, the only solution is the introduction of machines. 
No improvement without that.
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Guillaume: You can't improve the PDS without using these machines? 
Aftab: See, you received rations for 1,000 people, but you distributed only to 600. In 
your books you wrote that you distributed to all, but how can you distribute to 
all when 400 didn't receive anything? Suppose that I am poor and can't come to 
get the ration. [With the PoS machine,] the owner can only use my name when 
my card is with him. How can the machine run without my card? What is 
happening now? You come or not . . . the FPS owner makes an entry in the 
registry, and it is done. Your ration is gone.
At the heart of the end-to-end computerization of the TPDS, the removal of human agency in the 
exchange of entitlements constitutes the nodal element that underpins the overhaul of the 
rationing document. One could argue, as I did when we spoke with Aftab, that if the government 
operated FPSs, rather than licensing them to private entrepreneurs, latent practices of corruption 
could perhaps be better curtailed without having to introduce these PoS machines. Aftab 
disagreed. About a decade before our discussion, Aftab recalled, a few FPSs in the city were 
under the administration of the Delhi Department of State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited 
(DSCSC). These government-owned FPSs were eventually all shut down because they were 
deemed to be too expensive to be operated.135 Yet according to Aftab, these FPSs were actually 
very lucrative for the operators: in addition to securing a governmental salary, these officials 
pocketed profits from selling a portion of delivered food rations on the black market. 
During the course of our discussion, Aftab remained surprisingly loquacious about the 
informal practices that underpinned the operations at his FPS. Like other FPS owners, Aftab used 
to draw an income from his FPS in two distinct ways. The formal business model of each FPS 
entails the collection of commissions on all rations sold on a pro-rata basis, called margin money. 
FPS owners buy and sell entitlements at the fixed rate set by law, and they draw income from the 
135 A senior official working for the DSCSC later confirmed that these government-owned FPSs were shut down 
because they were too costly to be maintained.
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margin money they collect. Since 1997, when the PDS was overhauled into a targeted system, 
FPS owners located in Delhi received ₹ 35 for every quintal (100 kg) of rations sold each month 
to ration card holders. In the wake of the NFSA, the Delhi government doubled the margin 
money paid to FPS licensees to ₹ 70/quintal. Since the profitability of an FPS depends directly on
the quantity of ration cards attached to it, owners typically try to maximize the number of ration 
cards linked with their shops. By negotiating with bureaucrats from the DFSCA to have as many 
cards as possible linked to their FPSs, some ration shop owners see the profitability of their FPSs 
increase. According to Aftab, it is not unusual for FPS owners to bribe government officials in 
order to receive a larger share of ration cards and raise more profits. The second way to draw 
income from FPSs is to divert food grains to the black market, notably by drawing from APL 
rations that have not been collected by cardholders, a practice that used to be exercised, to 
various degrees, by every FPS owner in New Delhi.136 Typically then, FPS owners profit from 
their FPSs by collecting margin money on rations sold, as recorded in their registries, and by 
diverting a fraction of entitlements to the black market.
By the time of our interview, Aftab had not received his margin money from the 
DFSCA for the past three or four months. Aftab's businesses, including his FPS, had been very 
profitable over the past decades, and by his own admission, he had easily been able to absorb the 
day-to-day expenditures of the FPS. This is not necessarily the case for all FPS owners if they do 
not engage in practices of patronage. “Even you, me, or anyone else . . . you incur expenses to 
run a shop, right? So how can you run it properly? No one will do it for free. The government is 
136 During the course of my fieldwork, two different FPS owners told me that they used to sell the remainder of 
their APL rations on the black market at the end of the month. The most corrupt owners sell the entirety of their 
food rations on the black market, leaving cardholders without entitlements at the end of the month. I also 
witnessed FPS owners delivering jute bags full of wheat and rice to surrounding shops in plain sight.
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making us do this.”137 This was, according to Aftab, one of the reasons why practices of 
corruption were so widespread at the time of our interview. 
However, financial survival is certainly not the main rationale for pocketing rations 
from the TPDS. Greed, obviously, drives FPS owners to redirect food rations to the black market.
In the capital, Aftab maintained that several FPS owners rent their licenses to third parties that 
operate their shops. According to Aftab, this is rather advantageous for FPS licensees, since they 
benefit from the FPS without having any involvement in its day-to-day operations. Aftab told me:
In most cases, the owners give the shop to the third party and pay them ₹ 20,000
every month. It is up to the third party to show a profit. And if some verification
happens, then there will be corruption. They give money to inspectors.
In addition to all the fees associated with the management of a FPS, this additional rental charge 
compels, according to Aftab, the third party operators to maximize the profitability of their ration 
shops. “There is no other way,” Aftab concluded, “than to make bogus slips and to doctor the 
registry.” This is why, according to Aftab, the introduction of the PoS machine and the new ration
card may well be the only way to force FPSs to adopt transparent practices by limiting the agency
of their operators to divert rations to increase their profit margins.
In the ensuing months, Aftab stopped partaking in the pilot project and reverted back to
the use of manual registries to record entitlement transactions. In the year after my fieldwork, in 
October 2016, Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal confirmed that every FPS across the NCT 
would be equipped with a PoS machine as early as March 31, 2017. However, since different 
departments of the Delhi administration could not agree on the terms of implementation of the 
137 This does not necessarily means that running a FPS has become unprofitable. It was, in fact, quite the opposite 
for Aftab, who had, over the years, bought a few properties in South Delhi thanks to his FPS. However, the 
implementation of the new ration card may well make it much less lucrative for FPS owners.
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pilot project, the distribution of PoS machines to every FPS was postponed (Goswami 2017).
Compounding the UID technology with the ration card was the cornerstone of the end-
to-end computerization strategy set to curb leakages and ensure the delivery of entitlements to 
cardholders at FPSs. In re-materializing and compounding the rationing document with the UID 
technology, the government has sought to alter the exchange of entitlements in such a way as to 
minimize human agency and emphasize nonhuman agencies to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the provision of welfare services and goods. This was indeed Aftab's opinion: 
the PoS machine, used with the new ration card, is perhaps the association of things that can 
prevent FPS owners from finding loopholes in the system and from benefiting from them. 
However, for the pilot project to work, ration card holders must navigate bureaucratic worlds, 
avoid the pitfalls associated with the exchange of entitlements, and give their biometric 
information to the state to access their rightful entitlements. While it is true that the PoS machines
force FPS owners to adopt practices that are deemed both morally and legally respectable, in no 
way does the state impose on them the same burden of accountability and transparency that it 
does on cardholders. As covered in the previous section, the circulation of the new ration card 
generates systematic exclusions from rightful entitlements that are not alleviated by the use of the
PoS machine. In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss how the re-materialization of the 
rationing document has had unexpected effects on the lives of some basti-dwellers that rely on 
the ration card's “material embodiment of the right to dwelling” (Das 2011, 327). To pursue this 
argument, I will turn back to Manush and his own understanding of the value of the new ration 
card.
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4.5 Manush's Old AAY Card
When the new ration cards were put into circulation, the old colour-coded ration cards 
were discontinued. In effect, the deployment of the new rationing document in the population 
destabilized a relatively static and stable network of things and people that was widely 
understood to secure permanent residence in the city. To illustrate this, I return to Manush. I will 
describe how his old AAY rationing document used to secure his position in the city. I will 
examine how he has navigated and understood the realities of the Indian bureaucracy and how he 
has manipulated the things he owns in order to secure his footing in the city. In so doing, I wish 
to illustrate how the circulation of the new ration card has re-arranged the scope of action of 
objects that have historically secured a space in the city for Manush.
After Manush bought his 16 kg of wheat from Ashok’s FPS, he made sure to slide his 
new ration card back into its protective green sleeve and put it securely in his old leather wallet. 
As Pramila stepped away from the queue to head back home, Manush, still frustrated by the 
quality of their rations, began to voice his grievances louder:
My [old ration] card has been cancelled for two years. [To receive this ration card,]
they [the government officials] asked for ID proof three to four times. They said they
keep losing it. [And now, with this new card], we got [only] 16 kg of wheat for four
people!
Manush had waited in line for two days to submit his application for a new card in the middle of 
the winter. At the end of the first day, the officials, according to Manush, had “pushed them out of
the office and closed the door on them.” Manush came back the following day, waited for a few 
hours, and paid ₹ 1,000 when he submitted his application. He received his new ration card by 
mail 11 months later. On the card, unlike those of most of his neighbours, his family’s two 
youngest daughters were registered.
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To Manush's dismay, the FPS owner was decidedly unmoved by his grievances and 
dismissed the nature of his complaints: “But you got it in the end, didn’t you [ant tum mil to gaya
na]?” Ashok had other rations to distribute and, quite frankly, did not seem to care much about 
Manush’s pleas. He quickly dismissed him: “There is no use telling me this [mujhe bolne ka koi 
fayda nahi hai].” Still, Manush persisted. To me, seemingly, he added: “Nobody ever helps you. 
You stand four to six hours in the cold in a line.” As Manush gently pushed me, he added:
Then, they say, ‘Go away, come tomorrow, come in a week.’ Should we work, or
should we stand in a line? They think we are poor people and tell us they don’t have
time for us. They don’t care for us. They closed the door on us. It was so cold, we
couldn’t even eat, and we’d have to spend hours just going to the office and waiting.
Pramila and Manush finally left the FPS with their 16 kg of food rations. A few days later, 
Pramila brought the wheat to a mill located not so far away from her home. But the mill owner 
refused to wash and grind the wheat into flour (atta) because he considered the food grains to be 
not even good enough for dogs. Given the hordes of stray dogs inhabiting the streets of Delhi, 
ready to eat anything handed to them, such characterization spoke volumes about the quality of 
the food.
A few days later, near Nizamuddin Dargah in South Delhi, I ran across Manush talking 
with a couple of men around a small fire in the middle of a little basti, located at a walking 
distance from Ashok’s FPS, close to the open sewers. Around a cup of chai prepared by Pramila, 
we began to chat about Manush's experience at the FPS and his ration card. As Pramila put it 
bluntly, “Without the card, we won’t have a jhuggi, and we won’t get food as well.” For Manush, 
Pramila, and other basti-dwellers, the ration card is an object that can mediate not only access to 
welfare, but also their right of belonging in the city (see Das 2011). 
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Manush is vocally impaired, which makes him slightly difficult to understand at times. 
Years before, Manush claims, he had set up a bicycle shop next to a post office. Borrowing 
money from friends and relatives, he bought a pump, a cart, and some tools to fix bicycles on the 
side of the road. It did not take long before local business owners complained about his activities. 
According to Manush, during the night, police officers and local business owners smashed his 
cart. Frustrated, Manush found the police officers in the morning and allegedly “negotiated” with 
them, which ended up in a one-way fight. Manush got his jaw broken. Without any income to pay
medical bills, he never went to the hospital, resulting in impaired speech. Hot tempered, he never 
allowed his vocal impairment to stop him from letting anybody know what he thought. 
In 1988, Manush's father commanded his son to marry Pramila, who grew up in a small
village near Faridabad. The newly wed couple moved to the basti where I first found him, right 
across the street from Manush’s parents’ home. Caught in between the school’s 10-foot-tall wall 
and an open sewer, built around a dhalao (garbage disposal), the jhuggi multiplied over the 
decades. Once he saw people settling across from his parents’ home, Manush quickly leapt at the 
occasion. He found himself a spot and moved with his wife to the basti. He built the jhuggi 
himself, initially using scraps of woods, tarpaulins, and bamboo that he had collected from 
around the neighbourhood. Then over the years, like his neighbours, he transformed his kachcha 
(temporary) house into a pukka (solid) one. He erected brick walls, poured cement on the floor, 
and levelled it up. At first, like everybody else in the basti, he stole power from the electrical 
network. Once he got caught, however, the company installed a meter right next to his front door.
Monthly bills never fail to be delivered. 
In his jhuggi, Manush became a father of two daughters and one son. Life in the basti 
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was not easy on the family. In the early years, they regularly ate no more than once a day. Rolled 
up roti, served with salt, was a recurrent meal. A few years before I met them, their son passed 
away. Manush and Pramila did not share many details about his premature death, besides the fact 
that they had not been able to afford healthcare. These days, their socioeconomic situation had 
improved somewhat, but Manush’s debts continued to run high. With two daughters getting older,
and with little with which to construct enviable dowries, Manush’s debts are likely to escalate.
In the past, Manush had spent his days waiting for someone from the middle-class 
neighbourhoods around the basti to hire him to clean latrines, the drain, or the sewer, a line of 
work typically reserved for the Dalit. Once in a while, he had been contracted to do some other 
manual labour. By the time I met him, he considered himself too old to clean latrines and sewers. 
Instead, he was making a living by peddling small electric materials to local residents—selling 
light bulbs, wires, and fuses from the area in front of his parents’ home, just outside of the basti. 
When his father passed away, Manush moved his entire family—Pramila and his two 
daughters—into his parents’ house to take care of his mother. Together, they shared two beds in a 
one-bedroom and one-kitchen house. On a typical day, Manush would step out the house around 
10:00 am, draw a small chair behind him, and open up the panel of a large white cupboard that he
had affixed to the space where a window used to be. He would sit there all day in the little alley, 
waiting for customers and chain smoking bidi. In the winter, he would make a fire in the alley to 
warm up. In the summer, he would seek shade to cope with the dreadful heat. To fight boredom, 
he would come and go into the basti to chat with his neighbours, which is where I found him. 
Manush did not always answer every question that I asked him candidly. Fully aware of
my position as a researcher and my access to the Indian civil society or even some government 
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officials, he tended to present himself in a rather positive light. But he was very generous with his
time. During one of our chats conducted around the fire in the cold afternoon of Delhi’s winter, 
Manush mentioned that he stored his electric material in his old jhuggi. This came as a surprise to
me, since I assumed that when he moved into his parents’ house, he had either sold or put the 
jhuggi to rent. We left Manush's shop in front of his parents’ home so that Manush could show 
me his jhuggi, which was visibly barren and uninhabited. The jhuggi was in poor shape, but 
Manush said he continued to pay his electric bill every month and refused to rent it to other 
tenants. 
Without the jhuggi, Manush would not have been able to receive a ration card. After the
NFSA was enacted, his mother's old ration card was cancelled because she owned property in an 
area—Manush's current residence—that automatically excluded her from the TPDS. Even though
Manush's jhuggi was located a stone’s throw away from his parents' house, just down the street in
the informal settlement, Pramila and Manush were eligible for a new ration card because their 
little pukka house made them basti-dwellers. Thanks to their unused little jhuggi, Pramila and 
Manush were able to receive a new ration card. 
If a jhuggi can procure a ration card, a ration card can also secure a home. As it stood 
for Manush, the family’s old ration card and jhuggi remained important because both objects 
situated them within the informal settlement as far back as the early 1990s. If the basti is ever 
demolished by the Delhi Development Agency (DDA), their barren jhuggi may help them 
relocate to a government-sponsored resettlement lot. Since the 1990s, the Delhi government has 
tasked the DDA with making Delhi into what D. Asher Ghertner calls a “more beautiful urban 
future . . . [a] world-class city” (2015, 9). The presence of informal settlements, and their 
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residents, was cast as an unfortunate nuisance and obstacle to the realization of this project. The 
DDA was charged with surveying the residents of informal settlements, developing resettlement 
colonies for them, determining the eligibility of basti-dwellers for resettlement lots, and 
destroying informal settlements. Documents were (and still are) key instruments for 
accomplishing this mandate. Ration cards issued since the late 1980s can link the holder to a 
physical address in the city; these rationing document thus enable the DDA to produce 
knowledge on registered basti residents and, incidentally, to enact a biopolitical duty of care for 
registered basti-dwellers. As Ghertner reports, holding an old ration card “confirmed continuous 
occupation of land, giving settlers greater protection against uncompensated eviction” (2015, 53).
In the event that a basti gets bulldozed, therefore, an old ration card holds the power to protect 
the life of the holder and her livelihood. As Pramila told us, “If we don’t have the card, we won’t 
get a place to live here. A card guarantees a jhuggi.” This is precisely why IDs were so important 
to Manush's family. They acted as proof of residence, but also as a safeguard against the 
destruction of almost everything they owned.138
Once back in his parents’ home, Manush led us to his mother’s bedroom, where she 
was napping on one of the beds, wrapped under a fading yellow blanket. Manush picked up a 
white plastic bag from the closet, pulled out a mass of papers, and laid them down on the other 
bed. He handed me a small metallic object, a V. P. Singh token, carefully wrapped in a small 
handkerchief. V. P. Singh was the 7th prime minister of India, who won the general elections of 
1989 at the head of an anti-Congress coalition, called the Nationalist Front, which unified the 
138 Not all of Manush’s neighbours agreed with him. Many feared the destruction of the basti. When entire 
livelihoods are destroyed by the state’s bulldozers, schemes of resettlement fail to successfully relocate entire 
communities. What’s more, many of the basti inhabitants had for decades constructed a life that was, relatively 
speaking, much more comfortable than those in busier and more confined illegal settlements. In addition to 
living in a somewhat quiet space, many women in the basti worked as housemaids and earned decent pay. Yet for
Manush, the destruction of the basti would be seen as an opportunity. 
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forces of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and left-leaning political parties. Singh’s government 
developed a strategy to assemble knowledge of basti-dwelling residents in the country (Ghertner 
2010). While prior surveys had centralized information about land occupation, surveyors under 
Singh were deployed with the task of diagnosing issues of urban encroachment, in order to design
strategies to open a path to urban relocation and self-improvement (Ghertner 2010, 190). In 
exchange for participation in the survey, each household was allocated what came to be called the
“V. P. Singh token.” Initially nailed to the doorframe of a jhuggi, this round metallic object 
granted residents of urban basti a government-issued proof of residence. 
Since that time, Manush had carefully removed his token from the door frame of his 
old jhuggi and treasured it with the rest of his documents. However, without a jhuggi in the basti 
and an adequate ID placing him and his family in the basti as far back as possible, Manush’s V. P.
Singh token would have little worth. The token served as a formal proof of residence, but not as a
form of ID like ration cards. This was precisely why Manush still held onto his old AAY pink 
ration card, along with photocopies of older ration cards dating as far back as 1990. In the winter 
of 2013, a few months before the enactment of the NFSA, Manush’s FPS owner told him that his 
AAY ration card had been cancelled without giving him many more details. Frustrated, he headed
to the local DFSCA field office to enquire about the issue further. He left without much 
explanation. But on the second page of his old AAY ration card, a bureaucrat had written in 
English: “As per computer data bank, this is not a valid ration card.” Following this note are the 
unreadable initials of the officer who wrote it. Manush did not know how to read or write, but he 
understood what the note meant. In addition to preventing him from collecting entitlements at the
FPS, the cancellation of his old AAY ration card put in jeopardy his chances of government-
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sponsored relocation if his jhuggi was ever to be destroyed. 
Given that resettlement lots are limited, according to Manush, holding an old valid 
ration card would grant him a better chance of being resettled. However, since his old AAY ration
card had been inscribed with a message of invalidation by the state, Manush was afraid that it did 
not hold the power it once had. He was afraid that his family would thus be excluded from future 
resettlement schemes. As it stood, his old pink ration card appeared to be a bogus document and, 
accordingly, might not carry the same power in the eyes of the state (Das 2004). Here, the 
inscription of the state mattered, since it was the government’s marks on Manush’s ration card 
that enabled the document—or not—to draw other objects within the realm of welfare assistance 
(Sriraman 2013).
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As a last recourse, Manush decided to address his grievances to the DFSCA in writing. 
Trying to obtain a bogus ration card was out of the question, since only a genuine ration card 
would allow him to partake in future resettlement schemes if his jhuggi got bulldozed. However, 
in his words, “everybody works together to make things really difficult.” First, Manush knocked 
on his MLA’s door to share his concerns, to no avail. Then, since he could not write, he paid a 
friend to type a letter addressed to the DFSCA. In the letter, Manush communicated his level of 
poverty, which should have confirmed, according to him, his absolute need for an AAY ration 
card, despite his propensity to provide for his family by working very hard: “Saahab mein ek 
Illustration 6: Manush's old AAY ration card. It reads: “As per computer database, this is not a valid ration card.”
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gareeb aadmi houn. Mein mehanat mazdouree karake apna tatha apne parivaar paalan pochen 
kar rahaa houn.” In the end, however, he recognized the power dynamics between the 
bureaucratic state and himself and plead for mercy to receive what should have been his in the 
first place: “aapse haath jodkar prarthna hei ki mere raashan kaard par jo bhi kamiyaa hei ouse 
pouri karabaaee jaae aapkee ati krapaa hogee. Dhanyevaada.” 
The letter was sent in March 2013, a month after Manush realized that his card had 
been discontinued. However, he told me he had never heard back from the DFSCA:
Manush: It’s been more than a year and half. When they demolish the jhuggi, it’ll be a 
huge problem!
Guillaume: But you don’t know when. It can take 5 years or 11 years or 30 years. 
Manush: It can break at any time. I have submitted all my papers. 
Guillaume: I am not sure I understand. Maybe they’re just going to destroy the jhuggi and 
then nothing will happen. 
Manush: No, this won’t happen. The card acts like an ID proof. Those who have lived in 
jhuggi for 5-10 years will get a new place. The value is in the card. When the 
jhuggi breaks down, we’ll get a place with the help of the card. The jhuggi in 
itself is of no value, but it could help us to get a bigger place.
Guillaume: So what about the new ration card? Does it replace the old one?
Manush: This [pointing to the new ration card he just received] doesn’t have any value. 
I’ll just get a small place. Plus, you don't get a lot of rations on that, like sugar 
or oil.
This rather cryptic response was clarified later by the pradhan (leader, chef) of the basti. In the 
event of re-location to a government-owned settlement, the basti-dwellers believed that the oldest
cardholders of the basti would be granted priority over newer cardholders. This is why Manush's 
old AAY ration card was so valuable to him: it located him in the basti as far back as 1990, 
amongst the oldest residents of the basti. To him, the old AAY ration card that he had renewed 
every five years acted as a safeguard against the destruction of his home and held the possibility 
of his family’s relocation to an even larger place that would host his mother more comfortably. 
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But since his AAY card had been declared bogus in 2013, it was uncertain whether his old 
rationing document still bore the same power. 
Manush was certain of one thing: his new ration card did not hold the same “material 
embodiments of the right to dwelling” (Das 2011, 327) as his old card had. His new ration card 
authenticated his identity, but so did his aadhaar card, which was, in 2014, much more valued as 
an ID and consequently more widely used by bureaucratic authorities. The new ration cards have 
been designed, allocated, and distributed with the latent purpose of abating alternative uses of 
ration cards. In the aftermath of the TPDS in 1997, the Government of India issued a Control 
Order (2001) with directives regarding the responsibilities of state governments in the economy 
of ration cards of different categories (AAY, APL, BPL; Sriraman 2014). In the Annexe, the 
Control Order states that “ration cards shall not be used as documents of identity” (Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, GoI 2001, 21), thus indicating that ration cards 
“cannot be used for anything other than the withdrawal of rations” (Sriraman 2014, 227). 
In practice, however, the widespread use of ration cards as IDs persisted well into the 
2010s, since no alternative had been made available to large segments of the population, 
particularly people who inhabited spaces in the margins of the city, in basti. With the introduction
of the aadhaar card and the UID technology, among other forms of IDs, alternatives uses of 
ration cards could finally be abrogated. In making the UID technology mandatory for accessing 
welfare entitlements and services, the government ostensibly helped to restrict the use of the new 
ration card to the collection of entitlements alone. In doing so, as Manush argued, the state 
stripped the new ration card of some of the value that the old ration card had. This is especially 
the case when entitlements collected in FPSs are not even good enough for stray dogs.
199
4.6 Concluding Remarks: Tying It Up Together
According to Hull's conceptualization of documentation, ration cards are documents, 
rather than interpretative objects ready to be read by anthropologists, inasmuch as they act as 
“mediators that shape the significance of signs inscribed on them and their relations with the 
objects they refer to” (2012a, 253). Building on Hull in this chapter, I have explored what the 
ration card does in different contexts, examining the kinds of relations and socialities that are 
constituted through the circulation of this rationing document. For Hull (2012b), attending to the 
arrangement of such socialities—or “reassembling [of] the social” as Latour (2005) puts it—is a 
methodological endeavour that allows us to explore the relations between rule, technology, and 
materiality. “Documents,” Hull argues, “are not simply instruments of bureaucratic organizations,
but rather are constitutive of bureaucratic rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, subjectivities, 
objects, outcomes, and even the organizations themselves” (2012a, 253). 
For Hull, paper becomes documents or graphic artifacts once information inscribed on 
it generates a certain agency to draw a range of persons and things within bureaucratic control 
and coordination, which in turn, constitute the scope of action of the bureaucracy. Hull explores 
the question of materiality and bureaucratic power because documents are writable and 
recordable objects that circulate along networks of human and nonhuman actors. Similarly, 
Mathur (2012) and Sharma (2013) examine how documents, and their paper quality, are 
constitutive actors in the making of transparent bureaucratic worlds. However, once in 
circulation, these paper documents are governmentalized, and their scope of action on practices is
confined to bureaucratic proceduralism. The deployment of rights-based legislation depends on 
the ability of the government to generate, to circulate, and to manipulate a vast quantity of paper 
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documents, which in practice as Mathur shows, hinders rather than facilitates the implementation 
of such laws. In this chapter, I built on Hull's methods and Mathur’s and Sharma’s insights to 
investigate how the re-materialization of paper documents into a plastic form may have a distinct 
impact on bureaucratic practices and other socialities historically situated outside of bureaucratic 
rule. More concisely, I examined how the re-materialized ration card shapes, and is shaped by, an 
association of humans and things.
The new ration cards, as I hope to have shown, have helped to rearrange practices of 
ration delivery at the FPS. With the introduction of these cards, government officials have 
affirmed their faith in the idea that human agency is responsible for practices of corruption and 
patronage, a problem that can only be solved with the intervention of nonhuman actors to replace 
human ones. The new ration card was designed to transport the ideals of transparency and 
accountability into the FPSs, but in effect, it has not only distorted these intended effects, it has 
also put the onus of these ideals on cardholders’ shoulders. It is a technology of government that 
enacts realities, makes knowledge, and seeks to create novel yet mundane practices of entitlement
distribution—which in practice, fall short of the purported goals of the NFSA: to secure food 
entitlements and, more generally, improve lives. While it is true that the use of the new ration 
card and PoS machine may well discipline FPS owners to curb practices of patronage during the 
exchange of entitlements, it does not prevent all errors of inclusion or exclusion from access to 
rightful entitlements. In fact, the end-to-end computerization of the TPDS has generated 
systematic exclusions from the system that were nonexistent before the NFSA.
In the economy of the new ration card, the onus of accountability and transparency lies 
primarily with cardholders, rather than with FPS owners or government officials. It is true that in 
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the context of the pilot project, FPS owners are compelled to use the PoS machine. However, 
they do not have to wait in line for days and pay (illegal) fees to submit applications for new 
cards, nor do they have to hand their biometrics over to the state in exchange for welfare services 
and goods. 
One could arguably maintain that the new ration cards can be used as IDs, like the old 
ration cards were. However, as Manush's experiences show, the re-materialized ration cards do 
not simply replace old ones; rather, they alter the ways in which the rationing document can be 
used. While the old ration cards used to embody the “right to dwelling” (Das 2011, 327) and had 
serious implications for basti-dwellers such as Manush, the new ration cards do not mediate the 
same kind of relation, even though they carry the same inscriptions. In its increasing reliance on 
the UID technology, the government seems to have succeeded in taming the ID function of the 
new ration cards, while emphasizing instead the use of aadhaar cards.
That being said, the new ration cards have remained coveted objects in the Indian 
capital. After all, they enable access to the infrastructure of rationing, and many have attempted, 
rightly so, to fully take advantage of their right to food entitlement. The next chapter attempts to 
capture how the bureaucratic procedures deployed to grant access to the re-materialized ration 
cards are fraught with challenges for the empowered bodies the NFSA is seeking to shape.
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Chapter 5: Instruments of Government as Techno-Political Sites:
Towards the Construction of an Association of Humans and Things
In the previous chapter, I framed the ration card as a rationing document that brings 
under the confines of governmental power an association of humans and things. I examined how 
the overhaul of the ration card has reconfigured practices of entitlement collection, as well as 
governmental identification. But to partake in these practices, to collect one’s rations guaranteed 
by the right to food entitlement, one has first to get a hold of one of these mundane, yet coveted, 
rationing documents. This is not a simple task. In this chapter, I ethnographically explore the 
tactics deployed by interlocutors I encountered to successfully navigate the bureaucratic world 
and get what is rightfully theirs—the ration cards and rations guaranteed to them by the right to 
food entitlement.
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the era of neoliberal governmentality, the 
bureaucratic government increasingly relies on nonhuman actors to distribute entitlements to the 
targeted population. To plug leakages and to curb relations of patronage, unique identification 
(UID) technologies have been deployed to discipline human actors to adopt practices of good 
governance. This situation hinders, I showed, rather than facilitates, the collection of entitlements
at fair price shops (FPSs). In this chapter, I push this analysis further. I examine how individuals 
targeted by the National Food Security Act (NFSA) develop strategies to overcome the 
difficulties they face in accessing and manipulating devices to get a hold of a re-materialized 
rationing document. Building on Akhil Gupta’s “production of arbitrariness” (2012, 24), which he
uses to describe bureaucratic practices of welfare that arbitrarily produce detrimental outcomes 
for a segment of the population, I turn my attention to the selection of devices that one must 
203
utilize to get a hold of a rationing document. I show that in the era of neoliberal governmentality, 
these devices are sites of techno-politics in a which technocratic rationality of government is 
enacted.
5.1 Introduction
Early in my fieldwork, I was fortunate enough to meet Govind, the pradhan (leader, 
chief) of a small basti (informal settlement) located in Chandni Chowk, an area of Old Delhi 
known for its tumultuous bazaar (markets). Our mutual friend Kareem, who was affiliated with a 
few non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including Human Rights and Law Network 
(HRLN), and working on issues of urban homelessness, introduced me to Govind. Like most 
people living in the basti, Govind was from Bihar. He migrated to the city to find work in the 
mid-1990s. Comfortably seated in front of a water cooler and a muted television in his jhuggi, 
Govind pulled two cold bottles of soda from his fridge and poured it into three plastic cups. 
Govind was one of the few residents of the basti who owned a fridge. As we chatted, the pradhan
showed me his white ration card, which entitled him to rations at APL rates. However, unlike 
many other APL ration cards, Govind’s ration card was categorized as a temporary Jhuggi Jhopdi
Cluster card, i.e., a ration card distributed to basti residents that must be renewed every six 
months (see Chapter Two, Table 1, for a taxonomy of ration cards). Govind had used it only once.
He had paid an auto-rickshaw driver to take him to a FPS—at a cost of ₹ 100 for the round trip—
only to discover that the shop owner had decided to close that day. From that point onwards, he 
had never gone back. 
When new ration cards were made available by the Department of Food, Supplies, and 
Consumer Affairs (DFSCA) of Delhi after the enactment of the NFSA in 2013, Govind and 
204
Kareem had worked with residents of the basti to fill out ration card applications. However, by 
the time I returned to the basti in early 2015, almost nobody had received their new ration cards. I
saw here an opportunity to help basti residents to assemble their ration card applications and gain
an understanding of bureaucratic procedures in action, while witnessing the challenges that 
residents faced in accessing ration cards or not. Moreover, by supporting their efforts to get cards,
I hoped to build stronger ties with the basti-dwellers. 
I printed a few forms from the DFSCA website and made my way into the basti. The 
first day, on a hot afternoon, I filled out all 20 forms I had brought with me. Among the people I 
met was Prithvi, a tall mother of four who sold enough moonshine to support her family in Delhi 
and her relatives in Bihar. She told us that she planned to go to the DFSCA field office “in a 
group of five” on the following day. Generally speaking, for their forms to be processed by the 
DFSCA, applicants must submit them with proof of their residence and identities. However, 
according to provisions of the NFSA, the DFSCA can grant some of Delhi's most marginalized 
residents—homeless people—the opportunity to apply for ration cards without proof of address. 
The government of Delhi does not recognize jhuggi as formal housing and thus considers those 
who reside in basti to be homeless.139 Identity documents are, however, mandatory. The 
application form for ration cards delineates the required supporting documentation: (a) a “copy of
Aadhar Card of each member;” (b) a “proof of permanent address if different from address on 
Aadhar cards (proof of permanent address is not required for homeless people);” and (c) an 
income certificate (not required for homeless people).140 
139 Given the ambiguous nature of residence in informal settlements (see Ghertner 2015), “homeless” is a 
problematic category. This chapter constitutes an attempt to document how some interlocutors navigate that 
bureaucratic category.
140 The categories of applicants that do not need to provide an income certificate comprise: (i) slum dweller; (ii) 
residents of F, G, and H resettlement colonies; (iii) people living in rural areas; (iv) homeless people; (v) 
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Before we filled out any ration card applications in the basti, my assistant, Ritesh, and I
visited the DFSCA field office on our own to gather more information about the submission 
process. I entered into the large white building and passed beside the metal detector gate, without 
walking through it. The security guard saw me but let me go anyway. We took the stairs up to the 
third floor. I used my smartphone flashlight to illuminate our path down a dark and gloomy 
corridor, passing electrical wires hanging from the ceiling and a series of grimy and abandoned 
workplaces until we reached the DFSCA field office, which was located at the very end of the 
corridor. 
Answers to our questions were given sparingly. We were met by apprehensive food and
supplies officers (FSOs), who answered our questions sparingly. They repeatedly referred us to 
the DFSCA’s main offices in ITO—an area of Delhi named after the Income Tax Office 
buildings, where some government departments are located—for more information. In the end, 
they told us that “homeless” women could apply for ration cards without having to present proof 
of residence or income certificates.
After bringing this news to Prithvi, she invited us to join her and a few other women on
their trip to the DFSCA field office. While waiting for them to get ready, we filled out a few more
application forms. After about an hour, Neelam, another young mother of three, waved at us. She 
had already tried to submit two applications at the DFSCA office, the “ration office,” she said, 
but to no avail. It was time to try again. 
Neelam knew where the office was located, so she took the lead. Prithvi, who was 
transgender people; (vi) people holding certificates under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995; (vii) single 
women; (viii) orphans; (ix) low-income daily-wage workers; and (x) other families whose annual income is 
lower than 1 lakh rupee—about 2,000 CAD. These categories of applicants are relieved from providing an 
income certificate, since they do not typically work in the formal economy and thus do not pay taxes.
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carrying her six-month-old son, sat in a cycle rickshaw with four other women. Neelam shared 
another rickshaw with three other women and two toddlers. Ritesh and I took a third one. Our 
rickshaw wallah (driver) negotiated his way through the congested streets and boulevards of 
Chandni Chowk, and after nearly 40 minutes, we finally reached the ration office. I was thankful 
to Neelam and Prithvi for letting us accompany them, but I insisted that we should not interact on
their behalf with the DFSCA bureaucrats. While I had gladly helped them to fill out their 
application forms, I felt uneasy about submitting their applications for them. Ritesh and I were 
eager to assist them, but we did not seek to take over and cloud over the bureaucratic process. 
When we arrived at the building, a few of the women in our group went to a nearby 
shop to get their aadhaar cards photocopied and acquire mandatory passport-sized photos. We 
waited for a few minutes, under a tree, right next to the parking lot of the multi-storied white 
building. Minutes later, when the women returned, Neelam stood up, fixed her bright green and 
blue synthetic sari on her black shiny hair, and led the group into the ration office. All of the 
women were wearing well-kept sari, which is not always the case in the basti. Ritesh and I 
followed them at a short distance. The women began to climb the few steps up to the public 
entrance of the building, but they were stopped by a middle-aged man who aggressively started to
yell at them. The man, who appeared to be a security guard, refused to let the women pass. From 
where I stood, I could not hear the exchange between him and Neelam, but Prithvi later told me 
what the man said: “Tum logon ki yahan se entry nehin hei. (You people do not enter from this 
entry.)”141 Sweating in his white shirt, the paunchy man urged them to walk around the building 
141 The security guard used the familiar “you” pronoun, tum, rather than the more formal, aap. This could be read as
a sign of disrespect, but in Delhi, it is not unusual to use familiar language with strangers, as opposed to other 
areas of Northern India. However, in this context, my assumption was that the security guard looked on the 
women with contempt.
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to find the side entrance.
The security guard was not the same man who had let me enter without passing 
through the metal detector just a couple days before. As shocking as this experience was for me 
at the time, I had by then learned that this differentiated treatment is not particularly uncommon. 
Being a white male foreigner in New Delhi granted me access to people and places that are 
mundanely inaccessible for most Indians, especially those categorized by the government as 
“homeless women.” 
Obediently, the group of women, again led by Neelam, walked back down the white 
marble steps and began to walk along the side of the building, looking for a second entrance. 
When we reached the edge of the building without finding an open door, Neelam turned around, 
frustrated and determined this time to get through the main entrance. Prithvi, still holding her six-
month-old boy, and the rest of the group followed. This time, the middle-aged security guard was 
nowhere to be seen. Nobody stopped us at the entrance. We all went through the main entrance 
and the metal detector and took the stairs. Some forty steps later, we arrived on the third floor. We
walked down the same murky corridor that I had passed through before and reached the opened 
door of the DFSCA office, on which a white sheet of paper indicated in Hindi that we had arrived
at the “Food and Supplies Department Office.” Still leading the group, Neelam walked towards 
the door but stopped before entering the room, as if invisible red tape prevented her from 
penetrating the bureaucratic space. A few women looked at Ritesh and me. We made a silent 
gesture to encourage them to go in without us. We stayed in the corridor, close to the door, trying 
to record as much information as possible.
The DFSCA field office consisted of a single room of concrete, in which six tables 
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were positioned in a U-shape. Five FSOs occupied the empty room, two of them working busily 
behind their computer screens. A higher-ranked FSO, the inspector, was occupied in giving 
directives to another FSO. The ration card applicants walked in before us, unsure of what to do or
where to go. After what felt like a few minutes, Ritesh and I entered the room and sat on the long 
wooden bench leaning against a pile of broken chairs, right next to the door. Prithvi later told me 
that one of the FSOs asked them if “aaj socha hoga ghum atei hein [today, you thought, let’s go 
for an outing].”142 We remained at a distance from the group as much as possible, until we 
realized that the inspector would not accept any applications that day. According to an internal 
rule that no one else seemed to know, the window for submitting a ration card application fell 
between 10:00 am and 1:00 pm on any business day. After glancing at one application form, the 
inspector gave it back, not without adding that every single application would be processed on 
the condition that the women submitted a photocopy of their aadhaar card and an electricity bill 
as proof of residence. Such proof, or course, was impossible to produce, since none of these 
women’s jhuggi were legally connected to the electrical network. In other words, it seemed that 
even though there was no clear requirement for an electricity bill as proof of residence for basti 
residents, the FSO inserted this requirement, making it next to impossible to get a ration card for 
these women. 
In his book Red Tape, Akhil Gupta (2012) has drawn attention to the ways in which 
knowledge about bureaucratic procedures is disseminated. In an effort to show how governmental
power works, he dismantles the notion of a coherent bureaucratic state apparatus and instead 
urges us to pay attention to the contingencies, inherent chaos, and inconsistencies that pervade the
multiscalar apparatus of bureaucracy (see Weber 1978). Along with debunking the idea that the 
142 The expression does not translate well in English. The intention behind the statement was derogatory.
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state is a unitary and homogeneous entity and the coherence of bureaucracy (Gupta 1995; Gupta 
and Ferguson 1992; Sharma and Gupta 2006), Gupta is particularly interested in the apparent 
contradiction found in the systematic exclusion of a large section of a population targeted by 
welfare benefits and entitlements in a bureaucratic world that arbitrarily dispenses welfare (see 
also Sunder Rajan 2003). In a poignant question, Gupta asks: “Why, among the universe of needy
beneficiaries, do some people manage to receive assistance and others do not?” (2012, 24). The 
answer lies, he argues, in the ways in which the bureaucratic apparatus tends to systematically 
produce arbitrary outcomes, as opposed to consistent ones. Gupta writes: 
In stressing the intimate connection between violence and caring and in  rejecting
narratives of the indifference or inattentiveness of the state, I am trying to articulate
the ethics and politics of care that is arbitrary in its consequences. I am arguing that
such arbitrariness is not itself arbitrary, rather, it is systematically produced by the
very mechanisms that are meant to ameliorate social suffering. (2012, 24)
In situating arbitrariness in systematic bureaucratic mechanisms, Gupta does not blame individual
bureaucrats for the failures of implementation of development projects, which according to him, 
tends to reproduce the colonial perception that natives are incapable of properly implementing 
welfare programs for a wide range of reasons (from corruption to low level of education). 
Instead, Gupta points to the operation of bureaucratic procedures as generative practices of 
structural violence. He argues that within bureaucratic procedures, arbitrary outcomes and 
exclusions from welfare provisions are so widely spread that they appear to be systemic. While I 
agree with Gupta’s point that bureaucrats should not be framed as inherently incompetent state 
officials who work against the systematic inclusion of a population in welfare projects, I do 
however find it crucial to remember that bureaucrats’ sensibilities matter in providing welfare 
services. State officials are gatekeepers of knowledge about bureaucratic procedures. When the 
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DFSCA inspector demanded that Neelam, Prithvi, and the rest of the group come back with more 
documentation, she acted in a cursory manner that could, in the end, exclude these women from 
the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). As a gatekeeper of bureaucratic knowledge, the 
DFSCA inspector knew the documentation requirements for different categories of applicants and
could, therefore, have entertained the possibility that these women did not possess proof of 
residence. Her arbitrary actions and partial dissemination of information and rules could have 
excluded these basti-dwellers from their rightful entitlements.
Prithvi, Neelam, and the rest of the women calmly turned around, prepared to leave the 
bureaucratic space. I, on the other hand, was appalled by the inspector’s behaviour, especially 
since I had taken the time to get information from FSOs working in the same office just a few 
days before. Feeling frustrated and partially responsible, I stormed in and engaged with the 
inspector, perhaps not as composed as I should have been. I burst out in English, and in doing so, 
I mobilized all of my networks of influence, including my white, middle-class, foreign PhD 
candidate status. I angrily invoked the names of other high-ranking officials working in the ITO 
buildings (people I did not know) to conjure a political capital I did not really have. I made the 
case that even though these women did not have an electricity bill because they did not have an 
electric connection, they were entitled to food rations. I mirrored the inspector’s own failures by 
pointing out that these women should be categorized, as per the NFSA, as homeless. In front of 
her own subordinates, I pointed to her arbitrary decision-making in systematically excluding all 
of these women. I claimed she had acted unprofessionally. The NFSA had provisions for 
homeless applications, I told her, and it was her responsibility to ensure that these provisions 
were explicitly communicated and extended to ration card applicants.
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I retreated hastily, feeling first upset and then remorseful. I had not intended to be the 
“white saviour,” but in that moment, I just had to jump in. Behind me, the nine women remained 
in the DFSCA office for a few more minutes. The inspector told them that they could submit their
applications as they were, without proof of residence, but only between 10:00 am and 1:00 pm, as
per the internal ruling. 
The following morning, then, we arrived right on time at 11:15 am. A few other women
had joined us. We went through the metal detector and up to the ration office without any 
incident. The inspector was nowhere to be seen and the application process went smoothly.143 The
group of women sat in front of an FSO, who processed their forms, one after the other. The FSO 
first checked if the photocopies of their aadhaar cards, attached to the submitted forms, 
corresponded to the names of the applicants. Then, at the top of every form, he wrote 
“HOMELESS” in English in capital letters to indicate that the otherwise mandatory proof of 
residence was not required. On the back of each form, the bureaucrat nonchalantly stamped the 
seal of the FSO office. Finally, he mechanically presented a pen to each of the women in front of 
him, who, one after the other, made the thumb print gesture as a way to convey their illiteracy. 
Each woman pushed her thumb on a blue ink pad and apposed her print on the signature line of 
her form. Finally, the FSO tore off the lower part of each form and handed it over to the 
applicant. On this receipt, the date of the application, the thumbprint of the applicant, and another
stamp from the DFSCA office appeared. Most likely, each applicant would store this receipt with 
other important documents in a binder, locked somewhere in her jhuggi. 
For some of these women, this was their third or fourth trip to the DFSCA office to 
143 In Ritesh's notebook, the following is written: “The clerk is less than helpful. But that is the way clerks are.”
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apply for a new ration card. The process went surprisingly well. Within an hour, all women were 
on their way back home, their receipts in hand. According to the Delhi Food Security Portal, 
every single application was approved within two to three weeks. However, by the end of my 
fieldwork, more than six months later, only six of these women actually managed to have in their 
possession a new ration card—and, as I describe later in this chapter, only one of them was able 
to use it at her ascribed FPS. 
In this chapter, I build on the analytics of governmentality used in the anthropological 
literature on development (Bornstein and Sharma 2016; Ferguson 1990; Fuller and Bénéï 2001; 
Li 2007b; Moore 2005; Sharma and Gupta 2006) and delve into encounters between my 
informants and the government to explore how bureaucratic procedures produce and maintain a 
logic of power that perpetuates systematic exclusions from welfare services (Gupta 2012). In the 
previous chapter, I showed how the ration card circulates in different milieus and as it does, 
mediates bureaucratic signs and meanings that are negotiated and contested (see Hull 2012b). As 
I demonstrated in chapter four, the modernization of the TPDS and the re-materialization of the 
ration card have not been implemented with the primary incentive of facilitating people’s access 
to entitlements at FPSs. Instead, they have been designed and deployed with the objective of 
curbing practices of corruption. In this chapter, I argue that the deployment of this project has 
engendered a series of instruments—techno-political sites—that act as gatekeepers in the 
bureaucratic procedures involved in acquiring a ration card. I examine how different instruments 
of government—different devices—are utilized and manipulated to consolidate bureaucratic 
power. In turn, I describe how ration card applicants come to build networks and learn to 
negotiate these devices, which are rather alien to their everyday realities.
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5.2 On Political Society, Negotiations, and Technology
The question I ask here is: how do urban subjects who are entitled to ration cards 
negotiate and navigate their way in the bureaucratic world? I ask this question because the 
navigation of and negotiations within bureaucratic worlds are critical components of the 
implementation of the NFSA. To access their rightful entitlements at FPSs, two thirds of the 
Indian population have to submit applications for ration cards and engage with a series of devices
to get one. This rationing document is thus an important object for the realization of the right to 
food entitlement. Without it, the right to food entitlement for targeted beneficiaries—empowered 
bodies—is meaningless. The entire mechanism of entitlement provision in the TPDS relies 
primarily on the capacity of targeted population members to navigate bureaucratic procedures, 
tame alien devices, and develop tactics to use them for their own benefit. 
In the previous chapter, I briefly mentioned how Manush faced a number of challenges 
in getting his hands on a new ration card and collecting his household's entitlements. Here, I 
describe these bureaucratic procedures ethnographically. The analytics of governmentality 
provide a framework to understand how these procedures are designed to improve well-being of 
populations while generating mundane practices in which inequalities are established, negotiated,
and contested (Gupta 2012). In postcolonial democratic contexts, charged with the colonial 
legacy of exploitation, such ethnographic accounts of neoliberal governmentality are particularly 
insightful because they lead us to question the tensions between the normative nature of 
democratic political systems (imparted with the ethical significance of citizenship and the rule of 
law) and technologies of government that are perceived to be rather apolitical (Ferguson 1990). 
The right to food entitlement relies on this tension. Discursively, claims to entitlements are 
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informed by democratic ideals of social justice and equality (see Drèze and Sen 2013), but their 
material deployments depend on instruments of government that have historically systematically 
produced arbitrary outcomes (Gupta 2012). 
In his influential analysis of modern politics, Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2008, 2011) uses 
this tension to theorize on the modalities of democracy in postcolonial contexts. To do so, 
Chatterjee distinguishes civil society from political society. In his argument, civil society 
personifies the modern values of liberal democracy. In the transition from colonial to postcolonial
India, Chatterjee argues that civil society emerged from a section of the elite class whose 
objectives and activities were, under the British raj, inspired by tactics of civil disobedience. But 
in postcolonial India, with the establishment of the rule of law and democratic procedures, these 
same elites had to incarnate, along with the state institutions that they came to populate, the 
transformative processes of modernity. “[This] modernizing project [became] an expression of 
the will of the people and thus gloriously consistent with the legitimizing norms of modernity 
itself,” Chatterjee argues (2004, 46–47). Thus, civil society’s relations with the government came 
to embody principles of popular sovereignty, democratic action, and equal rights.
As for the rest of the Indian population, it engages with government agencies to secure 
livelihoods, housing, or access to welfare more generally. Chatterjee has famously conceptualized
this segment of the population as “political society”: people who “are only tenuously, and even 
then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the 
constitution. They are not, therefore, proper members of civil society and are not regarded as such
by the institutions of the state,” but as Chatterjee later adds, “. . . they have to be looked after and 
controlled by various governmental agencies” (2004, 38). While civil society enters into a 
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relation with the state apparatus on the terrain of democracy structured by the civic values of 
modernity (equality, freedom, and human rights), political society operates in a mode of 
negotiation or resistance with the Indian project of modernization on a playing field on which the 
legal arm of the state cannot fully regulate and administer political society members’ everyday 
cultural practices (Bhattacharya and Sanyal 2011). In the words of Chaterjee: “Civil society then, 
restricted to a small section of culturally equipped citizens, represents in countries like India the 
high ground of modernity” (2004, 41). Political society members, on the other hand, recognize 
that their everyday “activities are often illegal and contrary to good civic behaviour, but they 
make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right” (Chatterjee 2004, 40). 
This is not to say that the government does not recognize the existence of members of 
political society. It does, but only on an exceptional case-by-case basis, in such a way as to avoid 
fully endorsing their modes of livelihood and habitation, which may transgress the legal 
framework imposed on them. In the era of neoliberal governmentality, according to Chatterjee 
(2004, 2011), members of political society strategize to mediate their relation with the 
government. Albeit contextual and temporary, the spaces of mediation between political society 
and the state are always contingent on the ability of segments of the population to establish a 
working network of actors to influence governmental power in their favour.
It should be noted that the concepts of “civil society” and “political society” have been 
criticized for what they represent—namely, a dichotomous distinction between the lives of high- 
and middle-class urban taxpayers (or law-abiding citizens) and low-class, low-caste, indigenous, 
and other marginalized segments of the population. Amita Baviskar and Nandini Sundar (2008) 
have been particularly critical of this binary division, especially since there is no evidence that 
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members of the government or civil society are actually law-abiding citizens. In fact, there is 
evidence to the contrary, according to Baviskar and Sundar, who suggest that:
generally, it is members of the so-called civil society who break laws with impunity
and who demand that the rules be waived for them, whereas members of political
society strive to become legal, to gain recognition and entitlements from the state.
(2008, 88; see also Ghertner 2008; Ananya Roy 2009)
Baviskar and Sundar capture, rightly so, the aspirations of many members of so-called political 
society to find a space, within the formal rule of law, to also become members of what Chatterjee 
characterizes as civil society, as Manush’s relation to the ration card illustrates (see Chapter 
Four). Perhaps more to the point, in postcolonial contexts such as India, a number of social 
groups belonging to civil and political society have actively participated in social movements, 
even though they may, at times, propose “contending visions of democracy” (Baviskar and 
Sundar 2008, 87; Shah 2008).144 This was particularly evident in the national conventions of the 
Right to Food Campaign (RTFC; see Chapter Three).
Taking note of this critique, I, too, argue that Chatterjee's binary distinction of civil and 
political society forecloses the everyday politics of access to welfare in a rigid model. I contend 
that a close reading of ethnographic material, rather than an inelastic application of Chatterjee's 
concepts onto everyday lives, is more likely to reveal the intricacies of bureaucratic power. Like 
Judith Whitehead's critique of civil and political society, I believe that this binary division should 
be viewed as one of the “analytical, methodological divisions whose shifting boundaries can only
be examined through particular historical/political contexts and constellations of power” (2015, 
671). This being said, I also believe that Chatterjee has developed an intelligible framework to 
144 However, “contending visions of democracy” (Baviskar and Sundar 2008, 87) tend to be silenced in democratic 
constitutional regimes (see Rancière 2005).
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think of the ways in which a bureaucratic government shapes relations with a large section of the 
population under its rule. Keeping in mind the spatial properties of bureaucratic power that tend 
to percolate all the way down into every aspect of everyday activities and practices (Das 2004; 
Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Ferguson and Gupta 2002), I contend that detailed ethnographic 
accounts of the formation of this constellation of power around the techno-politics of instruments 
is necessary. Such an analysis of government enables us to think about the spaces of negotiation 
that members of Chatterjee’s political society repeatedly attempt to produce in their everyday 
lives. 
As has become abundantly clear, thanks to Foucauldian thinkers (Corbridge et al. 2005;
Legg 2007) and ethnographers (Ferguson 1990; Gupta 2012; Li 2007b; Sharma 2006), modern 
governments draw their legitimacy to govern from improving the lives of their populations. 
Technologies of government design and calibrate instruments to do so—instruments that tend to 
render the happiness, health, longevity, needs, productivity, and wants of the population in 
metrological terms, intelligible to governments, planners, and experts. Building on researchers 
interested in the political and social qualities of these metrological instruments (Barry 2002; 
Callon 1998; Mitchell 2005, 2008; Rose 1999), anthropologists have increasingly been interested 
in the politicized role of technology in its broadest sense, both material and symbolic, and have 
most notably highlighted the importance of materiality and infrastructure as vectors of political 
issues (Anand 2009; Hull 2012b; Von Schnitzler 2008, 2013, 2014). These accounts have often 
helped us to reflect on the ways in which infrastructures and devices are assembled in relation to 
the government rationality or the ethics and politics imparted to biopolitical projects (Collier 
2011; Mathur 2012; Sharma 2013; Von Schnitzler 2014, 672). 
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These instruments of government are deployed and manipulated in such a way as to 
shape subjectivities, but they also mediate the formation of association of humans and things. 
According to Matthew Hull, the capacity of these instruments of government to bear some forms 
of power:
depends  on  their  place  within  a  regime  of  authority  and  authentication.  .  .  .
Procedurally correct documents compel compliance not because the documents they
generate supersede the realities they purport to represent, but because . . . bureaucratic
procedures  normatively  embed  documents  in  those  realities.  (2012b,  26;  see  also
Raman 2012)
What ensues, according to Hull, is a methodological opening for ethnographers seeking to 
explore the gap between the power of documents to shape people, things, and places with the 
ways in which these documents are enacted in practice (see Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010). In 
the case that is of interest in this chapter, the gap is even wider. Instruments of government seek 
to shape populations based on reified models of law-abiding citizens entitled to rations of wheat 
and rice, but they require target populations to navigate a maze of alien bureaucratic procedures 
that make the enactment of such models hardly realizable. Of course, it is not impossible for 
individuals to navigate these procedures, but in the era of neoliberal governmentality, they must 
resort to their own means and resources to enact the right to food entitlement. In what follows, 
then, I examine how two instruments of government—the paper form and the phone as 
instruments of authentication—mediate the relations between interlocutors I have encountered 
and the bureaucracy.
5.3 Filling Out Forms: The Application Form as Bureaucratic Mediator
On that hot afternoon when I first met Prithvi, it seemed that she had already given up 
on her chances of receiving a ration card. She had gone twice already to the DFSCA office to no 
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avail and did not want to waste any more of her time. When Ritesh and I sat down to chat with 
her in one of the narrow alleys of the basti, her youngest child cried loudly while his mother aired
her grievances: 
Prithvi: The work wasn't happening. See, the cost of going again and again was too 
much. We had to pay ₹ 200 per day of get there. 
Guillaume: Were you treated well at the office?145 
Prithvi: They didn't mistreat me, but they just asked me to come back tomorrow. I was 
irritated because I had to spend ₹ 200 every time. 
Prithvi had first gone to the DFSCA office with a blank application form that she had obtained 
145 When I listen to the recording of our encounter, I can hear myself fishing for drama of structural violence. 
Rapidly, I learned that the most stunning everyday encounters of structural violence are the ones that can be 
observed, not the ones that can be told.
Illustration 7: A sample of the ration card application form. Source: http://bit.ly/2JHlTQL, last consulted on April 
13, 2018.
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from her local member of the legislative assembly (MLA), a Sikh politician working under the 
Congress banner who was a strong ally of the pradhan and particularly active in dispensing 
services and goods in the basti. The line at the DFSCA office was long, so she had waited her 
turn. After a couple hours, she had been sent back home. During her second visit, Prithvi had 
showed up once again with her blank application form. Prithvi was illiterate; she had thus 
assumed that the FSO would help her fill out her form. But when it was her turn to submit her 
application, the official had realized that the form was blank and had asked her to come back 
another day, after her application form had been duly filled out. In frustration, she had torn the 
blank form apart in front of the bureaucrat. “They said that if you don't want to make it [submit 
an application for a ration card], then don't do it,” she told me. She added: 
See, it was too crowded. I had waited for hours in the queue. There were many people
behind me, and maybe five people ahead of me. They told everybody to come back
another day. That's why I tore up the form.146 
Unlike the DFSCA office in which she had torn up her application form, the basti was a
place where Prithvi's wit served her well. She had been living in New Delhi her whole life. In 
2009, just before the Commonwealth Games, the Delhi Development Agency had destroyed 
Prithvi’s entire basti, which had been built on both sides of the train track leading up to Agra and 
the Taj Mahal. Prithvi and about 250 other basti-dwellers had relocated a stone’s throw away 
from where she had spent most of her adult life. Now in her mid-30s, Prithvi was a tall women 
with piercing eyes and a loud laugh. The “homeless” woman spent her days around her recently 
built jhuggi, feeding her toddler and handing away small bottles of moonshine made out of 
146 Thanks to their small business, Prithvi and Avinash made a relatively decent living and could easily survive 
without drawing their entitlements from the FPS. That probably explains why Prithvi was not ready to waste 
more than two days at the DFSCA office to submit her application. That being said, the ration card would still 
serve as a useful identification document for her basti-dwelling family. Prithvi had been rebuked by bureaucratic
processes that were alien to her everyday world, but not by the idea of having entitlements per se. Plus, even if 
Prithvi did not want to draw rations from the TPDS, she was entitled to a ration card. 
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oranges, called narangua, to anyone seeking a taste. Her husband, Avinash, also worked full time 
with Prithvi to trade moonshine when he was not busy drinking with customers. 
While managing her illegal business, hidden in the maze of alleys of the basti, Prithvi 
had dealt with all kinds of customers, from dawn to dusk every day. Again and again, she had 
frowned and shouted at drunk men twice her size, driving them away. She used to hide crates of 
narangua in her home under old blankets she had received years ago from an NGO operating in 
the settlement. A couple months before I met her, she had been caught by police officers, who 
found three crates of narangua in her jhuggi. Police officers regularly toured the basti and did not
hesitate to enter anybody’s jhuggi. That day, Avinash had gotten into a loud argument with a 
passer-by, and police officers had intervened. In retaliation, the officers raided Prithvi’s home and
caught her red-handed. They arrested her and sent her to prison, where she spent a few weeks 
with her newborn child. While she was in prison, her husband, along with other people involved 
in the narangua trade, built a pakka jhuggi (a solid temporary house made out of bricks) hidden 
under layers of black and blue tarpaulin, in which they stored behind a locked door all the crates 
of narangua. Avinash also renovated their kachcha jhuggi (temporary housing made out of 
diverse materials). Relatively spacious and built out of bright red brick, Avinash and Prithvi’s 
new pakka jhuggi was much more comfortable than average, but it got smoky very quickly when 
Prithvi lit fires to cook meals. 
Her run-in with the police had not stopped Prithvi from running her narangua trade. 
When we met, it was quite common for us to be interrupted by customers who handed Prithvi 
two ten-rupee bills. She would look around carefully, fish a bottle of narangua from an empty 
black water tank that was always sitting nearby, hidden away from police sight, and hand the 
222
bottle to the customer. She was a mother of four, but in the eight months that I spent in the basti, I
only met her youngest child, who at the time was six months old. Prithvi had been living in Delhi 
most of her life, but she periodically travelled to Bihar. Her three older children—who were 
seven, eight, and ten years old—lived with relatives and went to school in Bihar because, 
according to Prithvi, “once you study in Bihar, you won't face any problem elsewhere, like 
Delhi.” Like many other mothers living in the basti, Prithvi sent her children away from the Delhi
settlement, which they considered to be prone to petty or more significant crime, alcohol and 
drug consumption, child abduction, and tuberculosis and other viral infections. Plus, for basti-
dwellers such as Prithvi, sending children to a government school in Delhi required an 
assemblage of identification documents that were not readily available.
Prithvi had not known how to get a new ration card, let alone fill out her application 
form. The “knowledge had not reached her.” Before he was defeated in state legislative elections 
in February 2015, her MLA used to dispense information, material, and knowledge on 
bureaucratic processes to the pradhan and basti inhabitants to help them access welfare. After the
enactment of the NFSA, the MLA and other actors, such as Kareem and other NGO workers, had 
distributed blank ration card applications, but they had not assisted her in filling one out. Like 
most of her neighbours, Prithvi could not read. Illiteracy is pretty much the norm in Delhi’s basti,
and oftentimes, illiterate people reach out to authority figures, such as NGO workers, the local 
MLA, or the pradhan, to get application forms filled out. However, since Prithvi’s MLA had 
recently lost his election, if there was no NGO worker around, stumbling into the basti with a 
bunch of application forms, getting one filled out had seemed to demand a Sisyphean effort. 
As Prithvi stood up to take her leave, I offered to bring her an application form and to 
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help her fill it out. She took my empty plastic cup of chai and threw it on a pile of trash around 
the corner of her jhuggi. In Hindi, I asked: “How many forms should I bring? Five or six?” She 
surprised me with her answer: “Many people would need the forms. Get at least 100 forms 
whenever you bring them from. Otherwise other people will take the forms and I won't be able to 
get it. Because there would be a big crowd and everybody would try to have the form.” 
5.3.1 “The Myth of Voluntariness”
The ration card application form consists of a recto-verso page, divided into three 
sections. On the upper part of the paper form, nine fields help bureaucrats to categorize the 
applicant: (1) old ration card number (if available); (2) mobile number; (3) complete name of the 
head of the household; (4) form number; (5) nationality; (6) occupation; (7) complete address; (8)
monthly income; and (9) category of population. In the upper right-hand corner of the form, a 
square box indicates where the applicant’s passport picture must be stuck. Prominent on the form 
are the fields for the applicant’s name and picture, which are clear markers of identity, followed 
by questions about previous ration card numbers, nationality, address, occupation, and household 
income, which evoke class status. Finally, a phone number is required for every application. 
The second section of the form includes a table where the applicant is instructed to list 
the names of household members that will appear on the card. In this table, the applicant provides
the following information for every person living under the same roof as them who is eligible for 
rations: (a) name; (b) sex; (c) date of birth; (d) name of mother; (e) name of father; (f) head of the
household (mukhiya se sambamdh); and (g) unique identification number (UID).147 Under the 
NFSA, the eldest female is automatically deemed to be the head of the household to which each 
147 I retrieved this information from the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) website, uidai.gov.in, last 
accessed January 6, 2016. 
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new ration card is allocated; however, each female applicant must provide the name of either her 
father or husband, a marker of institutional patriarchy and normalized heterosexual marriage.148 It
is through the tabular information provided in this table that the volume of subsidized food to be 
allocated to each ration card holder is determined. In addition to the eldest women of the 
household with a UID number, every additional member holding a UID number grants the 
household an additional 5 kg of rations. The third section of the form is the detachable receipt on 
which the applicant’s signature (or thumb print) and the seal of the government legitimize and 
authenticate the application. 
If finding the form seemed like an impossible task for Prithvi, it was a rather easy one 
for me. Forms were available online, on the DFSCA website, hidden behind a maze of 
hyperlinks. To locate the pdf document, two skills (in addition to a bit of luck) were crucial: 
being literate and being e-literate.149 These two abilities are often taken for granted by (most) 
members of civil society, but for basti-dwellers like Prithvi, writing words, let alone decoding 
them, renders navigation into the bureaucratic world arduous. To get a form, Prithvi had to rely 
on the formation of an association of humans and things, of which I was a part. 
There were two different forms available for download. The first one, as I described 
above, requires the applicant to submit a UID number to be granted food entitlements. The 
second one, much more inconspicuously located on the DFSCA website, enables the applicant to 
submit any other identification document other than the UID with their ration card application. I 
had never heard of an application for a ration card in the National Capital Territory (NCT) that 
148 As Gupta concisely argues: “the requirement that any application submitted by a women to a bureaucratic office 
contain, for purposes of identification, the name of either her father or her husband, institutionalizes the 
patriarchal order and normalizes heterosexual marriage” (2012, 25; see also Das 1996).
149 E-literacy, or digital literacy, refers to the ability that one has to access and navigate the Internet.
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did not require the provision of an UID number. Curious, then, I printed 20 copies of the first 
application form for the basti-dwellers and only one of the second form. The following day, I 
headed straight to the DFSCA office in Chandni Chowk with my 21 forms in hand to inquire 
further on the bureaucratic validity of a ration card application that did not require the UID 
number.
Since the enactment of the NFSA in 2013, the governmental use of the aadhaar card, 
the UID number, has been raised as a political issue. On the one hand, governmental officials 
have supported the use of a universal form of identity document that was purposefully designed 
to eliminate “fake” documentation, to enable the mobility of identification documents across state
borders, and to create an online database of Indian residence. Created to “empower” the 
population, the aadhaar system grants a unique number to every Indian. To receive a number, 
one has to submit biometrics, such as retina scans and fingerprints to eliminate possible 
duplications of UID—and thus the production of fake aadhaar numbers (Ramanathan 2011). To 
oversee the deployment of the aadhaar project, the Unique Identification Authority of India 
(UIDAI) was founded in 2009, and the first UID was issued in September 2010. Six years later, 
in September 2016, 1.05 billion aadhaar cards had been issued (NDTV 2016). 
The driving force behind the aadhaar card project was Nandan Nilekani, a famous 
technocrat-cum-businessman and co-founder of Infosys,150 who was the chairman of UIDAI from
2009 until 2014.151 Nilekani strongly defended the aadhaar project because, compared to Western
countries, IDs are more difficult to access in India, and those IDs that do exist do not necessarily 
150 Infosys is an Indian multinational corporation that offers consulting services on information technology and 
outsourcing.
151 Nilekani quit his position in 2014 to run in the general election of 2014 under the banner of the Congress. He 
lost.
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extend to a large portion of the population. At the International Federation for Information 
Processing Conference (IFIP) held in Bangalore in 2013, Nilekani said: 
[W]ith  the  increasing  mobility  of  people,  their  aspiration,  people  moving  from
villages to cities, . . . lack of identities [identification documents] actually become a
huge bottleneck for the future because without ID, they [people without IDs] can't
really do anything: they can't get a job, they can't get admission [in schools], they
can't get their entitlements, they can't open their bank accounts. . . . So fundamentally,
ID creates a divide between, sort of, the people with IDs and the people without ID.
And as I said, the people without IDs run into hundreds of million of people; it's not a
small number. So the challenge was: how do we bring all these people who were left
out from an ID perspective into a formal system? Into a formal society? . . . and give
them an ID to start and then, they get on with other things in their life.152
152 Nilekani pronounced these words in 2013, at the IFIP 8.6 Conference at the Indian Institute of Management of 
Illustration 8: The much more unusual application form which did not require an aadhaar card (and thus a unique 
identification number). It reads:"Oun Abhyathriyon ke liye jo aadhaar card number nehin dena chaahaten [For those
who do not want to give their aadhaar card number]." Source: http://bit.ly/2HhH1id, last consulted on April 13, 
2018.
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For Nilekani, the aadhaar project—distributing aadhaar cards throughout the entire population 
so that each and every single Indian, poor or wealthy, can possess a UID number—is, in and of 
itself, generative of upward mobility. This line of argument is questionable. In fact, the wide 
acceptance of the aadhaar card by the population rests on the fact that holding a UID number is 
conditional to accessing a large ensemble of governmental and non-governmental services, such 
as opening a bank account, obtaining a phone number, or getting a ration card. To argue that the 
aadhaar card engineers modalities of upward mobility is to skip over the obstacles that one needs
to traverse to successfully manipulate instruments of government, as my argument in this chapter 
demonstrates.
Critics have vehemently voiced their concerns about the en masse collection of 
biometrics (retina scans and fingerprints), from Indians and foreigners alike, that are demanded in
exchange for UID numbers (Abraham and Rajadhyaksha 2015; Drèze and Khera 2015; Khera 
2017; Masiero 2017).153 Nilekani initially introduced the aadhaar project to the Indian population
as a non-mandatory program. However, after the enactment of the NFSA, government agencies 
quickly made the delivery of welfare services conditional on the presentation of a photocopy of 
an aadhaar card as proof of identity, a phenomenon that legal scholar Usha Ramanathan calls 
“the myth of voluntariness” (2011). Ramanathan, who has over the years become a vocal critique 
of the aadhaar project, writes about the myth of voluntariness: 
the compulsion will not come from the UIDAI, but other agencies may demand that a
person must have a UID number to be provided a service. Banks, for instance, may
make UID a prerequisite to opening, or maintaining, accounts. . . . Or to be entitled to
a  BPL [below poverty  line]  card.  And  so  on.  Voluntarism is  not  a  norm that  is
Bangalore (available at youtu.be/OH9TYU4RoVA?t=2m20s, accessed October 14, 2016).
153 In fact, what made these identification numbers unique—as in “unique identification”—was precisely their 
association with a single set of biometrics. 
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compatible with the unrelenting ambition of the UID to have universal enrolment.
(2011)
On three occasions, in September 2013, March 2014, and March 2015, the Supreme Court of 
India has ruled on this myth of voluntariness by ordering government agencies to bring an end to 
their use of the UID as mandatory for the dispensation of welfare services and entitlements. More
precisely, the Supreme Court has issued an interim order, in which it provided directions on the 
voluntary use of the UID. Ramanathan clearly lists these directions for us: 
One,  “it  is  not  mandatory  for  a  citizen  to  obtain  an  Aadhaar card.”  Two,  “the
production of an  Aadhaar card will  not be a condition for obtaining any benefits
otherwise due to a citizen.” Three, “the UID number or the Aadhaar card will not be
used by the respondents (which includes the UIDAI and the various departments of
the government including the Census Commissioner and the Election Commission, as
also state governments) for any purpose other than the public distribution scheme and
in particular  for  the  purpose of  distributing  foodgrains  and cooking fuel,  such as
kerosene.” Finally, the “Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG
[liquefied petroleum gas] distribution scheme.” (2015)
As Ramanathan reports, there were two exceptions presented in the court’s interim order: the 
TPDS and the distribution of cooking fuel. These exceptions were premised on the court’s idea 
that “91% of the population had already been enrolled on the UID database and that it was useful 
in reducing leakages in service delivery” (2015). Yet one could legitimately argue, as 
Ramanathan does, that the large coverage of the aadhaar card has arisen due to the fact that 
possessing the card has been made mandatory to access welfare services and entitlements. The 
distribution of new ration cards, in the aftermath of the NFSA, has certainly contributed to the 
widespread adoption of the aadhaar card by a large section of the targeted population—67% of 
the total Indian population to be specific.
For three years, between 2013 and 2015, the Supreme Court repeatedly ordered 
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government agencies to refrain from making the aadhaar card mandatory for accessing welfare; 
however, in practice, the Delhi government has rolled out the end-to-end computerization of the 
TPDS with the UID used as the key instrument for monitoring the exchange of rations. For 
governmental officials, the court’s interim order has given credence to the bureaucratic uses of 
the aadhaar card for the distribution of ration cards. Over the course of my fieldwork, I visited 
the DFSCA on several occasions to acquire a letter that would allow me to conduct research in 
the DFSCA field offices. I never received the authorization to do so in the field office of my 
choice, but I often leapt at the occasion to discuss with the Assistant Commissioner (AC) issues 
related to the TPDS. During one of these meetings, one AC proudly told me over green tea that 
the UID technology and its association with biometrics have helped to eliminate close to one 
million fake ration cards across Delhi (see also Pandey 2014). Needless to say, given the paranoia
over counterfeit cards and free rides, it seemed that the elimination of “bogus” cards—which is to
say cards that are not genuine, or fake ration cards—also extended to “bogus” people—the poor, 
the basti-dwellers, the migrant workers, which is to say urban residents without formal IDs—
whom the AC and the state deemed to be less worthy of welfare. 
For that reason, in the Spring of 2015, I was quite surprised to find a ration card 
application form that did not require a UID number on the DFSCA website. I had my doubts 
about the legitimacy of the form. Rather than using it right away in the basti, I visited the DFSCA
field office in Chandni Chowk to ask an FSO if they would process such a form. The senior FSO,
seated behind an empty table, received me nicely but was extremely uncomfortable about 
answering my questions. I explained to him that I had downloaded the form from the DFSCA 
website and wondered if it was valid. I slid the form across the table. After quickly glancing at it, 
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the officer said:
No,  no,  there is  no such thing.  The form that  is  [accepted]  here  is  the same for
everyone, whether the person is homeless or has a family or a flat. The conditions
have  been  laid  out.  So  read  this  and  on  the  basis  of  it,  if  you  come  under  the
conditions, you can apply for it [a new ration card]. 
The form was still on the table. Casually, the FSO pointed to the lower portion of the form, where
criteria of inclusion and exclusion were listed. My assistant grasped it, turned it around on the 
table, and read the third line of the header. In Hindi, he said: “Sir, here it is written: Oun 
Abhyathriyon ke liye jo aadhaar card number nehin dena chaahaten [For those who do not want 
to give their aadhaar card number].” Clearly, the form was intended for people who did not wish 
to enrol in the aadhaar project. For instance, for families with young children, this form could 
provide a useful pathway to accessing full entitlements for their household, since children three-
years old or less were not given an aadhaar card because, as I explained in Chapter Four, their 
fingerprints were too small to be detected by the scanner. Adults who did not have a UID, but had
other identification documents, such as the voter ID distributed widely in preparation for the 
general election of 2014, could also more easily enrol in the TPDS with this form. The FSO 
replied: “These are formalities. This is a circumstance for people who do not have aadhaar cards.
But the [ration card] will not come.” He concluded, “we may accept this form,” without failing to
add, however, that, “the computer will not upload it.” 
In addition to confirming the futility of using the second form, the FSO’s response shed
light on Ramanathan's (2011) “myth of voluntariness.” The aadhaar project may well be non-
mandatory in and of itself, but getting an aadhaar card, and thus a UID number, is a prerequisite 
to exercise one's right to food entitlement. Interestingly, the FSO also highlighted the technocratic
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function of “the computer” as a critical actor in the “production of arbitrariness” by the modern 
Indian bureaucracy (see Gupta 2012; see also Herzfeld 1993). In bureaucratic parlance, “the 
computer” often constitutes the first line of defence of bureaucrats against grievances and 
accusations of unfair treatment. Described by Gupta (2012) as systematic and methodological 
discrimination against large sections of the population, the production of arbitrariness generated 
by “the computer” is often exogenous to the interaction of human agents within bureaucratic 
worlds. It is relegated to processes that are out of an FSO’s control, by an insensitive machine 
meshing with a bureaucratic apparatus, which is otherwise quite fair in its treatment, since it is 
systematically prejudiced against a large section of the population in the exact same way.
5.3.2 Filling Out Application Forms
Soon after my meeting with the FSO, I was back in the basti with the 20 forms that 
could be processed by “the computer” in hand. I did not expect that my conversation with Prithvi,
described above, around chai on that hot afternoon, which ended in a candid suggestion, would 
position me in the basti as a (rather unsuccessful) ration card provider. These applications did 
open up an unexpected space of ethnographic investigation into bureaucratic practices of 
inclusion and exclusion of welfare services that I would not have been able to explore otherwise.
Sita was the first woman who asked us to fill out her ration card form. She lived at the 
entrance of the basti and conducted, just like Prithvi, a profitable moonshine business. Compared 
to Prithvi’s home, however, the location of Sita’s jhuggi made it more accessible to anyone who 
wanted to buy her moonshine without having to wander through the narrow lanes of the informal 
settlement. Everybody knew, including police officers, that Sita participated in the moonshine 
trade. She ran the business with her husband, Ram. Both in their early 30s, they had been married
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for over a decade in a love marriage, as opposed to the prevalent arranged marriage that many 
entered, and they had two young sons together. While Sita and Ram shared similar physical 
appearances—small in stature, bony cheeked, large smiles—their tempers were radically 
different. While Ram was quiet and composed, Sita was hot-tempered and did not let anybody 
step on her toes.
When we told Sita that we would need the UID numbers of her husband and two 
children to fill out her application form, she invited us into her home. She had submitted an 
application for a new ration card months before, but she had never heard back from the DFSCA. 
Tired of waiting, like everybody else, she was ready to go through the bureaucratic procedure 
once again. We sat down in the corner of her jhuggi on a purple carpet. She unlocked the large 
coffer located under a brand-new TV that was still covered in plastic wrap. She looked through 
what appeared to be winter blankets and other warm clothes for a while and found a transparent 
plastic folder. From inside the folder, Sita handed over two carefully folded receipts. She had 
received them when she had tried to get a UID number for her young sons.154 While she had 
aadhaar cards in her possession for herself and her husband, she had never received cards for her
sons. 
I used my smartphone to check the online UIDAI portal, where we discovered that only
one of her son's UIDs had been granted. She had never heard from the UIDAI regarding her first 
son’s submission, nor had she ever received information regarding the denied application for her 
second son. I filled out the ration card application form for Sita in English, using the three UID 
numbers she had for herself, her husband, and one of her sons. Without her second son’s UID 
154 The enrolment number can be used to download the aadhaar card from the UIDAI portal, provided that the 
applicant still possesses the same phone number used at the time of the submission.
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number, Sita would receive only 75% of her rightful monthly entitlements. Other than that issue, 
filling out her application form was exceptionally easy because she and her husband had had the 
same phone number for years; their names had been used consistently without any spelling 
mistakes; their dates of birth matched across the different pieces of ID they owned (they were 
both officially born on January 1,155 like many other residents of Delhi); and perhaps more 
importantly, Sita watched the news every day—the TV was always on—and she had kept herself 
informed and had ensured that her family members possessed various bureaucratic documents 
that they could or should acquire, whenever possible. 
However, all of her good intentions could not prevent institutionalized errors. In Delhi, 
since the deployment of the aadhaar project began, UIDAI employees have refused to take the 
prints of young children under the age of three years old. Sita had lined up with her young 
children a few years ago, in a run-down room adjacent to the post office, where she was told that 
the fingerprints of her youngest were too small to be picked up by the device. She had insisted 
that it be done anyways. The clerk had finally agreed, according to her story, but in the end, “the 
computer” had not computed the data.156 She had known that her son's receipt was not for a 
genuine UID, since the difference between that receipt and the aadhaar card (on which the UID 
is inscribed) was quite equivocal. However, she had placed hopes in the salience of the receipt, 
since it had been printed from what appeared to be a governmental document. Once completed, I 
gave Sita her application form, which she carefully slid into her plastic binder and locked back in 
the coffer. 
155 Many basti-dwellers do not know their birthday. When they apply for bureaucratic documents, officers register 
their birthdate as January 1. As a result, from a bureaucratic perspective, an unreasonable proportion of the 
population is born on January 1, including Sita and Ram.
156 I insert “the computer” within quotation marks to illustrate how the state official relied on “the computer” and 
technology to explain the shortcomings of the welfare system.
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We found Prithvi later that day. By then, we had already filled out almost all of the 20 
paper forms that I had brought with me.157 Like we did with other women, Ritesh and I began by 
listing the exclusion criteria included in NFSA provisions:
Guillaume: I am a citizen of India. It means you are a resident of this country . . .
Ritesh: I and the mentioned members permanently reside in Delhi . . . and these names 
do not have a ration card of Delhi or any other state . . . No member of my 
family pays income tax . . . None of your family members has a fixed job . . .
Guillaume: Like working for a company or government?
Prithvi: No, nothing like that.
Ritesh: No member of my family owns land or home in MCD (Municipal Corporation 
of Delhi) A to E colonies.158
Prithvi: No.159
Ritesh: No member of my family gets rations under any other government scheme.
Prithvi: None of this is wrong.
Ritesh: None of us is a government servant?
Prithvi: No.
Note here how Prithvi answered “no” to each of the exclusion criteria listed. During his fieldwork
with London’s homeless community, anthropologist Josh Burraway received similar answers 
when he helped homeless people to fill out a Job Seeker Allowance form, a two-page 
questionnaire of yes-or-no questions. Burraway quickly realized that homeless Londoners filling 
out forms, just like Prithvi in Delhi, were reduced by bureaucratic practices “to an easily 
docketed language of synecdoche” (2015). Bureaucracy produced what Burraway called the no-
person: no to earning money in the formal economy; no to having a formal or governmental job; 
no to owning land; no to a house; no to having a ration card; no to paying income tax; no to being
157 I mundanely did so without recording my interactions with the previous applicants, who were almost all women. 
I simply intended to reach out to these women, to introduce myself and my research, and to ease my way into 
their everyday lives. 
158 As previously stated, the National Capital Territory (NCT) is divided into eight different categories of residential
colonies, from A to H, classified according to the real estate property rates in New Delhi.
159 To this day, I wonder if Prithvi knew what the categories of different colonies were. I doubt it.
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able to read; no to having time and money to wait for days at the FSO; and no to trusting the state
to hand over entitlements.160 Just like Burraway’s experience with interlocutors, I found asking 
the list of questions quite uncomfortable. It was a humiliating process that Prithvi had to endure 
every time she filled out these forms fashioned by the bureaucratic state, no matter what benefit 
she was applying for. For illiterate people, filling out these forms also requires the vocalization of
every way that various structures of power have worked on them and left them with few 
economic opportunities, let alone a formal job or a formal housing facility. The paper forms 
seemed to shape Prithvi as an object of welfare, a no-person of India, a member of Chatterjee’s 
political society. 
With her aadhaar card in hand, we filled out most of the form in silence. Prithvi had 
also brought her voter ID, just in case. According to the voter ID, Prithvi was 37 years old, but 
according to her UID card, she was born on January 1, 1984, which at the time would make her 
31 years old. Since a copy of the UID document would be appended to the paper form, we chose 
to stay as close as possible to the information found on her aadhaar card. “Prithvi, what is your 
occupation? Your job?” She did not hesitate: “Selling pulses, masala . . .” She then talked in 
Bihari with other women around her, before adding: “We don't put up shop daily. Only on 
Sundays. We sell masala.” Prithvi was lying. She had not sold spices in years, if she had ever 
done so, but she could not tell us, nor the bureaucratic state, that she made a living illegally by 
selling moonshine. Regarding her household's income, another question on the form, she 
remained as evasive as possible: “My income? I can tell you my savings!” Like several other 
basti-dwellers in the Indian capital, Prithvi was an entrepreneur. Most of her profits were 
160 I borrow this stylistic alliteration from Burraway’s blog post: “In their case, almost every answer they gave was 
‘No.’ No to having a partner, No to having a bank account, No to having a higher education, No to having any 
savings, No to having a place of residence” (2015).
236
reinvested to pursue her economic activities and intricately meshed with everyday expenses: she 
had to, of course, buy the moonshine, pay a fee to the moonshine mafia (for lack of a better term),
bribe police officers, send remittances to Bihar, and buy food and other treats for her family. 
Whether it is selling spices, vegetables, or moonshine, or exchanging labour in return 
for daily wages, these practices enable the no-person to find their place in the capital (see Sethi 
2011) by bargaining with a range of services and commodities to maintain their position in the 
city (Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008). They make do, and as they do so, they take part in an intricate 
urban landscape that forges their aspirations of social mobility yet systematically entrenches them
in financial paucity (Baviskar and Ray 2011). Being on the street—whether it is to sell freshly cut
cucumbers sprinkled with masala, or to sort out spices under the harsh sun of May, or to hand out 
a bottle of booze—is costly and risky for hawkers who compete for space both among themselves
and with the state (Bayat 1997; Legg 2007; Shapiro Anjaria 2011, 2016), with little to no margin 
for error. Prithvi's illegal business abode by the same principles as most, with the difference that 
her customer base had an addiction to her goods. Her household was able to survive thanks to her
business, but she constantly had to adopt strategies to overcome the fact that she was, in the eyes 
of the state, not only a no-person, but also one that practiced frowned-upon economic activities. 
People who are active in the “formal economy” may enable institutional strategies to coerce and 
limit economic activities taking place in the “informal economy” (Bourdieu 1979; Chatterjee 
2011),161 leaving very few opportunities for social mobility to the no-person. 
After exchanging a few words in Bihari with her husband, Prithvi confirmed her 
161 Following Keith Hart, I too argue that the concept of “informal economy” is inadequate to empirically describe 
the complexities that characterize economic activities framed by the rules, values, and conventions of the 
modern state (see Davis 2006; Hart 1973; Hart, Laville, and Cattani 2010). Here, however, I am using these 
concepts to illustrate how they can be used to make sense of Prithvi's economic activities as part of the 
bureaucratic process to claim her entitlements.
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household's revenue: “My husband does not work. But if we put ₹ 5,000 [in buying moonshine], 
we get a ₹ 1,000 profit (every week).” A thousand rupees a week is not much when one considers 
that a phone bill—an essential commodity to receive a ration card—costs at least ₹ 250 every 
month. For a family of three, a meal consisting of a portion of rice and one of curry would cost 
anywhere between ₹ 40 and 100, including the wood bought to cook the food. If there were 
leftovers, they would get eaten around 11:00 am on the following day. “OK then,” I told Prithvi. 
“Let's write ₹ 3,000 a month then, just to be safe.” In theory, a yearly income of less than ₹ 
100,000 grants a ration card.
When the time came to fill out the second part of the form, the one that lists the names 
of household members holding a UID number and correspondingly determines the quantity of 
monthly entitlements to be allocated, we asked Prithvi to give us the UID numbers of the other 
members of her household. She did not have them. Her husband always thought that getting an 
aadhaar card was a waste of time, her toddler was too young to get one, and the rest of her 
children were living in Bihar; they may have had UID numbers, but Prithvi did not have a copy 
of their aadhaar cards with her. “Who is the eldest woman of your family?” Ritesh then asked. 
Since the NFSA christens the eldest woman in the household as the cardholder, we tried to see if 
we could add any other members to Prithvi’s household to maximize her monthly entitlements. 
Prithvi: My mother-in-law...
Guillaume: Does she have an aadhaar card? 
Prithvi: No, she does not live in Delhi. She lives in the village.
Ritesh: No, no . . . who is the elder women living with you, here in Delhi?
Prithvi: Myself.
Prithvi looked confused, and so was I. Household compositions are fluid in the capital. Some 
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migrant workers tend to go back and forth between what they identify as home during the winter 
and fall to help their family harvest crops. Others, like Prithvi, send monthly remittances home so
that their children can be fed, clothed, sent to school, and taken care of, far away from Delhi’s 
basti. Many migrant workers162 rent shared rooms; others sleep on their cycle rickshaws, on their 
cart, or simply on the sidewalk, wrapped in blankets, a few months a year or all year round. 
Prithvi did have a roof over her head, and she had been living in the same jhuggi since 2009. 
However, despite the apparent household stability, the composition of her household still varied 
depending on the time of the year. Relatives showed up to her home from time to time to take 
their chances at making a living in the capital. When that happened, Prithvi fed them. She also 
cooked for her parents who lived just in front of her jhuggi. 
To complete the form, I asked for Prithvi’s phone number. She asked her husband to 
give her their old Nokia mobile phone, which was powered off to save the battery. She turned it 
on and, after a minute, she handed it to me, showing me the number on the screen. Without 
thinking too much about it, I wrote the number on the form and gave it back to Prithvi. We 
exchanged a few words and planned to go to the DFSCA office, as I described in the introduction 
of this chapter. Over the months that followed, I filled out a number of applications for other 
households. I always had a few forms on me as a way to introduce myself and my research. On 
these occasions, we developed a number of ways to communicate the applicant's phone number. 
Some would show it to me on their phone, just like Prithvi had done. Some would call me. Others
would have it written down on a piece of paper by their children who attended governmental 
schools. It took me quite a while to realize that many of these women, unable to write a word, 
162 “Migrant workers” is a rather analytical and bureaucratic category that is porous, since it encompasses both 
people who travel for work seasonally and those who have been living in the city for most of their lives but still 
feel like they belong to their home state. 
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could not read or write numbers either—and therefore rely on their husbands, children, relatives, 
or friends to use a telephone, let alone to fill out a governmental form that relies on the cellular 
phone number as a technology of identity. 
When a mobile phone number is registered on an application form for a ration card, it is
used as a security measure to ensure the identity of the applicant who seeks to access her 
information online. In practice, for many basti-dwellers, this had historically had few 
implications for the enrolment process, since many of them did not possess a stable phone 
number, let alone a computer or the ability to navigate the Internet. In fact, on several occasions, 
many applications submitted to the DFSCA were registered with the same phone number, since 
some of the women we helped did not possess one of their own. However, as I explore further in 
the next section, when, without warning, the DFSCA stopped issuing re-materialized new ration 
cards and relied instead on people accessing digital e-ration cards from the Food Security Portal, 
the mobile phone number, and the skills required to manipulate it, became crucial for Prithvi, 
Sita, Neelam, and other women in their efforts to access their entitlements.
5.4 Phones as a Technology of Identification
When Chatterjee theorizes on civil and political societies, he does so to explore how the
workings of governmentality create conditions that generate claims for entitlements for 
populations living on the margins of the rule of law (2004, 76). Chatterjee writes: 
To effectively direct those benefits toward them [members of the political society],
they  must  succeed  in  applying  the  right  pressure  at  the  right  places  in  the
governmental machinery. This would frequently mean the bending or stretching of
rules, because existing procedures have historically worked to exclude or marginalize
them. They must, therefore, succeed in mobilizing population groups to produce a
local political consensus that can effectively work against the distribution of power in
society as a whole. (2004, 66)
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Chatterjee's The Politics of the Governed (2004) constitutes a rather elegant attempt to reconcile 
techniques of government to improve the well-being of specific populations in postcolonial 
contexts with democratic ideals found in human rights. To do so, Chatterjee uses the binary 
distinction of civil society versus political society to explore:
a far more subtle process of the induction of ever increasing sections of the people,
individually as well as in the mass, into a web of power relations in which they are
being  transformed  into  the  subjects  of  power.  As  I  keep  saying,  they  are  not
necessarily  turning  into  republican  citizens,  but  they  are  nonetheless  acquiring  a
stake, strategically and morally, in the processes of governmental power. (2008, 93)
The binary distinction drawn between civil society and political society is rather productive for 
exploring the different modalities of subject formations and encounters in bureaucratic worlds. 
However, this binary distinction is not as clear cut as it may appear. As Baviskar and Sundar 
(2008) have rightly pointed out, law-abiding members of civil society do not hesitate to curb or 
stretch the rules for their own interests. Conversely, most members of so-called political society 
seek to assert their position as law-abiding citizens (see chapter four). While I contend that the 
categories of civil society and political society are analytically significant, I argue that in practice,
basti-dwellers tend to construct networks that transcend these categories for their own interests.
In providing entitlements to a collection of individual bodies that may be hungry, the 
NFSA is designed to generate mechanisms to improve the overall well-being of the population. 
But these mechanisms have little to no chance of having any impact on the population if 
individual bodies are incapable of getting a hold of ration cards, which facilitate—among other 
things—the collection of food entitlements. I argue that the formation of networks that enable 
access to ration cards is carefully established. In the era of neoliberal governmentality, the 
deployment of food welfare relies on a collection of state and non-state actors (human and 
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nonhuman) distributed according to the circulation of governmental power. In this section, I 
examine phones as a technology of identification that mediates the circulation of this power (see 
Hull 2012b).
Due to their ubiquity around the world, cell phones have increasingly been on the radar 
of anthropologists who have begun to address how these devices shape and are shaped by social, 
economic, and political worlds (Alexandrakis 2013; Hobbis 2017). Drawn from a rich 
ethnography in Jamaica, Heather A. Horst and Daniel Miller explore (2006) the relationship of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) and poverty alleviation in the Global South. 
Horst and Miller question the assumption (shared by Indian planners and bureaucrats) that the 
cell phone has been a “key technology for helping the world’s poor move out of poverty” (2006, 
3). Horst and Miller seek to enrich that rather deterministic assumption, using thick ethnographic 
research to illustrate how communication and connectivity, mediated via ICTs, generate 
economic opportunities (or income) through social networking and connections rather than work 
or entreneurship. Connectivity, they argue, goes well beyond the cell phone as a functional object 
of poverty alleviation; it reconfigures social and economic lives. But what happens when ICTs, in
and of themselves, hinder that social connectivity? What happens when people must use ICTs to 
access welfare entitlements, but are incapable of doing so? When users cannot decipher the sole 
technology designed to facilitate their access to the TPDS, or to their ration cards, do ICTs 
become a liability rather than a facilitator of poverty alleviation? 
The aadhaar card (or UID technology) and the ration card both rely on mobile phone 
numbers as a technology of identity and work in a similar fashion. As a way to increase 
accountability and transparency, governmental authorities have rendered these identification 
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documents available online. When an ID application is approved by the appropriate governmental
authority (either UIDAI for the UID number or DFSCA for the ration card), an account is created,
through which the cardholder may log into her own dashboard to access and modify certain 
information (for example, to correct errors in her name or change her phone number). More 
importantly, the cards are deliberately made available for download to be printed later. To access 
the approved pieces of identification, however, the user has to input her own phone number as a 
security measure, following which an SMS (short message service) is sent to her, containing a 
numeric one-time password (OTP) that must be entered on the web portal. This is a rather well 
known and widespread security measure, used across the world and web interfaces to protect 
important information online from hacking and theft. 
For Prithvi and many others, however, these series of interactions with a computer and 
a mobile phone require intellectual gymnastics, since they cannot decipher the OTP presented to 
them on their phones, let alone navigate the Internet, find the page to access their dashboards, 
read the instructions on the DFSCA (or UIDAI) portal, and write down the required information. 
Facing these barriers, Prithvi did not go to one of several Internet cafés in her neighbourhood to 
access and print her card electronically. Instead, like Alka in Chapter One, Sati in this chapter, 
and everybody else in the basti, she waited for the mail carrier to deliver her new ration card or 
her aadhaar card. When she did not receive either, she did not know whether her application had 
been denied, her card had gotten lost in the mail, or her card was simply being stored at a 
governmental office, waiting to be delivered.
Prithvi’s ration card never came. In the weeks following our visit to the DFSCA field 
office, the DFSCA stopped distributing the re-materialized ration cards altogether, in order to 
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entice approved cardholders to download and print their ration cards from the Food Security 
Portal. By pushing the end-to-end computerization of the TPDS onto the everyday practices of 
political society, the government was clearly shedding some of the operation costs of its system 
and, in doing so, relegating the responsibility of accessing cards to the targeted population. It did 
so on its own terms, without acknowledging, or at least without attempting to alleviate, the 
pitfalls inherent in the process of accessing digitized ration cards—the e-ration card—for a 
population battling illiteracy and e-illiteracy. For instance, Prithvi, who had to seek help from the 
pradhan to use her phone because she could not read numbers, was evidently not able to retrieve 
her ration card from the DFSCA portal by herself. By compelling users to download the e-ration 
card, the DFSCA has created a political space in which it is incumbent on the individual to 
deploy mundane tactics to access the bureaucratic world and, ultimately, their entitlements. Here, 
I do not wish to argue that the DFSCA has purposefully re-materialized ration cards to exclude 
large sections of the targeted population from accessing the TPDS as part of a larger objective to 
reinforce practices of accountability and transparency. But I want to emphasize that the 
government has not adequately considered the conditions of illiteracy and e-illiteracy in which 
many ration card applicants find themselves—conditions that pose major barriers to the 
acquisition of ration cards. As I have tried to show, the bureaucratic state has relied on informal 
mechanisms and instruments of government that differentially impact members of civil society 
and political society and inadvertently work to create barriers for targeted no-persons.
On a hot morning of June, on which the asphalt was melting on the roads of the NCT, I 
received an SMS from Prithvi and Sita’s pradhan, Govind. He was concerned that I had given a 
fake ration card to Sita. She had tried to draw rations with the card I had printed for her, but the 
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FPS owner had refused to sell her rations. Concerned, Govind texted me, politely asking if I had 
fabricated Sita's ration card, to which I proudly replied: “Mein rashan card bana sakta houn! [I 
can make ration cards!]” 
Just a few days before, I had indeed printed Sita's e-ration card from a computer ki 
dukaan (Internet café) close to my home. A few weeks after we had visited the DFSCA office 
together, I had sat with Sita and logged on to the Food Security Portal on my phone, only to 
realize that the DFSCA had already approved Sita’s application (and all the other women’s 
applications). However, three months later, Sita’s re-materialized ration card had still not reached 
her by mail. Once we discovered that the DFSCA had stopped delivering the plastic ration cards 
and that nobody in the basti would ever receive their cards by mail, I had suggested to Sita that 
we use the Food Security Portal to download and print her ration card electronically. I had 
brought my bulky laptop to the basti and downloaded Sita’s card using her information. On my 
way back home, I had printed the card in black and white at an Internet café. The following day, I
had given Sita the piece of paper on which her fresh e-ration card had been printed. She had tried 
to use it at her FPS. The owner had recorded Sita’s card and taken her fingerprints in his 
registry.163 He had then informed her that it would take two additional months for her entitlements
to reach the FPS—a lie, since Sita’s entitlements had been approved for three months already and
were already being delivered to the ration shop. The FPS owner asked her to come back with a 
genuine plastic ration card. 
Once back in the basti, Sita had complained to the pradhan, who had decided to take 
matters into his own hands. We met later that day, under a peepal tree (Ficus Religiosa), where 
163 The FPS owner did not partake in the pilot project mentioned in Chapter Four.
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meetings of all sort typically took place in the basti, on the front step of the mandir (temple). I 
had until then maintained a fairly good relation with Govind. Yet, in printing a ration card, I came
to realize that I had overstepped a boundary. 
I had met the pradhan at the beginning of my fieldwork through our common friend 
Kareem, who regularly visited Govind to consult with him on a wide range of issues that affected
the basti. The pradhan had been generous enough to introduce me to the basti residents, with 
whom I had spent countless hours during the months that followed. Generally speaking, the 
pradhan had affably taken time to answer the most basic questions that I had about the everyday 
lives of the basti’s people and the history of the settlement. But that afternoon, he was not 
pleased. Bluntly, in his distinctive soft voice, he explained that I should refrain from printing any 
other ration card ever again:
We shouldn't hand-feed them [the residents of the basti]. If we do this, they will never
become mature. Now, there are so many children. But people don't send children to
school. The parents send their kids to steal at dusk. They don't take care of them.
Their kids will become like the parents. So, first the parents should become mature.
Then the children will also become mature.
Govind never did explicitly demand that I stop printing ration cards. But he gently yet firmly 
insisted that procuring ration cards was part of his responsibilities as pradhan, along with 
informing his people about the different welfare programs and entitlements available to them. 
Like any other government authority, part of Govind’s political capital is drawn from 
his ability to secure welfare for his people. He was literate and had relations with members of 
civil society. He was well acquainted with the defeated Congress MLA of the area. He had built 
close relations with a number of social workers who regularly laboured in the basti on various 
issues, such as health, education, anganwadi, and subsidized food, including Kareem who was 
246
himself intricately embedded in a network of different NGOs, including the RTFC. Kareem was a
social activist with strong ties with basti-dwellers across Delhi. He organized surveys compiling 
data that could later be used by NGOs. He printed forms for basti-dwellers so that they could 
apply for various IDs and other entitlements, like the aadhaar card, the ration card, or the voter 
ID card. He established liaisons with human rights lawyers when someone stumbled into a legal 
problem. More importantly, Kareem spent time with basti-dwellers, attended political meetings, 
shared chai, and did not hesitate to dine with them whenever the opportunity arose. In other 
words, Kareem occupied a prime position of liaison between members of political society and 
civil society.
It would be ill advised for me to argue that the pradhan convinced me to stop printing 
ration cards in order to maintain his political clout in the community. Govind had been selected as
pradhan eight years before I first walked into the basti, at a moment when nobody else had 
sought to take the position. In the past, he had convened the residents to let them know of his 
intentions to let someone else lead the basti. But he had faced opposition from them, to the point 
where they had agreed, according to him, to pay him a rent of ₹ 7,000 per month to do the job. He
told me:
No one wants to take it. That is the matter. But I want to leave it. I have done several
meetings so that someone else become the pradhan. I do not want to do it. Because
now my children are of marriageable age. Now I want to work for a couple of years
and then rely on them.
In addition to disseminating information regarding governmental programs and services, he had 
worked to improve the area. Financed by the Congress MLA, a mandir was constructed around 
the peepal tree. Govind had arranged for the “ground to become pakka (solid),” or resurfaced 
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with asphalt, which helped to drain excess water and trash away from the jhuggi, an act for which
he was sent to the Tihar Jail for six months on the accusation of having usurped government land.
Govind was thus happy about my presence in the basti, since it alleviated some of his tasks and 
responsibilities as pradhan. He let me be and do whatever I wanted, as long as it did not add to 
his charges. But when Sati had complained to the pradhan about her allegedly dysfunctional e-
ration card, it was not just another chore the pradhan had to deal with; I had destabilized the 
network that fuelled his political capital. 
Govind’s position and responsibilities as pradhan were symptomatic of the workings of
the mechanics of the welfare state in a context of neoliberal governmentality. Among the chief 
criticism directed at neoliberalism since the 1980s, the reconfiguration of welfare services and 
goods for the population and thus the redistribution of responsibilities to secure those welfare 
services and goods among state and non-state actors certainly figure at the top. In this process of 
reconfiguration, some of the welfare responsibilities forsaken by the state have been picked up by
the NGO sector (Sharma 2006, 2013), thus triggering the formation of new networks exogenous 
to the bureaucratic world to ensure that welfare works. Locally, this has often resulted in the 
establishment of close connections between the NGO sector and the political leaders of the basti 
and other settlements.
A few days later, over a cup of milky chai shared with Govind and both of his wives, I 
gave him the remaining forms I had printed for the basti-dwellers, so that he would have some 
handy. But he did not want them: 
Kareemji wants me to remain pradhan. . . . Now look here, there are staplers, pens,
fevicol, I get troubled buying it all. . . . There are many staplers here that work. But
the people here have become so lazy. I want to push them forward a little because I
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want to leave this position of pradhan. But I am not able to leave it.
The pradhan knew how to read and write. And he assured me that he helped his people to 
complete their application forms. But he insisted on the importance of letting the applicants 
navigate the city and the bureaucratic world on their own. For Govind, the job of a pradhan, or of
any NGO worker trying to help basti-dwellers, consisted in educating them about the 
mechanisms of the bureaucracy—that “in addition to helping, we should make them aware (help 
ke sat, jaagarouk bhi kerenge).” Making them aware also surely means not venturing into the 
bureaucratic world for them—hand-feeding them, in other words—so that they, themselves, can 
manage to overcome the maze of bureaucratic practices one has to undertake to access one’s own 
entitlements, a perspective that has gained a lot of traction in the development literature (see 
Ansell 2014).
In doing so, however, Govind sustained the informal network of social and NGO 
workers—active members of civil society—that mediated the interactions between the 
government and so-called political society. Since instruments deployed by the bureaucratic 
government to access entitlements were so alien to Prithvi, Sita, and the other women that I 
encountered throughout my fieldwork, some sort of mediation was mandatory; otherwise, a large 
segment of the population simply would give up on getting ration cards or aadhaar cards. What 
is more, at every step of the way, acts of mediation to help residents access welfare services or 
entitlements generate political capital—either for the graduate student who seeks to gain access to
a field site, for the NGO worker, or for the pradhan. Without the intervention of the pradhan or 
Kareem, one could certainly question how a no-person may find required information on welfare 
services, practical knowledge to fill out forms, or the political clout to face the arbitrary power of 
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the bureaucratic government. In such cases, bribes then become the only remaining solution for 
basti-dwellers—and perhaps the most effective mediator for accessing welfare services swiftly 
(Gupta 2005; Srivastava 2012), including a re-materialized ration card.164 
5.5 Concluding Remarks
During my last week in Delhi, I accompanied Prithvi to the FPS. By then, her ration 
card had been approved for six months. During the summer, Kareem had managed to print an e-
ration card for her. She had then tried to use it at the FPS, but the owner had informed her, just 
like he had with Sita, that she would be able to draw rations from the FPS only after a two-month 
delay had passed after registering her card with him. There we were, then, two months later, 
following Prithvi, who led us straight to the FPS, manoeuvring through the crowded streets of 
Chandni Chowk. Once we reached the FPS, we stayed behind, leaving Prithvi by herself with the 
owner. After she handed over her e-ration card, printed in colour on a A4 piece of white paper, it 
took only a minute for the FPS owner to refuse to give Prithvi her entitlements, pleading that he 
had not received her food grains yet. She waved at us, and this time, I let Ritesh take the lead. He 
impersonated an NGO worker; he told the owner that he had connections with bureaucrats at the 
DFSCA, that the FPS owner was embezzling Prithvi’s rations, and that he would most certainly 
file a complaint with the government. Meanwhile, I took a picture of the FPS to record the name 
of the FPS owner and the shop’s number, which all FPSs must display. We left as promptly as we 
had arrived, with Prithvi once again taking the lead. Two blocks further, the FPS owner caught up
with us on a scooter. Alarmed, he exhorted us to come back to the FPS. He told us that he had 
164 About corruption in the exercise of bureaucratic practices, Govind was adamant:
All this corruption starts and ends in Delhi. Its roots are here. Whatever work we have to do, we have to pay 
bribe of ₹ 50 or ₹ 100 for the ration card or the voter ID card. When you go to submit form, then you also have 
to pay. If you pay, you get it easily. Otherwise, they give us a hard time.
250
made a mistake, that he had Prithvi’s 5 kg of food grains in his ration shop, and he apologized for
the misunderstanding. Ritesh silently acquiesced. Prithvi reassured him that if he distributed the 
entitlements to ration card holders, we would have no reason to denounce him to the DFSCA. In 
the end, Prithvi decided to head back to the FPS to collect her entitlements for the first time: 4 kg 
of wheat and 1 kg of rice.
Albeit anecdotal, this vignette illustrates well how members of so-called political 
society are subjected to random, arbitrary practices that hamper their access to entitlements. To 
mediate their access to welfare, to navigate the bureaucratic world, members of so-called political
society are most successful when they construct an association of humans and things that enables 
them to reach what should otherwise be theirs in the first place. This is especially true in the era 
of neoliberal governmentality, in which these networks are partially shaped as a response from 
the increased presence of non-state actors in the delivery of entitlements and the resilience of 
basti-dwellers, who do not hesitate to build on their socialities to mediate their way in the 
bureaucratic world.
In describing the challenges that Prithvi, Sita, and other women face when trying to get 
ration cards, I have analyzed the unintended consequences that the use of new devices can have 
in the context of government interventions. I have shown that the digitization of many forms of 
identification, designed to curb practices of patronage and to plug leakages from the TPDS, has 
indeed reproduced patterns of endemic exclusion from welfare entitlements—what Gupta (2012) 
calls the production of arbitrariness. More to the point, I have described how bureaucratic 
instruments of welfare distribution, such as the application form, the cell phone, the computer, 
and the digital e-ration card, are deployed to shape interactions between segments of the 
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population and the state, with a blunt and desensitized disregard for the ways in which the 
targeted population engage with these instruments. Left to themselves to navigate these 
bureaucratic devices—sites of government rationality—targeted population members have little 
choice but to build a network of humans and things to help negotiate their access to what is 
otherwise discursively constructed as their rightful entitlements.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
One of the key provisions of accountability in the National Food Security Act (NFSA) 
is the constitution of grievance-redressal mechanisms designed to help members of the 
population voice claims regarding their right to food entitlement. These mechanisms include call 
centres, help lines, the nomination of district grievance-redressal officers, and the formation of 
State Food Commissions. The NFSA has mandated these techniques of government to oversee 
the implementation of the Act, to attend to complaints made by users of the Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TPDS), and to monitor the entire infrastructure of rationing. In Delhi, in 
addition to a sporadic help line, vigilance committees have been allegedly chaired by a member 
of the legislative assembly and constituted by a food and supplies officer (FSO) and ration card 
holders nominated by a senior bureaucrat. In February 2014, the Department of Food, Supplies, 
and Consumer Affairs (DFSCA) of Delhi issued an order to institute a vigilance committee in 
each of the 70 circles of the National Capital Territory (NCT). But to my knowledge, none of 
these 70 vigilance committees were functional during my fieldwork, which ended in October 
2015, and they remain largely fictitious outside of the plans of the Delhi government.
Although the mechanisms of accountability set up in Delhi remained largely 
dysfunctional two years after the ratification of the NFSA, techniques of government deployed to 
render bureaucratic practices transparent were on the other hand almost fully operational. The 
purpose of digitization was to allow the government to closely monitor and to publicly display 
the circulation of food grains along the TPDS infrastructure. Experts and planners have assumed 
that by tracking subsidized grain along this network, the government would be in a better position
to contain practices of patronage and corruption—and to finally plug leakages from the TPDS 
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that have been said to cripple the infrastructure of rationing since the 1980s (see Planning 
Commission 2005). The DFSCA of Delhi set up a Food Security Portal—accessible to all who 
have the literacy and ability to access the Internet—to track the movement of food grains across 
the NCT. Every month, the portal publishes the quantity of food grains in transit from godowns to
more than 2,100 Fair Price Shops (FPSs)165 and seven millions ration card holders across the 
capital. Month after month, since 2014, the portal has shown that 100% of the food grains have 
reached the FPSs. This is rather puzzling, since I have encountered during my fieldwork a 
substantial number of ration card holders who have been unable to draw their entitlements at their
respective FPSs.
While different methods for tracking subsidized grains have been developed, the most 
contentious is certainly the use of unique identification numbers (UIDs). The UID is a technology
developed by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) at the beginning of 2009 as a 
“fix” for practices of corruption, inefficiencies, and leakages. Printed on the aadhaar card, the 
UID is a 12-digit number issued to individual Indians. Initially, this technology was designed to 
empower individual bodies—who typically access IDs with difficulty and thus have no identity in
the eyes of the government—to use biometrics to authenticate their identity across state borders. 
In and of itself, the aadhaar card does not have any use for its holder except to authenticate their 
identity. However, since its deployment, the aadhaar card has increasingly become a prerequisite 
object that an individual must have in order to access a range of government services, including 
entitlements distributed through the TPDS.
Enrolment in the UID program is voluntary. To access a UID number, applicants must 
165 As of August 2018, there are 2145 FPSs in Delhi.
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submit fingerprints and retina metrics. These biometrics are stored in UIDAI servers, along with 
socio-economic information about applicants, which is cross-checked by other governmental 
agencies providing services (Ramanathan 2011). This process helps to ensure that no more than a 
single UID number is attributed to any given citizen, thus facilitating the governmental task of 
monitoring the circulation of people and the delivery of entitlements across the country.
In the context of a digitized TPDS, the UID technology has been compounded to a re-
materialized ration card to exert bureaucratic control over the issuing of rations. While UID 
numbers are allocated to individual bodies, ration cards are distributed to household units. Under 
the NFSA, 5 kg of food grains are allocated to each person that has been granted a UID number. 
To ensure that every kilogram of food grains remains within the confines of the rationing 
infrastructure—which is to say that it is not leaked outside of the TPDS—every member of a 
household must be registered to a UID number associated with the household’s ration card. By 
compounding individual UID numbers with household ration cards, the government intended to 
better monitor the economy of rationing documents. The use of the compound ration card/UID, it 
was thought, would curb practices of corruption and eradicate the economy of bogus ration cards,
thereby seemingly improving the overall efficiency of the TPDS (and thus obliquely raise levels 
of food security in the country). 
This re-materialization of the ration card was envisaged for some time. In 2005, a study
published by the Planning Commission suggested that the issuing of new ration cards should be 
used as a strategy to counter the diversion of subsidized food grains to the black market.166 With 
166 One of the recommendations of the study commissioned by the Planning Commission is that:
New cards could be issued to eliminate the bogus cards, which were in circulation. If the cards had been issued 
in the recent past, instead of fresh issue, the existing ones for the identified BPL [below-the-poverty-line] 
families could be appropriately stamped and be affixed with the photographs of the heads of the families. 
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the formulation of the NFSA eight years later, the re-materialized ration card became a central 
instrument deployed to eliminate leakages of food grains. In the blueprint for implementing a 
right to food entitlement, each FPS would be equipped with a device for reading the fingerprints 
of UID number/ration card holders, enabling operators to compute every transaction at the FPS. 
This set of devices helped to exert bureaucratic command over rationing practices that had been 
previously out of reach of government surveillance; however, as I showed in the last chapters, it 
also re-arranged dynamics of exclusions from rightful entitlements. As legal researcher Usha 
Ramanathan reminds us: 
Technology  and  machine  can  .  .  .  seem  relatively  incorruptible.  The  potential
intrusiveness  of technology is  shielded by the extent  to  which the temptations  of
technology  have  upended  ideas  of  privacy,  confidentiality,  personal  security  and
fraud. This seems to have prepared the ground for a technology fix. (2011)
In the design of the NFSA, planners and experts engineered the UID as an incorruptible 
technology—one that could translate normative claims of good governance into technocratic 
bureaucratic practices. This “technology fix” echoed a new rationality of government—one that 
is obsessed with eliminating corruption. Informed by human rights discourses, the ration card 
became the quintessential instrument for transposing the objectives of good governance into 
rationing practices. However, instead of instituting functioning mechanisms of accountability to 
ensure that the targeted beneficiaries of the TPDS would be in a position to scrutinize officials’ 
actions and demand compensation if needed, the UID technology added another layer of 
bureaucratic administration that multiplies the risk of exclusion from the TPDS. 
Soon after the NFSA was enacted, several members of the RTFC unanimously 
expressed discontent with the UID technology. In 2015, to provide a forum to TPDS stakeholders
(Planning Commission 2005, 5)
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to voice their concerns, the Delhi faction of the RTFC, Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan 
(DRRAA), organized a public hearing on the implementation of the NFSA in the NCT. Much like
the jan sunwai set up by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) two decades ago, the 
DRRAA convened bureaucratic officials to hear the grievances of activists and stakeholders of 
the NFSA. On a humid day in September, more than 200 people from all parts of Delhi were 
seated under large fans rotating from the ceiling of the Gandhi Peace Foundation in South Delhi. 
Lined up on a stage in front of them, a panel sat quietly under a large portrait of the Mahatma 
Gandhi. This panel included, among others, Special Commissioner to the Supreme Court Harsh 
Mander, Assistant to the Commissioners Biraj Patnaik, human rights lawyer Usha Ramanathan, 
petitioner for the right-to-food case Kavita Srivastava, founder of MKSS and activist for the 
National Campaign for People’s Right to Information Nikhil Dey, and right-to-information and 
right-to-food activist Anjali Bhardwaj. 
In the morning, at the beginning of the event, a series of assistant commissioners from 
the DFSCA entered the room to take their seats in front of the crowd, on the floor right next to the
stage. These bureaucrats were, in fact, the much-awaited audience. The event could finally begin. 
Throughout the day, women took the microphone, one after the other, to share their struggles with
the computerized TPDS. Forum participants raised several issues, but the one that perhaps best 
deserves attention here is how the bureaucratic uses of UID numbers have excluded potential 
users from the TPDS. Throughout the day, women described the challenges they had faced in 
getting a hold of ration cards. For instance, a widow living in a basti in South Delhi revealed that 
she had lost her old below-the-poverty-line (BPL) ration card in the overhaul of the TPDS 
because none of her family members had a UID number when someone from an NGO visited her 
257
basti to complete her ration card application. Another woman, also residing in an informal 
settlement of South Delhi, made the plea that less than half of her family of nine had a UID 
number at the time she applied for a ration card, leaving them with 20 kg of rations every month, 
rather than 45 kg. 
Exasperated, Dey, a leading figure of civil society, summed up the concerns raised. 
Standing on the stage and turning towards the assistant commissioners, he said:
Your entire structure depends on a machine system, and it is a big problem. You are
getting to know who is  getting rations,  but you don't  know who is  not getting it
because of UID. You are getting to know who [should be] getting their rations, but
people across India are putting their thumb on [a machine] and they are not getting
rations. There is no information available for [people not getting their rations]. We are
tired of these machines. These machines might be helpful for you, but we are sick of
these machines, and that is why we are fighting against them. And, now the Supreme
Court has also said that it is not required. So we beg you to please [stop using them],
having seen how difficult the machines [make it for] the people who face problems.
Dey alluded to a recent Supreme Court judgment that had concluded that the government may 
use the UID system in the deployment of welfare services, as long as its uses were not 
mandatory (see Chapter Five). Since it was impossible to receive a ration card without a UID 
number, Dey, along with other members of the RTFC, affirmed that the current compounding of 
ration cards with UID numbers ran counter to the Supreme Court order. Dey continued:
please don't exclude us. That is why we say to make [the TPDS] universal. This Delhi
government talks about electricity and water, but I think food and pension are equally
important.  Please  do  this.  And  the  third  point  is  about  transparency  and
accountability.  This government  talks a lot  about it,  but it  is  just  not possible by
[using only] machines. It should be at every point. And action must be taken on those
officers who do not take action on complains filed by us.
When Dey sat down, the audience clapped loudly. For 15 years since the early 2000s, a fair 
majority of the RTFC’s members had repeatedly called for the abolition of the targeted system 
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that systematically excludes rightful beneficiaries from the infrastructure of rationing. In 
response, the new digital infrastructure was deployed to closely monitor the exchange of 
entitlements between FPS owners and ration card holders, but very little attention was paid to 
officials and other actors who were involved in a number of bureaucratic practices in the 
distribution of rations. The TPDS coverage mandated under the NFSA was perhaps more 
comprehensive, but it was accompanied by mechanisms designed to eliminate localized practices 
of corruption in TPDS without addressing other practices of patronage and corruption happening 
outside the confines of FPSs.
In reply to Dey, an assistant commissioner took the floor and said:
I will respond on all these points, one by one. [Firstly,] some people are not aware
that [the UID] system exists. We need to share this with the people who are not aware
about it so that we [the Delhi government] can perform better. Secondly, this is not an
ideal situation, but the government takes decisions after looking at its finances. The
third point, that you talked about UID and Supreme Court, we are not insisting on it,
but the Supreme Court also acknowledged that [we can use it].  From the last 40
years, we have also seen that this PDS system is very corrupt and the only possible
solution that we could see is technology. If you know other better system then the
government can adopt that as well. . . . There might be cases that there are issues in
implementation  and  that  is  why  we  want  your  cooperation.  If  you  have  better
suggestions or better ideas, we are trying to adopt them.
Arguably, one could not blame the assistant commissioner for seeking help from the audience and
members of the DRRAA. He laid a situation down before them that Merry has perhaps best 
illustrated: human rights activists are “restricted by the discursive field within which they work” 
(2006, 48). While activists and intellectuals have actively helped to echo discourses of good 
governance in making claims about the needs of the population—via campaigns for the right to 
information, the right to work, and the right to food in India—the political claims of need 
interpretation have been overcast by the technocratic nature of governmental mechanisms that, 
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due to their opacity and convoluted processes, reproduce systemic exclusions from welfare (see 
Gupta 2012). The government chose to deploy the UID technology as a panopticonic instrument 
to plug leakages from the TPDS and track the circulation of food grains and bogus ration cards, 
using technocratic strategies to enforce measures of accountability and transparency. However, in
doing so, the state framed practices of corruption and patronage as falling outside of the realm of 
bureaucratic activities. It is perhaps for this reason that the assistant commissioner welcomed 
suggestions to improve the TPDS, inasmuch such suggestions helped to reaffirm the use of the 
UID, rather than pleas for a universalization of the TPDS, an undertaking that was considered to 
be unrealistic, perhaps too ideologically driven, and certainly against the grain of a rationality of 
government that presupposes efficient governmental spending on welfare.
Negotiations between activists and government administrators reveal frictions in the 
implementation of practices of good governance. The right to food as framed by members of the 
RTFC has been proposed as a way to ensure that the Indian government fulfills its most basic 
responsibilities to improve the lives of its population. Since 2001, the RTFC has struggled to 
enshrine provisions for food security in the legal system, using instruments at their disposal, such 
as the Supreme Court’s interim orders and the para-public institutions of the NAC I and II, to 
leverage their claims into governmental action. Despite the Supreme Court’s judgement on the 
question, the government is positioning the UID technology as a catchall technology for ensuring 
bureaucratic transparency. However, while it directs closer scrutiny upon the ration card holder, 
the aadhaar technology turns a blind eye to practices that lead to leakages outside of the delivery 
of rations to cardholders. The UID fails to monitor the activity of state officials involved in the 
infrastructure of rationing. Plus, it contributes to the exclusion of potential beneficiaries of the 
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NFSA from the distribution of rations, which the UID also fails to capture. In the aftermath of the
NFSA, intrusive governmental scrutiny on ration card holders and their empowered bodies 
appears to have been granted greater priority over what is perhaps the most important normative 
claim made in the lead-up to the NFSA—that is, the government has a biopolitical duty to 
alleviate experiences of chronic hunger across the country.
*****
In the introduction, when I set up the premise of my ethnography, I cited Harsh 
Mander, one of the engineers of the NFSA. Mander’s argument stipulates that rights-based 
legislation embodies a sort of transformative power that changes passive benevolent people into 
active agents, or what I have referred as individual empowered bodies. As I close this 
dissertation, I draw on another quote from his book Ash in the Belly, which was published just a 
year before the enactment of the NFSA. Mander writes:
A rights-based legislation requires robust and reliable systems of enforcement and
accountability  through institutions  that  are  credible  and independent.  At  the  same
time, it is important to recognize that very often less literate and impoverished groups
unfamiliar  with government  working are  at  a  disadvantage  when it  comes to  the
recording of complaints in any grievance-redressal system. (2012, 285)
Noting that previous human rights legislation has depended on the enforcement of accountability 
and transparency measures for its realization or full implementation, Mander suggests that 
without strong mechanisms of good governance, the right to food entitlement would have mixed 
results. This is, however, the nature of human rights legislation. As Mark Goodale summarizes: 
“the idea of human rights must be legislated, legally recognized, and codified before it can be 
taken seriously as part of the law of nations” (2006a, 6; emphasis added). Therefore, the 
transposition of normative codes into systematically arranged and implemented mechanisms is 
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critically important for the enactment of human rights legislation. However, if those mechanisms 
are not taken seriously by the Indian population, then there is little sense in legalizing the matter 
in the first place. Given the Indian experience of patronage in the delivery of governmental 
services and goods (Sainath 1996), the establishment of grievance-redressal mechanisms may 
help to give some credence to these human rights laws. As I mentioned above, however, most of 
these grievance-redressal mechanisms have remained poorly implemented or totally 
dysfunctional (at least in Delhi, where I conducted my fieldwork).
While members of civil society formulated a grievance-redressal system in the text of 
the law as a measure to audit bureaucratic practices, the state has emphasized another avenue to 
render bureaucratic practices transparent in the implementation of the law. The digitization of the 
TPDS has played a central role in governmental interventions on the matter, and as such, it took a
prominent place in my fieldwork as well. On rights-based legislation in India, recent 
ethnographic research has shown that the manufacture of paperwork required to make the state 
accountable and transparent has ironically tended to render welfare practices and procedures 
rather opaque, formal, and unserviceable, instead of making these practices, and the bureaucratic 
worlds they engender, more accessible (cf. Mathur 2012; cf. Sharma 2013). Here, I have built on 
these insights. I have contended that in the aftermath of the NFSA, the overhaul of the TPDS has 
been couched in technocratic interventions that have not always well serviced the targeted 
population. 
In the first half of this dissertation, I provided an account of food security interventions 
in India that have been implemented since the Second World War in order to contextualize the 
formulation and the implementation of the NFSA. In Chapter Two, I examined the cultural 
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constitution of the TPDS. Rationing in India was a central feature of welfare under the Nehruvian
regime, which used rationing to channel food from rural to urban areas—where industries, 
conceived to be the engine of Indian development, were located—to feed workers. In 1966, under
Indira Gandhi’s rule, the Indian nation-state re-articulated its food policies as a field of 
interventions used to eradicate poverty. The infrastructure of rationing expanded over ensuing 
decades. This, however, came at a cost. In the 1990s, given the growing fiscal deficit, apologists 
for neoliberal reforms pleaded for a scaling down of the public distribution system, with the aim 
of transforming it into an efficient welfare program that would distribute resources to the most 
deserving. Meanwhile, practices of corruption were reported to plague the TPDS (Sainath 1996).
As the new millennium dawned, waves of drought repeatedly hit the northern states of 
India, leaving millions of Indian households dealing with food scarcity. The Food Corporation of 
India (FCI), the Government of India, and state governments failed to prevent death from 
starvation. For more than a decade, human rights activists used democratic means to entice the 
state to adopt constitutional provisions to guarantee entitlements and to empower citizens. In 
Chapter Three, I investigated the multifaceted struggles leading up to the formulation of the right 
to food entitlement in the NFSA. I paid particular attention to the politics of need interpretation of
chronic hunger in the country, as well as to the sites of struggle in which meanings of good 
governance are contested. 
In the second part of this dissertation, I focused on the techno-politics of the right to 
food entitlement. More specifically, I ethnographically explored how instruments of government 
mediate discourses of good governance to render welfare practices transparent and accountable—
and how those instruments, in the process, have acted on association of humans and things. I 
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compared the old rationing cards to the new ones and analyzed how the UID technology 
compounded to those documents has radically transformed not only the materiality of the 
documents itself, but also their power over association. This ethnographic study led me to 
conclude that the UID technology exerts bureaucratic control over practices that had been 
otherwise difficult to rule, but as a result, it has acted on an association of humans and things in 
such a way as to generate or reproduce systematic exclusions from welfare services.
As I illustrated in Chapter Four, the ration card is a powerful document. In Chapter 
Five, I explored the strategies undertaken by ration card holders to obtain that documents. I 
covered a succession of instruments of government—the ration card application form, the 
aadhaar card, and the cell phone—which applicants must manipulate to access their right to food
entitlement. For a variety of structural reasons, applicants who are mostly female face challenges 
to successfully utilizing these instruments of government as they have been designed. Thus, these
women strategize, actively engaging with an association of humans and other things to overcome 
the challenges presented to them. It is not a small feat, but in the era of neoliberal 
governmentality, the construction of these networks is an integral part of governmental 
interventions. As I concluded in the last chapter, it became quite clear to me that the right to food 
entitlement in Delhi would simply not function without an informal distribution of actors able to 
help applicants navigate the Indian bureaucracy. To make people into active agents—to produce 
empowered bodies, in other words—is contingent on a myriad of actors, humans and things, and 
their ability to bridge the gap between what the NFSA attempts to do and what it actually 
accomplishes.
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